4 ideas
6981 | Determinism clashes with free will, as the past determines action, and is beyond our control [Inwagen, by Jackson] |
Full Idea: I find compelling Peter van Ingwagen's argument that because the past is outside our control, and any action fully determined by something outside our control is not free, determinism is inconsistent with free will. | |
From: report of Peter van Inwagen (An Essay on Free Will [1983]) by Frank Jackson - From Metaphysics to Ethics Ch.2 | |
A reaction: I am puzzled by anyone who even dreamt that full blown free will (very free indeed) could be compatible with the view that past events impose a necessity on future events. So called 'compatibilists' strike me as being determinists. |
22474 | Unlike aesthetic evaluation, moral evaluation needs a concept of responsibility [Foot] |
Full Idea: Moral, as opposed to aesthetic, evaluation does require some distinction between actions for which we are responsible and those for which we are not responsible. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Nietzsche's Immoralism [1991], p.154) | |
A reaction: It is hard to disagree with this, but difficult to give a precise account of responsibility, probably because it is not an all-or-nothing matter. If we accept responsibility for our controlled actions, why not for our considered aesthetic judgements? |
1590 | The just man does not harm his enemies, but benefits everyone [Plato] |
Full Idea: First, Socrates, you told me justice is harming your enemies and helping your friends. But later it seemed that the just man, since everything he does is for someone's benefit, never harms anyone. | |
From: Plato (Clitophon [c.372 BCE], 410b) | |
A reaction: Socrates certainly didn't subscribe to the first view, which is the traditional consensus in Greek culture. In general Socrates agreed with the views later promoted by Jesus. |
22472 | The practice of justice may well need a recognition of human equality [Foot] |
Full Idea: I wonder whether the practice of justice may not absolutely require a certain recognition of equality between human beings, not a pretence of the equality of talents, but something deeper. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Nietzsche's Immoralism [1991], p.152) | |
A reaction: {My 'something deeper' is expressed by Foot in a quotation from Gertrude Stein]. This may well be the most fundamental division which runs across a society - between those who accept and those reject human equality. |