68 ideas
21634 | Metaphysics is (supposedly) first the ontology, then in general what things are like [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: Metaphysics can be divided into two parts: first ontology, which is supposed to tell us what there is in general. The second part is the rest of metaphysics, which is supposed to tell us what these things are like, in various general ways. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 01.1) | |
A reaction: Hofweber is a fairly sceptical guide to metaphysics, but this has been the standard view for the last decade. Before that, Quine had set an agenda of mere ontology. |
21666 | 'Fundamentality' is either a superficial idea, or much too obscure [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: The dilemma of neo-Aristotelian metaphysics is that on an ordinary reading of prioriy, 'fundamentality' won't give the intended results, and on a metaphysical reading it turns into esoteric metaphysics. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 13.4.2) | |
A reaction: Hofweber is hostile to 'esoteric' metaphysics, but sympathetic to 'egalitarian' metaphysics, which anyone can understand (with a bit of effort). |
224 | When questions are doubtful we should concentrate not on objects but on ideas of the intellect [Plato] |
Full Idea: Doubtful questions should not be discussed in terms of visible objects or in relation to them, but only with reference to ideas conceived by the intellect. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 135e) |
232 | Opposites are as unlike as possible [Plato] |
Full Idea: Opposites are as unlike as possible. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 159a) |
8937 | Plato's 'Parmenides' is the greatest artistic achievement of the ancient dialectic [Hegel on Plato] |
Full Idea: Plato's 'Parmenides' is the greatest artistic achievement of the ancient dialectic. | |
From: comment on Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Georg W.F.Hegel - Phenomenology of Spirit Pref 71 | |
A reaction: It is a long way from the analytic tradition of philosophy to be singling out a classic text for its 'artistic' achievement. Eventually we may even look back on, say, Kripke's 'Naming and Necessity' and see it in that light. |
21640 | 'It's true that Fido is a dog' conjures up a contrast class, of 'it's false' or 'it's unlikely' [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: 'It's true that Fido is a dog' gives rise to a contrastive focus on 'true', with the contrast class probably depending on members like 'it's false that...' or 'it's unlikely that...'. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 02.6.3) | |
A reaction: If we introduce (from linguistics) the idea of a 'contrast class', then Ramsey's famous example begins to sound meaningful. It might occur in a discussion of 'did Antony actually say 'Friends, Romans. countrymen'?' |
21657 | Since properties can have properties, some theorists rank them in 'types' [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: Since properties themselves can have properties there is a well-known division in the theory of properties between those who take a typed and those who take a type-free approach. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 08.5) | |
A reaction: I take this idea to be about linguistic predicates, and about semantics which draws on model theory. To see it as about actual 'properties' in the physical world makes no sense. |
21653 | Maybe not even names are referential, but are just by used by speakers to refer [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: A more radical alternative which takes names not to be referring even in the broader sense, but only takes speakers to refer with uses of names. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 08.1) | |
A reaction: Given that you can make up nicknames and silly nonce names for people, this seems plausible. I may say a name in a crowded room and three people look up. |
21636 | 'Singular terms' are not found in modern linguistics, and are not the same as noun phrases [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: Being a 'singular term' is not a category in contemporary syntactic theory and it doesn't correspond to any of the notions employed there like that of a singular noun phrase or the like. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 02.3) | |
A reaction: Hofweber has researched such things. This is an important objection to the reliance of modern Fregeans on the ontological commitments of singular terms (as proof that there are 'mathematical objects'). |
21637 | If two processes are said to be identical, that doesn't make their terms refer to entities [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: Identity between objects occurs in 'How Mary makes a chocolate cake is identical to how my grandfather used to make it', but does this show that 'how Mary makes a chocolate cake' aims to pick out an entity? | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 02.3) | |
A reaction: This is a counterexample to the Fregean thought that the criterion for the existence of the referent of a singular term is its capacity to participate in an identity relation. Defenders of the Fregean view are aware of such examples. |
21643 | The inferential quantifier focuses on truth; the domain quantifier focuses on reality [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: When we ask 'is there a number?' in its inferential role (or internalist) reading, then we ask whether or not there is a true instance of 't is a number'. When we ask in its domain conditions (externalist) reading, we ask if the world contains a number. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 03.6) | |
A reaction: Hofweber's key distinction. The distinction between making truth prior and making reference prior is intriguing and important. The internalist version is close to substitutional quantification. Only the externalist view needs robust reference. |
13986 | Plato found antinomies in ideas, Kant in space and time, and Bradley in relations [Plato, by Ryle] |
Full Idea: Plato (in 'Parmenides') shows that the theory that 'Eide' are substances, and Kant that space and time are substances, and Bradley that relations are substances, all lead to aninomies. | |
From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Gilbert Ryle - Are there propositions? 'Objections' |
14150 | Plato's 'Parmenides' is perhaps the best collection of antinomies ever made [Russell on Plato] |
Full Idea: Plato's 'Parmenides' is perhaps the best collection of antinomies ever made. | |
From: comment on Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Bertrand Russell - The Principles of Mathematics §337 |
21644 | Numbers are used as singular terms, as adjectives, and as symbols [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: Number words have a singular term use, and adjectival (or determiner) use, and the symbolic use. The main question is how they relate to each other. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 05.1) | |
A reaction: Thus 'the number four is even', 'there are four moons', and '4 comes after 3'. |
21646 | The Amazonian Piraha language is said to have no number words [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: The now famous Piraha language, of the Amazon region in Brazil, allegedly has no number words. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 05.6) | |
A reaction: Two groups can be shown to be of equal cardinality, by one-to-one matching rather than by counting. They could get by using 'equals' (and maybe unequally bigger and unequally smaller), and intuitive feelings for sizes of groups. |
21665 | The fundamental theorem of arithmetic is that all numbers are composed uniquely of primes [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: The prime numbers are more fundamental than the even numbers, and than the composite non-prime numbers. The result that all numbers uniquely decompose into a product of prime numbers is called the 'Fundamental Theorem of Arithmetic'. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 13.4.2) | |
A reaction: I could have used this example in my thesis, which defended the view that essences are the fundamentals of explanation, even in abstract theoretical realms. |
21649 | How can words be used for counting if they are objects? [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: Number words as singular terms seem to refer to objects; numbers words in determiner or adjectival position are tied to counting. How these objects are related to counting is what the application problem is about. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 06.1.3) | |
A reaction: You can't use stones for counting, so there must be more to numbers than the announcement that they are 'objects'. They seem to have internal relations, which makes them unusual objects. |
16150 | One is, so numbers exist, so endless numbers exist, and each one must partake of being [Plato] |
Full Idea: If one is, there must also necessarily be number - Necessarily - But if there is number, there would be many, and an unlimited multitude of beings. ..So if all partakes of being, each part of number would also partake of it. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 144a) | |
A reaction: This seems to commit to numbers having being, then to too many numbers, and hence to too much being - but without backing down and wondering whether numbers had being after all. Aristotle disagreed. |
21647 | Logicism makes sense of our ability to know arithmetic just by thought [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: Frege's tying the objectivity of arithmetic to the objectivity of logic makes sense of the fact that can find out about arithmetic by thinking alone. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 06.1.1) | |
A reaction: This assumes that logic is entirely a priori. We might compare the geometry of land surfaces with 'pure' geometry. If numbers are independent objects, it is unclear how we could have any a priori knowledge of them. |
21648 | Neo-Fregeans are dazzled by a technical result, and ignore practicalities [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: A major flaw of the neo-Fregean program is that it is more impressed by the technical result that Peano Arithmetic can be interpreted by second-order logic plus Hume's Principle, than empirical considerations about how numbers come about. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 06.1.3) | |
A reaction: This doesn't sound like a problem that would bother Fregeans or neo-Fregeans much. Deriving the Peano Axioms from various beginnings has become a parlour game for modern philosophers of mathematics. |
229 | The one was and is and will be and was becoming and is becoming and will become [Plato] |
Full Idea: The one was and is and will be and was becoming and is becoming and will become. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 155d) | |
A reaction: This seems to be rhetorical, rather a precise theory, given that the One is said to be eternal and unchanging. The One is not just what we call 'reality'. |
21821 | Plato's Parmenides has a three-part theory, of Primal One, a One-Many, and a One-and-Many [Plato, by Plotinus] |
Full Idea: The Platonic Parmenides is more exact [than Parmenides himself]; the distinction is made between the Primal One, a strictly pure Unity, and a secondary One which is a One-Many, and a third which is a One-and-Many. | |
From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Plotinus - The Enneads 5.1.08 | |
A reaction: Plotinus approves of this three-part theory. Parmenides has the problem that the highest Being contains no movement. By placing the One outside Being you can give it powers which an existent thing cannot have. Cf the concept of God. |
21664 | Supervenience offers little explanation for things which necessarily go together [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: The results from the use of supervenience in philosophical theorising are limited. In particular, modal notions can't distinguish between things which necessarily go together. For example, that truths about numbers are grounded in truths about sets. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 13.4.1) | |
A reaction: [compressed] |
21660 | Reality can be seen as the totality of facts, or as the totality of things [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: Reality can be seen as everything that is the case - the totality of all facts that obtain - or reality can be seen as everything there is - the totality of all things that exist. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 10) | |
A reaction: Things are a lot easier to specify than facts, but on the whole I prefer facts, just in order to affirm that there is more to reality than the mere 'things' that compose it. Our ontology must capture the dynamic and relational character of reality. |
221 | Absolute ideas, such as the Good and the Beautiful, cannot be known by us [Plato] |
Full Idea: The absolute good and the beautiful and all which we conceive to be absolute ideas are unknown to us. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 134c) | |
A reaction: These seems to thoroughly pre-empt Plato's Theory of Forms a century before he created it. Which shows (as Simone Weil says) that Plato was just part of a long tradition. |
21661 | There are probably ineffable facts, systematically hidden from us [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: We do have reason to think that there are ineffable facts, and that these facts are systematically hidden from us. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 10.2.4) | |
A reaction: [Hofweber's Ch.10 is a lengthy and interesting discussion of ineffable facts] Things which are very very small, or very very remote in space seem obvious candidates. The most obvious candidates are tiny detail about the remote past. |
227 | You must always mean the same thing when you utter the same name [Plato] |
Full Idea: You must always mean the same thing when you utter the same name. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 147d) |
223 | If you deny that each thing always stays the same, you destroy the possibility of discussion [Plato] |
Full Idea: If a person denies that the idea of each thing is always the same, he will utterly destroy the power of carrying on discussion. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 135c) |
210 | It would be absurd to think there were abstract Forms for vile things like hair, mud and dirt [Plato] |
Full Idea: Are there abstract ideas for such things as hair, mud and dirt, which are particularly vile and worthless? That would be quite absurd. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 130d) |
219 | If absolute ideas existed in us, they would cease to be absolute [Plato] |
Full Idea: None of the absolute ideas exists in us, because then it would no longer be absolute. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 133c) |
228 | Greatness and smallness must exist, to be opposed to one another, and come into being in things [Plato] |
Full Idea: These two ideas, greatness and smallness, exist, do they not? For if they did not exist, they could not be opposites of one another, and could not come into being in things. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 149e) |
211 | If admirable things have Forms, maybe everything else does as well [Plato] |
Full Idea: It is troubling that if admirable things have abstract ideas, then perhaps everything else must have ideas as well. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 130d) |
220 | The concept of a master includes the concept of a slave [Plato] |
Full Idea: Mastership in the abstract is mastership of slavery in the abstract. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 133e) |
16151 | Plato moves from Forms to a theory of genera and principles in his later work [Plato, by Frede,M] |
Full Idea: It seems to me that Plato in the later dialogues, beginning with the second half of 'Parmenides', wants to substitute a theory of genera and theory of principles that constitute these genera for the earlier theory of forms. | |
From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Michael Frede - Title, Unity, Authenticity of the 'Categories' V | |
A reaction: My theory is that the later Plato came under the influence of the brilliant young Aristotle, and this idea is a symptom of it. The theory of 'principles' sounds like hylomorphism to me. |
212 | The whole idea of each Form must be found in each thing which participates in it [Plato] |
Full Idea: The whole idea of each form (of beauty, justice etc) must be found in each thing which participates in it. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 131a) |
213 | Each idea is in all its participants at once, just as daytime is a unity but in many separate places at once [Plato] |
Full Idea: Just as day is in many places at once, but not separated from itself, so each idea might be in all its participants at once. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 131b) |
215 | If things partake of ideas, this implies either that everything thinks, or that everything actually is thought [Plato] |
Full Idea: If all things partake of ideas, must either everything be made of thoughts and everything thinks, or everything is thought, and so can't think? | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 132c) |
216 | If things are made alike by participating in something, that thing will be the absolute idea [Plato] |
Full Idea: That by participation in which like things are made like, will be the absolute idea, will it not? | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 132e) |
218 | Participation is not by means of similarity, so we are looking for some other method of participation [Plato] |
Full Idea: Participation is not by means of likeness, so we must seek some other method of participation. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 133a) |
214 | If absolute greatness and great things are seen as the same, another thing appears which makes them seem great [Plato] |
Full Idea: If you regard the absolute great and the many great things in the same way, will not another appear beyond, by which all these must appear to be great? | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 132a) |
217 | Nothing can be like an absolute idea, because a third idea intervenes to make them alike (leading to a regress) [Plato] |
Full Idea: It is impossible for anything to be like an absolute idea, because a third idea will appear to make them alike, and if that is like anything, it will lead to another idea, and so on. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 133a) |
16980 | We need a logical use of 'object' as predicate-worthy, and an 'ontological' use [Strawson,P] |
Full Idea: There is a good case for a conservative reform of the word 'object'. Objects in the 'logical' sense would be all predicate-worthy identifiabilia whatever. Objects in the 'ontological' sense would form one ontological category among many others. | |
From: Peter F. Strawson (Entity and Identity [1978], I n4) | |
A reaction: This ambiguity has caused me no end of confusion (and irritation!). I wish philosophers wouldn't hijack perfectly good English words and give them weird meanings. Nice to have a distinguished fellow like Strawson make this suggestion. |
21652 | Our perceptual beliefs are about ordinary objects, not about simples arranged chair-wise [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: The belief that there are simples arranged chair-wise is not a perceptual belief. Our perceptual beliefs have a content about ordinary objects, not simples arranged chair-wise. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 07.3.1) | |
A reaction: Hofweber gives ontological priority to 'perceptual beliefs'. I'm inclined to agree, but I hear the critical hordes swarming against the gate. |
15851 | Parts must belong to a created thing with a distinct form [Plato] |
Full Idea: The part would not be the part of many things or all, but of some one character ['ideas'] and of some one thing, which we call a 'whole', since it has come to be one complete [perfected] thing composed [created] of all. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 157d) | |
A reaction: A serious shot by Plato at what identity is. Harte quotes it (125) and shows that 'character' is Gk 'idea', and 'composed' will translate as 'created'. 'Form' links this Platonic passage to Aristotle's hylomorphism. |
15846 | In Parmenides, if composition is identity, a whole is nothing more than its parts [Plato, by Harte,V] |
Full Idea: At the heart of the 'Parmenides' puzzles about composition is the thesis that composition is identity. Considered thus, a whole adds nothing to an ontology that already includes its parts | |
From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Verity Harte - Plato on Parts and Wholes 2.5 | |
A reaction: There has to be more to a unified identity that mere proximity of the parts. When do parts come together, and when do they actually 'compose' something? |
15849 | Plato says only a one has parts, and a many does not [Plato, by Harte,V] |
Full Idea: In 'Parmenides' it is argued that a part cannot be part of a many, but must be part of something one. | |
From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 157c) by Verity Harte - Plato on Parts and Wholes 3.2 | |
A reaction: This looks like the right way to go with the term 'part'. We presuppose a unity before we even talk of its parts, so we can't get into contradictions and paradoxes about their relationships. |
15850 | Anything which has parts must be one thing, and parts are of a one, not of a many [Plato] |
Full Idea: The whole of which the parts are parts must be one thing composed of many; for each of the parts must be part, not of a many, but of a whole. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 157c) | |
A reaction: This is a key move of metaphysics, and we should hang on to it. The other way madness lies. |
13259 | It seems that the One must be composed of parts, which contradicts its being one [Plato] |
Full Idea: The One must be composed of parts, both being a whole and having parts. So on both grounds the One would thus be many and not one. But it must be not many, but one. So if the One will be one, it will neither be a whole, nor have parts. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 137c09), quoted by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 5.2 | |
A reaction: This is the starting point for Plato's metaphysical discussion of objects. It seems to begin a line of thought which is completed by Aristotle, surmising that only an essential structure can bestow identity on a bunch of parts. |
16979 | It makes no sense to ask of some individual thing what it is that makes it that individual [Strawson,P] |
Full Idea: For no object is there a unique character or relation by which it must be identified if it is to be identified at all. This is why it makes no sense to ask, impersonally and in general, of some individual object what makes it the individual object it is. | |
From: Peter F. Strawson (Entity and Identity [1978], I) | |
A reaction: He links this remark with the claim that there is no individual essence, but he seems to view an individual essence as indispensable to recognition or individuation of the object, which I don't see. Recognise it first, work out its essence later. |
15847 | Two things relate either as same or different, or part of a whole, or the whole of the part [Plato] |
Full Idea: Everything is surely related to everything as follows: either it is the same or different; or, if it is not the same or different, it would be related as part to whole or as whole to part. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 146b) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as a really helpful first step in trying to analyse the nature of identity. Two things are either two or (actually) one, or related mereologically. |
21663 | Counterfactuals are essential for planning, and learning from mistakes [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: Counterfactuals are important for reasoning about the past and to plan for the future. If we want to learn from our mistakes, it is important to think about what would have happened if I had done things differently. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 13.4.1) | |
A reaction: A thought also found in Tim Williamson, but not the sort of thing you hear from Lewis or Stalnaker. It is a nice example of how highly abstract and theoretical problems need to be slotted into human psychology. |
21654 | The "Fido"-Fido theory of meaning says every expression in a language has a referent [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: The picture of language often called the "Fido"-Fido theory of meaning says every expression in natural languages refers; they simply differ in what they refer to. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 08.2) | |
A reaction: It seems obvious that at least there are syncategorematic terms like 'not' and 'or' and 'maybe' that are internal to language. I'm inclining to the opposite view of Paul Pietroski. Hofweber says if all words are names, they can't add up to truth. |
21641 | Inferential role semantics is an alternative to semantics that connects to the world [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: An inferential role semantics is generally seen as a large-scale alternative to a semantics based on reference and other language-world relations. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 03.4.5) | |
A reaction: Presumably the other obvious language-world relation is truth. Being a robust realist, I take it I have to be strongly committed to semantics which connects to the world - or do I? Reality is robust, but our talk about it is evasive? |
21638 | Syntactic form concerns the focus of the sentence, as well as the truth-conditions [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: Syntactic form is not only related to the truth conditions of a sentence; it is also related to what focus an utterance of a sentence will have. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 02.5.2) | |
A reaction: Hofweber has commendably studied some linguistics. The idea of mental and linguistic 'focus' increasingly strikes me as of importance in many areas of philosophy. E.g. in the scope of ethics, on whom should you focus? |
21658 | Properties can be expressed in a language despite the absence of a single word for them [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: Simply because there is no single word in a certain language for a certain property doesn't mean that it isn't expressible in that language. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 09.1.1) | |
A reaction: Good. For example a shade of blue for which there is no label might be 'the next darkest discriminable shade of blue adjacent to the one we are looking at'. And then the one after that... But 'tastes better than Diet Pepsi' in ancient Greek? |
21659 | 'Being taller than this' is a predicate which can express many different properties [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: It is said that not every property can be expressed because there are more properties than there are predicates. ...But the same predicate can be used to express many different properties: 'being taller than this' depends on what 'this' refers to. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 09.2) | |
A reaction: A good example, but being a comparative and relying on a demonstrative indexical makes it a favourable example. 'Being made of iron' doesn't have much scope for expressing many properties. |
21655 | Compositonality is a way to build up the truth-conditions of a sentence [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: Compositional semantics assigns semantic values to various expressions in order to generate the truth conditions of the sentences in which they can occur correctly, ...thus leading to the truth-conditions of the sentence. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 08.3) | |
A reaction: I favour both the compositional and the truth-conditional accounts of semantics, but I am not sure how to fit the pragmatic and contextual ingredient into that picture. You can't leave out psychology. |
21656 | Proposition have no content, because they are content [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: If there propositions then they do not have content, because they are content. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 08.4) | |
A reaction: This sounds right. A rather obvious regress threatens if you say otherwise. |
21635 | Without propositions there can be no beliefs or desires [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: If there are no propositions, then there are no contents, and thus there are no beliefs and desires. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 01.4.3) | |
A reaction: A simple but powerful point. Those who claim that there are only sentences (and no propositions) can hardly claim that you must formulate a sentence every time you have a specific belief or desire. |
21662 | Do there exist thoughts which we are incapable of thinking? [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: Might there be some thought token that has a different content than any such token we can in principle have? | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 10.3.3) | |
A reaction: For me the idea that a thought might exist which can never be thought is an absurdity, but people who believe in the external existence of parts of reality called 'propositions' seem committed to it. A baffling view. |
21645 | 'Semantic type coercion' is selecting the reading of a word to make the best sense [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: 'Semantic type coercion' is where an expression of variable type is forced to take a particular type on a particular occasion so that the sentence as a whole in which it occurse is semantically interpretable. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 05.4.4) | |
A reaction: He compares 'and' in 'John sang and Mary danced' with 'John and Mary danced together', where 'and' can vary in type, and we adopt the reading that makes sense. Hofweber says we do this with number language. He favours 'cognitive need'. |
21639 | 'Background deletion' is appropriately omitting background from an answer [Hofweber] |
Full Idea: 'Background deletion' is the pheomenon that what isn't focused in an answer, what is the background, can be left out of the answer, with the resulting sub-sentential answer nonetheless being appropriate. | |
From: Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 02.6.2) | |
A reaction: [I'm struck by the verbosity of this sentence, from an over-long book] It is not unreasonable to think that each conversational exchange has an implicit and agreed domain of quantification. Well, 'focus', then. |
222 | Only a great person can understand the essence of things, and an even greater person can teach it [Plato] |
Full Idea: Only a man of very great natural gifts will be able to understand that everything has a class and absolute essence, and an even more wonderful man can teach this. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 135a) |
225 | The unlimited has no shape and is endless [Plato] |
Full Idea: The unlimited partakes neither of the round nor of the straight, because it has no ends nor edges. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 137e) |
233 | Some things do not partake of the One [Plato] |
Full Idea: The others cannot partake of the one in any way; they can neither partake of it nor of the whole. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 159d) | |
A reaction: Compare Idea 231 |
2062 | The only movement possible for the One is in space or in alteration [Plato] |
Full Idea: If the One moves it either moves spatially or it is altered, since these are the only motions. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 138b) |
231 | Everything partakes of the One in some way [Plato] |
Full Idea: The others are not altogether deprived of the one, for they partake of it in some way. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 157c) | |
A reaction: Compare Idea 233. |
234 | We couldn't discuss the non-existence of the One without knowledge of it [Plato] |
Full Idea: There must be knowledge of the one, or else not even the meaning of the words 'if the one does not exist' would be known. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 160d) |