59 ideas
162 | Can we understand an individual soul without knowing the soul in general? [Plato] |
Full Idea: Do you think it possible to form an adequate conception of the nature of an individual soul without considering the nature of soul in general? | |
From: Plato (Phaedrus [c.366 BCE], 270c) | |
A reaction: Do animals understand anything (as opposed to simply being aware of things)? |
160 | The highest ability in man is the ability to discuss unity and plurality in the nature of things [Plato] |
Full Idea: When I believe that I have found in anyone the ability to discuss unity and plurality as they exist in the nature of things, I follow his footsteps as if he was a god. | |
From: Plato (Phaedrus [c.366 BCE], 266b) | |
A reaction: This sounds like the problem of identity, which is at the heart of modern metaphysics. |
2056 | Philosophers are always switching direction to something more interesting [Plato] |
Full Idea: Philosophers are always ready to change direction, if a topic crops up which is more attractive than the one to hand. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 172d) | |
A reaction: Which sounds trivial, but it may be what God does. |
2086 | Understanding mainly involves knowing the elements, not their combinations [Plato] |
Full Idea: A perfect grasp of any subject depends far more on knowing elements than on knowing complexes. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 206b) |
166 | A speaker should be able to divide a subject, right down to the limits of divisibility [Plato] |
Full Idea: A speaker must be able to define a subject generically, and then to divide it into its various specific kinds until he reaches the limits of divisibility. | |
From: Plato (Phaedrus [c.366 BCE], 277b) |
2083 | Either a syllable is its letters (making parts as knowable as whole) or it isn't (meaning it has no parts) [Plato] |
Full Idea: Either a syllable is not the same as its letters, in which case it cannot have the letters as parts of itself, or it is the same as its letters, in which case these basic elements are just as knowable as it is. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 205b) |
2082 | A rational account is essentially a weaving together of things with names [Plato] |
Full Idea: Just as primary elements are woven together, so their names may be woven together to produce a spoken account, because an account is essentially a weaving together of names. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 202b) | |
A reaction: If justification requires 'logos', and logos is a 'weaving together of names', then Plato might be taken as endorsing the coherence account of justification. Or do the two 'weavings' correspond? |
2052 | Eristic discussion is aggressive, but dialectic aims to help one's companions in discussion [Plato] |
Full Idea: Eristic discussions involve as many tricks and traps as possible, but dialectical discussions involve being serious and correcting the interlocutor's mistakes only when they are his own fault or the result of past conditioning. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 167e) |
15854 | A primary element has only a name, and no logos, but complexes have an account, by weaving the names [Plato] |
Full Idea: A primary element cannot be expressed in an account; it can only be named, for a name is all that it has. But with the things composed of these ...just as the elements are woven together, so the names can woven to become an account. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 202b01-3) | |
A reaction: This is the beginning of what I see as Aristotle's metaphysics, as derived from his epistemology, that is, ontology is what explains, and what we can give an account [logos] of. Aristotle treats this under 'definitions'. |
10216 | We master arithmetic by knowing all the numbers in our soul [Plato] |
Full Idea: It must surely be true that a man who has completely mastered arithmetic knows all numbers? Because there are pieces of knowledge covering all numbers in his soul. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 198b) | |
A reaction: This clearly views numbers as objects. Expectation of knowing them all is a bit startling! They also appear to be innate in us, and hence they appear to be Forms. See Aristotle's comment in Idea 645. |
2060 | There seem to be two sorts of change: alteration and motion [Plato] |
Full Idea: There are two kinds of change, I think: alteration and motion. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 181d) |
7953 | Reasoning needs to cut nature accurately at the joints [Plato] |
Full Idea: In our reasoning we need a clear view of the ability to divide a genus into species, observing the natural joints, not mangling any of the parts, like an unskilful butcher. | |
From: Plato (Phaedrus [c.366 BCE], 265d) | |
A reaction: In modern times this Platonic idea has become the standard metaphor for realism. I endorse it. I think nature has joints, and we should hunt for them. There are natural sets. The joints may exist in abstract concepts, as well as in objects. |
16121 | I revere anyone who can discern a single thing that encompasses many things [Plato] |
Full Idea: If I believe that someone is capable of discerning a single thing that is also by nature capable of encompassing many, I follow 'straight behind, in his footsteps, as if he were a god'. | |
From: Plato (Phaedrus [c.366 BCE], 266b) | |
A reaction: [Plato quote Odyssey 2.406] This is the sort of simple but profound general observation which only the early philosophers bothered to make, and no one comments on now. Encompassing many under one is the very essence of thinking. |
153 | It takes a person to understand, by using universals, and by using reason to create a unity out of sense-impressions [Plato] |
Full Idea: It takes a man to understand by the use of universals, and to collect out of the multiplicity of sense-impressions a unity arrived at by a process of reason. | |
From: Plato (Phaedrus [c.366 BCE], 249b) |
154 | We would have an overpowering love of knowledge if we had a pure idea of it - as with the other Forms [Plato] |
Full Idea: What overpowering love knowledge would inspire if it could bring a clear image of itself before our sight, and the same may be said of the other forms. | |
From: Plato (Phaedrus [c.366 BCE], 250d) | |
A reaction: the motivation in Plato's theory |
13160 | To exist and be understood, a multitude must first be reduced to a unity [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: A plurality of things can neither be understood nor can exist unless one first understands the thing that is one, that to which the multitude necessarily reduces. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Notes on Comments by Fardella [1690], Prop 3) | |
A reaction: Notice that it is our need to understand which imposes the unity on the multitude. It is not just some random fiction, or a meaningless mechanical act of thought. |
13161 | Substances are everywhere in matter, like points in a line [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: There are substances everywhere in matter, just as points are everywhere in a line. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Notes on Comments by Fardella [1690], Clarif) | |
A reaction: Since Leibniz is unlikely to believe in the reality of the points, we must wonder whether he was really committed to this infinity of substances. The more traditional notion of substance is always called 'substantial form' by Leibniz. |
2084 | If a word has no parts and has a single identity, it turns out to be the same kind of thing as a letter [Plato] |
Full Idea: If a complex or a syllable has no parts and is a single identity, hasn't it turned out to be the same kind of thing as an element or letter? | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 205d) |
15844 | A sum is that from which nothing is lacking, which is a whole [Plato] |
Full Idea: But this sum now - isn't it just when there is nothing lacking that it is a sum? Yes, necessarily. And won't this very same thing - that from which nothing is lacking - be a whole? | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 205a) | |
A reaction: This seems to be right, be rather too vague and potentially circular to be of much use. What is the criterion for deciding that nothing is lacking? |
15843 | The whole can't be the parts, because it would be all of the parts, which is the whole [Plato] |
Full Idea: The whole does not consist of parts; for it did, it would be all the parts and so would be the sum. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 204e) | |
A reaction: That is, 'the whole is the sum of its parts' is a tautology! The claim that 'the whole is more than the sum of its parts' gets into similar trouble. See Verity Harte on this. |
2080 | Things are only knowable if a rational account (logos) is possible [Plato] |
Full Idea: Things which are susceptible to a rational account are knowable. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 201d) |
16126 | Expertise is knowledge of the whole by means of the parts [Plato] |
Full Idea: A man has passed from mere judgment to expert knowledge of the being of a wagon when he has done so in virtue of having gone over the whole by means of the elements. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 207c) | |
A reaction: Plato is emphasising that the expert must know the hundred parts of a wagon, and not just the half dozen main components, but here the point is to go over the whole via the parts, and not just list the parts. |
2050 | It is impossible to believe something which is held to be false [Plato] |
Full Idea: It is impossible to believe something which is not the case. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 167a) |
2076 | How can a belief exist if its object doesn't exist? [Plato] |
Full Idea: If the object of a belief is what is not, the object of this belief is nothing; but if there is no object to a belief, then that is not belief at all. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 189a) |
2045 | Perception is infallible, suggesting that it is knowledge [Plato] |
Full Idea: Perception is always of something that is, and it is infallible, which suggests that it is knowledge. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 152c) |
2067 | Our senses could have been separate, but they converge on one mind [Plato] |
Full Idea: It would be peculiar if each of us were like a Trojan horse, with a whole bunch of senses sitting inside us, rather than that all these perceptions converge onto a single identity (mind, or whatever one ought to call it). | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 184d) |
2068 | With what physical faculty do we perceive pairs of opposed abstract qualities? [Plato] |
Full Idea: With what physical faculty do we perceive being and not-being, similarity and dissimilarity, identity and difference, oneness and many, odd and even and other maths, ….fineness and goodness? | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 185d) |
2078 | You might mistake eleven for twelve in your senses, but not in your mind [Plato] |
Full Idea: Sight or touch might make someone take eleven for twelve, but he could never form this mistaken belief about the contents of his mind. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 195e) |
2069 | Thought must grasp being itself before truth becomes possible [Plato] |
Full Idea: If you can't apprehend being you can't apprehend truth, and so a thing could not be known. Therefore knowledge is not located in immediate experience but in thinking about it, since the latter makes it possible to grasp being and truth. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 186c) |
151 | True knowledge is of the reality behind sense experience [Plato] |
Full Idea: True knowledge is concerned with the abode of true reality, without colour or shape, intangible but utterly real, apprehensible only to the intellect. | |
From: Plato (Phaedrus [c.366 BCE], 247c) |
2089 | An inadequate rational account would still not justify knowledge [Plato] |
Full Idea: If you don't know which letters belong together in the right syllables…it is possible for true belief to be accompanied by a rational account and still not be entitled to the name of knowledge. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 208b) | |
A reaction: In each case of justification there is a 'clinching' stage, for which there is never going to be a strict rule. It might be foundational, but equally it might be massive coherence, or no alternative. |
2085 | Parts and wholes are either equally knowable or equally unknowable [Plato] |
Full Idea: Either a syllable and its letters are equally knowable and expressible in a rational account, or they are both equally unknowable and inexpressible. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 205e) | |
A reaction: Presumably you could explain the syllable by the letters, but not vice versa, but he must mean that the explanation is worthless without the letters being explained too. So all explanation is worthless? |
2091 | Without distinguishing marks, how do I know what my beliefs are about? [Plato] |
Full Idea: If I only have beliefs about Theaetetus when I don't know his distinguishing mark, how on earth were my beliefs about you rather than anyone else? | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 209b) | |
A reaction: This is a rather intellectualist approach to mental activity. Presumably Theaetetus has lots of distinguishing marks, but they are not conscious. Must Socrates know everything? |
2087 | A rational account might be seeing an image of one's belief, like a reflection in a mirror [Plato] |
Full Idea: A rational account might be forming an image of one's belief, as in a mirror or a pond. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 206d) | |
A reaction: Not promising, since the image is not going to be clearer than the original, or contain any new information. Maybe it would be clarified by being 'framed', instead of drifting in muddle. |
2090 | A rational account involves giving an image, or analysis, or giving a differentiating mark [Plato] |
Full Idea: A third sort of rational account (after giving an image, or analysing elements) is being able to mention some mark which differentiates the object in question ('the sun is the brightest heavenly body'). | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 208c) | |
A reaction: This is Plato's clearest statement of what would be involved in adding the necessary logos to your true belief. An image of it, or an analysis, or an individuation. How about a cause? |
2081 | Maybe primary elements can be named, but not receive a rational account [Plato] |
Full Idea: Maybe the primary elements of which things are composed are not susceptible to rational accounts. Each of them taken by itself can only be named, but nothing further can be said about it. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 201e) | |
A reaction: This still seems to be more or less the central issue in philosophy - which things should be treated as 'primitive', and which other things are analysed and explained using the primitive tools? |
2088 | A rational account of a wagon would mean knowledge of its hundred parts [Plato] |
Full Idea: In the case of a wagon, we may only have correct belief, but someone who is able to explain what it is by going through its hundred parts has got hold of a rational account. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 207b) | |
A reaction: A wonderful example. In science, you know smoking correlates with cancer, but you only know it when you know the mechanism, the causal structure. This may be a general truth. |
2047 | What evidence can be brought to show whether we are dreaming or not? [Plato] |
Full Idea: What evidence could be brought if we were asked at this very moment whether we are asleep and are dreaming all our thoughts? | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 158b) |
2053 | If you claim that all beliefs are true, that includes beliefs opposed to your own [Plato] |
Full Idea: To say that everyone believes what is the case, is to concede the truth of the oppositions' beliefs; in other words, the person has to concede that he himself is wrong. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 171a) |
2059 | How can a relativist form opinions about what will happen in the future? [Plato] |
Full Idea: Does a relativist have any authority to decide about things which will happen in the future? | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 178c) | |
A reaction: Nice question! It seems commonsense that such speculations are possible, but without a concept of truth they are ridiculous. |
2054 | Clearly some people are superior to others when it comes to medicine [Plato] |
Full Idea: In medicine, at least, most people are not self-sufficient at prescribing and effecting cures for themselves, and here some people are superior to others. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 171e) |
165 | If the apparent facts strongly conflict with probability, it is in everyone's interests to suppress the facts [Plato] |
Full Idea: There are some occasions when both prosecution and defence should positively suppress the facts in favour of probability, if the facts are improbable. | |
From: Plato (Phaedrus [c.366 BCE], 272e) |
9296 | The soul is self-motion [Plato] |
Full Idea: Self-motion is of the very nature of the soul. | |
From: Plato (Phaedrus [c.366 BCE], 245e) | |
A reaction: This culminates a length discussion of the soul. He gives an implausible argument that the soul is immortal, because it could never cease its self-motion. Why are we so unimpressed by motion, when the Greeks were amazed by it? |
23997 | Plato saw emotions and appetites as wild horses, in need of taming [Plato, by Goldie] |
Full Idea: Plato had a conception of the emotions and our bodily appetites as being like wild horses, to be harnassed and controlled by reason. | |
From: report of Plato (Phaedrus [c.366 BCE]) by Peter Goldie - The Emotions 4 'Education' | |
A reaction: This seems to make Plato the patriarch of puritanism. See Symposium, as well as Phaedrus. But bringing up children can often seem like taming wild beasts. |
158 | An excellent speech seems to imply a knowledge of the truth in the mind of the speaker [Plato] |
Full Idea: If a speech is to be classed as excellent, does that not presuppose knowledge of the truth about the subject of the speech in the mind of the speaker. | |
From: Plato (Phaedrus [c.366 BCE], 259e) | |
A reaction: I like the thought that Plato's main interest was rhetoric, but with the view that the only good rhetoric is truth-speaking. It would be hard to admire a speech if you disagreed with it. |
159 | Only a good philosopher can be a good speaker [Plato] |
Full Idea: Unless a man becomes an adequate philosopher he will never be an adequate speaker on any subject. | |
From: Plato (Phaedrus [c.366 BCE], 261a) | |
A reaction: Depends. Hitler showed little sign of clear philosophical thinking, but the addition of lights and uniforms seemed to sweep reasonably intelligent people along with him. |
5946 | 'Phaedrus' pioneers the notion of philosophical rhetoric [Lawson-Tancred on Plato] |
Full Idea: The purpose of the 'Phaedrus' is to pioneer the notion of philosophical rhetoric. | |
From: comment on Plato (Phaedrus [c.366 BCE], Ch.10) by Hugh Lawson-Tancred - Plato's Republic and Greek Enlightenment | |
A reaction: This is a wonderfully challenging view of what Plato was up to. One might connect it with Rorty's claim that philosophy should move away from epistemology and analysis, towards hermeneutics, which sounds to me like rhetoric. 'Phaedrus' is beautiful. |
155 | Beauty is the clearest and most lovely of the Forms [Plato] |
Full Idea: Only beauty has the privilege of being the most clearly discerned and the most lovely of the forms. | |
From: Plato (Phaedrus [c.366 BCE], 250e) | |
A reaction: the motivation in Plato's theory |
143 | The two ruling human principles are the natural desire for pleasure, and an acquired love of virtue [Plato] |
Full Idea: In each one of us there are two ruling and impelling principles: a desire for pleasure, which is innate, and an acquired conviction which causes us to aim at excellence. | |
From: Plato (Phaedrus [c.366 BCE], 237d) | |
A reaction: This division is too neat and simple. An obsession with pleasure I would take to be acquired. If you set out to do something, I think there is an innate desire to do it well. |
157 | Most pleasure is release from pain, and is therefore not worthwhile [Plato] |
Full Idea: Life is not worth living for pleasures whose enjoyment entirely depends on previous sensation of pain, like almost all physical pleasures. | |
From: Plato (Phaedrus [c.366 BCE], 258e) | |
A reaction: Eating exotic food which is hard to obtain? (Pay someone to obtain it). Rock climbing. Training for sport. |
144 | Reason impels us towards excellence, which teaches us self-control [Plato] |
Full Idea: The conviction which impels us towards excellence is rational, and the power by which it masters us we call self-control. | |
From: Plato (Phaedrus [c.366 BCE], 237e) |
156 | Bad people are never really friends with one another [Plato] |
Full Idea: It is not ordained that bad men should be friends with one another. | |
From: Plato (Phaedrus [c.366 BCE], 255b) |
148 | If the prime origin is destroyed, it will not come into being again out of anything [Plato] |
Full Idea: If the prime origin is destroyed, it will not come into being again out of anything. | |
From: Plato (Phaedrus [c.366 BCE], 245d) | |
A reaction: This is the essence of Aquinas's Third Way of proving God's existence. |
152 | The mind of God is fully satisfied and happy with a vision of reality and truth [Plato] |
Full Idea: The mind of a god, sustained by pure intelligence and knowledge, is satisfied with the vision of reality, and nourished and made happy by the vision of truth. | |
From: Plato (Phaedrus [c.366 BCE], 247d) |
2058 | God must be the epitome of goodness, and we can only approach a divine state by being as good as possible [Plato] |
Full Idea: It is impossible for God to be immoral and not to be the acme of morality; and the only way any of us can approximate to God is to become as moral as possible. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 176c) |
150 | We cannot conceive of God, so we have to think of Him as an immortal version of ourselves [Plato] |
Full Idea: Because we have never seen or formed an adequate idea of a god, we picture him to ourselves as a being of the same kind as ourselves but immortal. | |
From: Plato (Phaedrus [c.366 BCE], 246d) |
149 | There isn't a single reason for positing the existence of immortal beings [Plato] |
Full Idea: There is not a single sound reason for positing the existence of such a being who is immortal | |
From: Plato (Phaedrus [c.366 BCE], 246d) |
146 | Soul is always in motion, so it must be self-moving and immortal [Plato] |
Full Idea: All soul is immortal, for what is always in motion is immortal. Only that which moves itself never ceases to be in motion. | |
From: Plato (Phaedrus [c.366 BCE], 245c) |
2057 | There must always be some force of evil ranged against good [Plato] |
Full Idea: The elimination of evil is impossible, Theodorus; there must always be some force ranged against good. | |
From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 176a) |