88 ideas
| 23890 | For Plato true wisdom is supernatural [Plato, by Weil] |
| Full Idea: It is evident that Plato regards true wisdom as something supernatural. | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Simone Weil - God in Plato p.61 | |
| A reaction: Taken literally, I assume this is wrong, but we can empathise with the thought. Wisdom has the feeling of rising above the level of mere knowledge, to achieve the overview I associate with philosophy. |
| 24261 | Devotion to learning and applied intelligence leads to divine wisdom - if truth is available [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Anyone who has devoted himself to learning and has genuinely applied his intelligence cannot fail to attain immortal, divine wisdom, if the truth should come within his grasp. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 90b) | |
| A reaction: Quite a significant proviso about truth coming within his grasp. A very scholarly view of wisdom. Anyone in academic life is certain to know people who are immensely learned but not very wise. That said, I sort of agree with this. |
| 3060 | Plato never mentions Democritus, and wished to burn his books [Plato, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Plato, who mentions nearly all the ancient philosophers, nowhere speaks of Democritus; he wished to burn all of his books, but was persuaded that it was futile. | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.7.8 |
| 326 | For relaxation one can consider the world of change, instead of eternal things [Plato] |
| Full Idea: If, for relaxation, one gives up discussing eternal things, it is pleasant to consider likely accounts of the world of change. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 59c) | |
| A reaction: To understand this, examine Plato's example of the Line at 'Republic' 509d. |
| 315 | Philosophy is the supreme gift of the gods to mortals [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Philosophy is the greatest gift the gods have ever given or ever will give to mortals. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 47b) | |
| A reaction: I wonder why they gave it to us? |
| 306 | Nothing can come to be without a cause [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Nothing can come to be without a cause. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 28a) |
| 23891 | Two contradictories force us to find a relation which will correlate them [Plato, by Weil] |
| Full Idea: Where contradictions appear there is a correlation of contraries, which is relation. If a contradiction is imposed on the intelligence, it is forced to think of a relation to transform the contradiction into a correlation, which draws the soul higher. | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Simone Weil - God in Plato p.70 | |
| A reaction: A much better account of the dialectic than anything I have yet seen in Hegel. For the first time I see some sense in it. A contradiction is not a falsehood, and it must be addressed rather than side-stepped. A kink in the system, that needs ironing. |
| 24250 | We should not pick out 'this' water, but only 'something of this sort' [Plato] |
| Full Idea: We should never say 'this' water, but 'something of this sort', and the same goes for everything else that we indicate by means of expressions such as 'that' and 'this'. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 49d) | |
| A reaction: [translation disputed] The point seems to be that 'this' does not say what is being picked out, even with pointing, so the type must be specified. This connects to Geach's claim that identity can only be asserted under some embracing concept. |
| 24246 | The sun was made for light, so we could learn numbers from astronomical movement [Plato] |
| Full Idea: The god created the sun to illuminate as much of the universe as it could, and to enable all suitably endowed creatures to become numerate by studying the revolution of identity and sameness. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 39b) | |
| A reaction: Note that the sun has a specific purpose. All numbers are Forms, and are therefore eternal, the learning of numbers is empirical. It is regular movement (rather than quantities) which reveals number. |
| 324 | Before the existence of the world there must have been being, space and becoming [Plato] |
| Full Idea: There were, before the world came into existence, being, space, and becoming, three distinct realities. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 52d) | |
| A reaction: 'Becoming' is the central idea of Heraclitus, and must be what Aristotle calls 'potentiality' [dunamis]. If it was 'before' creation, he should add time to the list. Are these three 'distinct'? Being has potential. |
| 20364 | The apprehensions of reason remain unchanging, but reasonless sensation shows mere becoming [Plato] |
| Full Idea: That which is apprehended by intelligence and reason is always in the same state, but that which is conceived by opinion with the help of sensation and without reason is always in a process of becoming and perishing, and never really is. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 28a) | |
| A reaction: Lots of problems with this, of which I take the main one to be the idea that sensation is 'without reason', as if there were a sharp dichotomy in our ways of evaluating reality. Laws of nature seem to be laws of change, not of stasis. |
| 14502 | Plato's idea of 'structure' tends to be mathematically expressed [Plato, by Koslicki] |
| Full Idea: 'Structure' tends to be characterized by Plato as something that is mathematically expressed. | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects V.3 iv | |
| A reaction: [Koslicki is drawing on Verity Harte here] |
| 307 | Something will always be well-made if the maker keeps in mind the eternal underlying pattern [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Whenever the maker of anything keeps his eye on the eternally unchanging and uses it as his pattern for the form and function of his product the result must be good. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 28b) |
| 318 | In addition to the underlying unchanging model and a changing copy of it, there must also be a foundation of all change [Plato] |
| Full Idea: In addition to an eternal unchanging model and a visible and changing copy of reality, there must be a third part, the receptacle and nurse of all becoming and change. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 49b) | |
| A reaction: cf Aristotle's criticism in Metaphysics |
| 17948 | Plato's Forms meant that the sophists only taught the appearance of wisdom and virtue [Plato, by Nehamas] |
| Full Idea: Plato's theory of Forms allowed him to claim that the sophists and other opponents were trapped in the world of appearance. What they therefore taught was only apparent wisdom and virtue. | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Alexander Nehamas - Eristic,Antilogic,Sophistic,Dialectic p.118 |
| 321 | For knowledge and true opinion to be different there must be Forms; otherwise we are just stuck with sensations [Plato] |
| Full Idea: If intelligence and true opinion are different, then the forms must exist, but if they are the same, then what our senses perceive must be the most certain reality. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 51d) |
| 3039 | When Diogenes said he could only see objects but not their forms, Plato said it was because he had eyes but no intellect [Plato, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: When Diogenes told Plato he saw tables and cups, but not 'tableness' and 'cupness', Plato replied that this was because Diogenes had eyes but no intellect. | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 06.2.6 |
| 20906 | Platonists argue for the indivisible triangle-in-itself [Plato, by Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The Platonists, on the basis of purely logical arguments, posit the existence of an indivisible 'triangle in itself'. | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) 316a15 | |
| A reaction: A helpful confirmation that geometrical figures really are among the Forms (bearing in mind that numbers are not, because they contain one another). What shape is the Form of the triangle? |
| 12042 | Plato's Forms were seen as part of physics, rather than of metaphysics [Plato, by Annas] |
| Full Idea: In the ancient world Plato's Theory of Forms was mostly seen as one aspect of Plato's 'physics' or theory of the world (rather than as 'metaphysics'). | |
| From: report of Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE]) by Julia Annas - Ancient Philosophy: very short introduction Ch.5 | |
| A reaction: This is how I also see the theory, but then I am inclined to see religion as a rather startling branch of speculative physics. Annas cites 'Timaeus' as the key text for this. |
| 556 | If there is one Form for both the Form and its participants, they must have something in common [Aristotle on Plato] |
| Full Idea: If there is the same Form for the Forms and for their participants, then they must have something in common. | |
| From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 991a |
| 317 | The universe is basically an intelligible and unchanging model, and a visible and changing copy of it [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Our basic description of the universe contained an intelligible and unchanging model, and a visible and changing copy of it. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 48e) |
| 563 | If gods are like men, they are just eternal men; similarly, Forms must differ from particulars [Aristotle on Plato] |
| Full Idea: We say there is the form of man, horse and health, but nothing else, making the same mistake as those who say that there are gods but that they are in the form of men. They just posit eternal men, and here we are not positing forms but eternal sensibles. | |
| From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 997b |
| 565 | The Forms cannot be changeless if they are in changing things [Aristotle on Plato] |
| Full Idea: The Forms could not be changeless if they were in changing things. | |
| From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 998a |
| 557 | A Form is a cause of things only in the way that white mixed with white is a cause [Aristotle on Plato] |
| Full Idea: A Form is a cause of things only in the way that white mixed with white is a cause. | |
| From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 991a |
| 9607 | The greatest discovery in human thought is Plato's discovery of abstract objects [Brown,JR on Plato] |
| Full Idea: The greatest discovery in the history of human thought is Plato's discovery of abstract objects. | |
| From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by James Robert Brown - Philosophy of Mathematics Ch. 2 | |
| A reaction: Compare Idea 2860! Given the diametrically opposed views, it is clearly likely that Plato's central view is the most important idea in the history of human thought, even if it is wrong. |
| 13263 | We can grasp whole things in science, because they have a mathematics and a teleology [Plato, by Koslicki] |
| Full Idea: Due to the mathematical nature of structure and the teleological cause underlying the creation of Platonic wholes, these wholes are intelligible, and are in fact the proper objects of science. | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 5.3 | |
| A reaction: I like this idea, because it pays attention to the connection between how we conceive objects to be, and how we are able to think about objects. Only examining these two together enables us to grasp metaphysics. |
| 13265 | Plato was less concerned than Aristotle with the source of unity in a complex object [Plato, by Koslicki] |
| Full Idea: Plato was less concerned than Aristotle with the project of how to account, in completely general terms, for the source of unity within a mereologically complex object. | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 5.5 | |
| A reaction: Plato seems to have simply asserted that some sort of harmony held things together. Aristotles puts the forms [eidos] within objects, rather than external, so he has to give a fuller account of what is going on in an object. He never managed it! |
| 13261 | Plato sees an object's structure as expressible in mathematics [Plato, by Koslicki] |
| Full Idea: The 'structure' of an object tends to be characterised by Plato as something that is mathematically expressible. | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 5.3 | |
| A reaction: This seems to be pure Pythagoreanism (see Idea 644). Plato is pursuing Pythagoras's research programme, of trying to find mathematics buried in every aspect of reality. |
| 593 | Plato's holds that there are three substances: Forms, mathematical entities, and perceptible bodies [Plato, by Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Plato's doctrine was that the Forms and mathematicals are two substances and that the third substance is that of perceptible bodies. | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 1028b |
| 13260 | Plato says wholes are either containers, or they're atomic, or they don't exist [Plato, by Koslicki] |
| Full Idea: Plato considers a 'container' model for wholes (which are disjoint from their parts) [Parm 144e3-], and a 'nihilist' model, in which only wholes are mereological atoms, and a 'bare pluralities' view, in which wholes are not really one at all. | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 5.2 | |
| A reaction: [She cites Verity Harte for this analysis of Plato] The fourth, and best, seems to be that wholes are parts which fall under some unifying force or structure or principle. |
| 11237 | Only universals have essence [Plato, by Politis] |
| Full Idea: Plato argues that only universals have essence. | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 1.4 |
| 11238 | Plato and Aristotle take essence to make a thing what it is [Plato, by Politis] |
| Full Idea: Plato and Aristotle have a shared general conception of essence: the essence of a thing is what that thing is simply in virtue of itself and in virtue of being the very thing it is. It answers the question 'What is this very thing?' | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 1.4 |
| 24254 | Two existing entities can never strictly coincide [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Anything that genuinely exists is supported by the true and rigorous argument that neither of two distinct entities can ever occur in the other, because that would simultaneously make them one and two. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 52c) | |
| A reaction: A pair of boots is one and two, but maybe our seeing them or naming them that way cannot be precisely simultaneous. If a salt molecule is two things, does it therefore not exist? On the whole I agree with Plato! |
| 24236 | Some statements about what is obvious and stable are as irrefutable as possible [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Statements about that which is stable, secure and manifest to the intellect are themselves stable and reliable (and it's important for statements about such things to be just as irrefutable and unassailable as statements can possibly be). | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 29b) | |
| A reaction: This is a nice thoughtful account of what we mean by a necessary truth, without attributing to it an absolute character. |
| 24252 | Knowledge is taught, has logos, is unshakeable, and is rare [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Unlike true belief, knowledge is the result of instruction, …it is always accompanied by a true account [logos], …it is unmoved by persuasion, …and it is the property of scarcely any human beings. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 51e) | |
| A reaction: Nowadays we are most likely to challenge the unshakeable condition, since science depends on critical challenges. Indeed Greek dialectic seem to require continual openness to the possibility of error. I like the account/logos. Those who know can teach. |
| 24251 | If knowledge is just true belief, we are forced to rely on the senses [Plato] |
| Full Idea: If true belief is no different from knowledge, then we must count all the things we perceive with our bodily senses as the most reliable thing in existence. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 51d) | |
| A reaction: Timaeus goes on to explain how knowledge differs from true belief, roughly in the way outlined in 'Theaetetus'. |
| 334 | Only bird-brained people think astronomy is entirely a matter of evidence [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Birds are empty-headed men who grew feathers instead of hair, because they were interested in astronomy but thought it was entirely a matter of physical evidence. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 91d) |
| 17085 | A good explanation totally rules out the opposite explanation (so Forms are required) [Plato, by Ruben] |
| Full Idea: For Plato, an acceptable explanation is one such that there is no possibility of there being the opposite explanation at all, and he thought that only explanations in terms of the Forms, but never physical explanations, could meet this requirement. | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by David-Hillel Ruben - Explaining Explanation Ch 2 | |
| A reaction: [Republic 436c is cited] |
| 5962 | Plato says the soul is ordered by number [Plato, by Plutarch] |
| Full Idea: Plato regards the substance of soul not as number but as being ordered by number. | |
| From: report of Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE]) by Plutarch - 68: Generation of the soul in 'Timaeus' 1023 | |
| A reaction: This remark points towards Plato's esoteric doctrines, which are some sort of mathematical metaphysics. The idea that order and numbers are in some way connected is one of the most powerful in western civilization, with undeniable appeal. |
| 24244 | The soul is a complex mixture of pure mind and changing matter [Plato] |
| Full Idea: To create the soul the god combined two kinds of substance - one indivisible and never changing, the other the divided and created substance of the physical world - with intermediates between them, and then a homogeneous mixture. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 35a) | |
| A reaction: Interestingly, this does not imply simple mind-matter dualism, but includes bridging intermediates, ending in what seems to be a continuum between physical and mental. Not to be taken too seriously, though. Plato admits it is all speculation. |
| 24258 | The gods placed the mortal soul in the chest [Plato] |
| Full Idea: The gods bound the mortal soul within the chest - the thorax, as it is called. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 69e) | |
| A reaction: Timaeus recognises the importance of the head, and the fact that the main senses pass into the brain, but they had no indication of where thought and reason occur. |
| 330 | No one wants to be bad, but bad men result from physical and educational failures, which they do not want or choose [Plato] |
| Full Idea: No one wishes to be bad, but a bad man is bad because of some flaw in his physical makeup and failure in his education, neither of which he likes or chooses. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 86e) |
| 1651 | Plato wanted to somehow control and purify the passions [Vlastos on Plato] |
| Full Idea: Plato put high on his agenda a project which did not figure in Socrates' programme at all: the hygienic conditioning of the passions. This cannot be an intellectual process, as argument cannot touch them. | |
| From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Gregory Vlastos - Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher p.88 | |
| A reaction: This is the standard traditional view of any thinker who exaggerates the importance and potential of reason in our lives. |
| 24240 | Intelligence requires soul [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Nothing can have intelligence unless it has soul. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 30b) | |
| A reaction: Not the last word on the subject, but perhaps the first. If we allow a powerful chess playing computer to have intelligence, how can we not also attribute intelligence to a thermostat? Does it matter? |
| 3324 | Plato's whole philosophy may be based on being duped by reification - a figure of speech [Benardete,JA on Plato] |
| Full Idea: Plato is liable to the charge of having been duped by a figure of speech, albeit the most profound of all, the trope of reification. | |
| From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.12 | |
| A reaction: That might be a plausible account if his view was ridiculous, but given how many powerful friends Plato has, especially in the philosophy of mathematics, we should assume he was cleverer than that. |
| 24241 | Beauty must always be perfect [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Nothing touched by imperfection can ever be beautiful. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 30c) | |
| A reaction: Beautiful may also be 'noble'. In human experience this seems obviously false, though it may be true in Plato's world of ideals. |
| 316 | Music has harmony like the soul, and serves to reorder disharmony within us [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Music has harmonic motions like the orbits of the soul, and is not for irrational pleasure, but to reduce to order any disharmony in the revolutions within us. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 47d) |
| 7503 | Plato never refers to examining the conscience [Plato, by Foucault] |
| Full Idea: Plato never speaks of the examination of conscience - never! | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Michel Foucault - On the Genealogy of Ethics p.276 | |
| A reaction: Plato does imply some sort of self-evident direct knowledge about that nature of a healthy soul. Presumably the full-blown concept of conscience is something given from outside, from God. In 'Euthyphro', Plato asserts the primacy of morality (Idea 337). |
| 24260 | The best part of the soul raises us up to the heavens, to which we are naturally akin [Plato] |
| Full Idea: The most important type of soul …raises us up from the earth towards the heavenly region to which we are naturally akin, since we are not soil-bound plants but, properly speaking, creatures rooted in heaven. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 90a) | |
| A reaction: An early example of human exceptionalism, which is still with us. Personally I think life goes much better if we acknowledge that we have more affinity with plants than with angels. |
| 2173 | As religion and convention collapsed, Plato sought morals not just in knowledge, but in the soul [Williams,B on Plato] |
| Full Idea: Once gods and fate and social expectation were no longer there, Plato felt it necessary to discover ethics inside human nature, not just as ethical knowledge (Socrates' view), but in the structure of the soul. | |
| From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Bernard Williams - Shame and Necessity II - p.43 | |
| A reaction: anti Charles Taylor |
| 24259 | Death in old age is a natural end, untroubled, and more pleasure than distress [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Therre's no death less troublesome than the one which accompanies old age on its journey to it natural end. Such a death comes with more pleasure than distress. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 81e) | |
| A reaction: You have to be more in tune with nature than we are to believe this. We only really think this way about extreme old age. Before that we are usually hoping for more. Quite a lot of people seem to welcome death in old age. |
| 24239 | Perfect goodness always produces perfect beauty [Plato] |
| Full Idea: What is perfectly good can accomplish only what is perfectly beautiful; this was and is a universal law. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 30a) | |
| A reaction: Beautiful must be 'kalon', which is better understood here as fine and noble, rather than looking pretty. This is a quintessential Plato opinion. At the highest level, the supreme Forms endorse one another. He is discussing cosmic creation. |
| 9274 | Plato's legacy to European thought was the Good, the Beautiful and the True [Plato, by Gray] |
| Full Idea: Plato's legacy to European thought was a trio of capital letters - the Good, the Beautiful and the True. | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by John Gray - Straw Dogs 2.8 | |
| A reaction: It seems to have been Baumgarten who turned this into a slogan (Idea 8117). Gray says these ideals are lethal, but I identify with them very strongly, and am quite happy to see the good life as an attempt to find the right balance between them. |
| 94 | Pleasure is better with the addition of intelligence, so pleasure is not the good [Plato, by Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Plato says the life of pleasure is more desirable with the addition of intelligence, and if the combination is better, pleasure is not the good. | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Nicomachean Ethics 1172b27 | |
| A reaction: It is obvious why we like pleasure, but not why intelligence makes it 'better'. Maybe it is just because we enjoy intelligence? |
| 332 | One should exercise both the mind and the body, to avoid imbalance [Plato] |
| Full Idea: One should preserve a balance and avoid exercising the mind or body without the other; mathematicians should exercise physically, and athletes mentally. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 88c) | |
| A reaction: Excellent, and very modern. Use it or lose it. It suggests that Plato had a fairly holistic view of a human being, and saw mind and body as closely integrated. |
| 17947 | Plato decided that the virtuous and happy life was the philosophical life [Plato, by Nehamas] |
| Full Idea: Plato came to the conclusion that virtue and happiness consist in the life of philosophy itself. | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Alexander Nehamas - Eristic,Antilogic,Sophistic,Dialectic p.117 | |
| A reaction: This view is obviously ridiculous, because it largely excludes almost the entire human race, which sees philosophy as a cul-de-sac, even if it is good. But virtue and happiness need some serious thought. |
| 24257 | Unnatural modifications are painful, and restoring normality is pleasant [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Any modification that is unnatural (that is, forced) and sudden is painful, while any modification that restores the normal condition and is sudden is pleasant. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 64d) | |
| A reaction: [see also 65a] Possibly circular, if the painful is defined as unnatural, but the unnatural is defined as painful. Nowadays we find it very hard to specify what counts as 'unnatural', but our ancestors used that label all the time. Not convincing. |
| 328 | Everything that takes place naturally is pleasant [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Everything that takes place naturally is pleasant. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 81e) | |
| A reaction: Not many people would agree with this. I recently watched a sparrowhawk eat a pigeon in my garden. This is the source of the stoic formula of living according to nature. |
| 6015 | Plato, unusually, said that theoretical and practical wisdom are inseparable [Plato, by Kraut] |
| Full Idea: Two virtues that are ordinarily kept distinct - theoretical and practical wisdom - are joined by Plato; he thinks that neither one can be fully possessed unless it is combined with the other. | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Richard Kraut - Plato | |
| A reaction: I get the impression that this doctrine comes from Socrates, whose position is widely reported as 'intellectualist'. Aristotle certainly held the opposite view. |
| 23896 | We see our character as a restricting limit, but also as an unshakable support [Weil] |
| Full Idea: Our character appears to us as a limit by which we do not want to be imprisoned, …but also as a support that we want to believe is unshakable. | |
| From: Simone Weil (On the Concept of Character [1941], p.100) | |
| A reaction: A nice perception. It is fairly easy to criticise, or even laugh at, one's own actions, but extremely hard to criticise our own character. Maybe we all wish we were more determined in our projects, but not much else. |
| 23893 | We don't see character in a single moment, but only over a period of time [Weil] |
| Full Idea: Character is constant over a period of time; the way a person is at a single moment does not at all reflect the character of this person. We do, however, concede that character changes. | |
| From: Simone Weil (On the Concept of Character [1941], p.98) | |
| A reaction: I do think, though, that there are moments in behaviour which are hugely revealing of character, even in a single remark. But I agree that most single moments do not show much. |
| 23894 | The concept of character is at the centre of morality [Weil] |
| Full Idea: We cannot pose a moral problem without putting the concept of character at its centre. | |
| From: Simone Weil (On the Concept of Character [1941], p.98) | |
| A reaction: The question for Aristotle (which I derive from Philippa Foot) is whether moral goodness simply is good character, or whether it is the actions (or even the consequences). Weil is close to modern virtue theory here. |
| 23895 | We modify our character by placing ourselves in situations, or by attending to what seems trivial [Weil] |
| Full Idea: We can modify our character, by putting ourselves in circumstances that will act on us from the outside, …or by the orientation of our attention in the moments that appear most insignificant or indifferent in our lives. | |
| From: Simone Weil (On the Concept of Character [1941], p.99) | |
| A reaction: I've never seen anyone address this question (apart from Aristotle's emphasis on training habits). Choosing your source for current affairs information strikes me as very important. What you read, what you watch, who you spend time with… |
| 2912 | Plato is boring [Nietzsche on Plato] |
| Full Idea: Plato is boring. | |
| From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Friedrich Nietzsche - Twilight of the Idols 9.2 |
| 24234 | I have discussed the best constitution, and the kind of citizens it requires [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Yesterday I explained my views on what the best kind of constitution might be and what kind of citizens should make up such a state. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 17c) | |
| A reaction: This seems to refer back to 'Republic'. I include this because it says political thought should cover what good citizens ought to be like, as well as how they are organised. This is the key link between ethics and politics. |
| 24235 | Female Guardians will have identical duties to the men [Plato] |
| Full Idea: We said that the characters of the female Guardians were to be made to match the men's more or less exactly, and that in every aspect of life, including warfare, all the women were to be assigned all the same tasks as the men | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 18c) | |
| A reaction: Refers to 'Republic'. This is despite the fact that Timaeus firmly says (at 42a) that men are superior to women. Either there is an overlap in ability, or the highest ability is not essential for be a guardian. Or (best) Plato disagrees with Timaeus. |
| 24248 | The god said human nature comes as the superior male, and inferior female [Plato] |
| Full Idea: The god explained that human nature comes in two forms, and the superior kind was that which would come to be called 'male'. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 42a) | |
| A reaction: Since this contradicts what Plato says about women as Guardians, I surmise that this is the view of Timaeus, rather than of Plato. This view is presumably the more common one in its time. |
| 322 | Intelligence is the result of rational teaching; true opinion can result from irrational persuasion [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Intelligence is produced by teaching, involves truth and reason, and cannot be moved; true opinion involves persuasion, is irrational and can be moved. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 51e) |
| 331 | Bad governments prevent discussion, and discourage the study of virtue [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Under a bad government discussion, both public and private, is bad, and no courses of study are available to cure faults of character. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 87b) |
| 310 | The creator of the cosmos had no envy, and so wanted things to be as like himself as possible [Plato] |
| Full Idea: This changing cosmos was made because its maker is good, and therefore lacks envy; he therefore wished all things to be as like himself as possible. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 29e) |
| 311 | The cosmos must be unique, because it resembles the creator, who is unique [Plato] |
| Full Idea: So that our universe can resemble the perfect living creature in being unique, the universe was, is and will continue to be its maker's only creation. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 31c) |
| 24249 | The elements seem able to transmute into each other [Plato] |
| Full Idea: It looks as if there is a cyclical process whereby the elements generate one another. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 49c) | |
| A reaction: He gives examples of elements turning into one another, such as air turning into rain. But originally it sounds as if they were immutable, since creation was from the distinct four elements, and not from a mixture of them. This is Timaeus speculating. |
| 24243 | The world-maker used the four elements and their properties in entirety [Plato] |
| Full Idea: The formation of the world occupied each of the four in its entirety; the maker made it out of the totality of fire, water, air and earth, leaving unused no part or property of any of them. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 32c) | |
| A reaction: So all of the four elements entirely pre-existed (presumably for eternity), before the ordering of the cosmos. There seems to be no reference to a first creation of this chaotic collection. Interesting that all properties are used. That is a constraint. |
| 325 | We must consider the four basic shapes as too small to see, only becoming visible in large numbers [Plato] |
| Full Idea: We must think of the individual units of all four basic shapes as being far too small to be visible, and only becoming visible when massed together in large numbers. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 56c) |
| 327 | There are two types of cause, the necessary and the divine [Plato] |
| Full Idea: We must distinguish two types of cause, the necessary and the divine. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 68e) |
| 24255 | Motion needs differing moved and mover, so it originates in diversity [Plato] |
| Full Idea: In the absence of a mover and a moved there's no such thing as motion, and mover and moved cannot possibly be uniform with each other. It follows that we should always associate rest with uniformity and attribute motion to diversity. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 57e) | |
| A reaction: Newtonian inertia allows movement without a mover. Perhaps Plato means acceleration rather than movement. Newton ignores the question of what got the inertial movement started. The full picture needs powers! |
| 24256 | The spherical universe composed of four elements squeezes out every bit of void [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Once the vault of the universe has gathered the four bodies [elements] together inside itself, it compresses everything and and squeezes out every last bit of void, because, being spherical, it is in its nature to want to close itself. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 58a) | |
| A reaction: Notice the explanation by 'its nature'. This thought is in opposition to the atomists, who needed a perfect void to explain the movement of the atoms. Maybe the fields of modern physics squeeze out any void? |
| 24253 | Space is eternal and indestructible, but is only known by barely credible reasoning [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Space exists for ever and is indestructible, and acts as the arena for everything that is subject to creation. It is grasped by a kind of bastard reasoning, without the support of sensation, and is hardly credible. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 52b) | |
| A reaction: I'm struck by the thought that space and time are features of nature which are indestructible. Space seems to resemble what Timaeus calls the 'receptacle' for creation. When we move don't we have a spatial sensation? |
| 24245 | The god created eternity in the sequence of the universe, and its image we call 'time' [Plato] |
| Full Idea: In the very act of ordering the universe the god created a likeness of eternity, a likeness that progresses eternally through the sequence of numbers, while eternity abides in oneness. This image of eternity is what we have come to call 'time'. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 37d) | |
| A reaction: As in Aristotle, the Greek view is usually that movement creates time. But it is hard to conceive movement without a prior conception of time. |
| 314 | Heavenly movements gave us the idea of time, and caused us to inquire about the heavens [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Days, months, years and solstices have caused the invention of number, given us the notion of time, and caused us to inquire into the nature of the universe. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 47a) |
| 1526 | Almost everyone except Plato thinks that time could not have been generated [Plato, by Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: With a single exception (Plato) everyone agrees about time - that it is not generated. Democritus says time is an obvious example of something not generated. | |
| From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Physics 251b14 |
| 312 | Time came into existence with the heavens, so that there will be a time when they can be dissolved [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Time came into being with the heavens, so that they should be dissolved together if ever they are dissolved. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 38c) |
| 309 | Clearly the world is good, so its maker must have been concerned with the eternal, not with change [Plato] |
| Full Idea: If the world is beautiful and its maker good, he had an eye on the eternal; if not, on that which is subject to change; clearly the world is the fairest of things, and he the best of causes, so it is eternal. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 29a) |
| 308 | If the cosmos is an object of perception then it must be continually changing [Plato] |
| Full Idea: The cosmos is visible, tangible and corporeal, and therefore perceptible by the senses; therefore it is an object of opinion and sensation, and therefore change and coming into being. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 28d) |
| 24238 | The god found chaos, and led it to superior order [Plato] |
| Full Idea: The god found everything visible in a state of turmoil, moving in a discordant and chaotic manner, so he led it from chaos to order, which he regarded as in all ways better. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 30a) | |
| A reaction: This god is usually referred to as the 'demiurge', who creates the ordered nature which is itself a god. I find this view more appealing than the creation of the cosmos ex nihilo, our of nothing. |
| 24242 | Is there a plurality (or even an infinity) of universes? No, because the model makes it unique [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Is there a single universe, or would it be more correct to speak of a plurality, even an infinite plurality, of universes? No, there can be only one, if it is to be created by the craftsman-god so as to correspond to its model. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 30d) | |
| A reaction: Democritus believed there was an infinite plurality of universes. Does this entail that there could only be one horse, and one thing of beauty, and one truth - to correspond to their Forms? Presumably not! |
| 24247 | The universe has four types of living being: gods, birds, fish, and land animals [Plato] |
| Full Idea: There are four kinds of living being in the universe: the heavenly gods, winged creatures that travel through the air, those that live in water, and finally those that go on foot on dry land. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 39e) | |
| A reaction: So while the original gods are a different order of existence, the famous Olympian gods are living beings, distinguished only by their power and their immortality. |
| 24237 | The divine organiser of the world wanted it to have as little imperfection as possible [Plato] |
| Full Idea: The god wanted everything to be good, marred by as little imperfection as possible. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.362 BCE], 30a) | |
| A reaction: The god is the demiurge which brings order to the original chaos of the cosmos. This is the trade-off view of what is bad in the world, equivalent to Leibniz's best of all possible worlds. |