67 ideas
23890 | For Plato true wisdom is supernatural [Plato, by Weil] |
Full Idea: It is evident that Plato regards true wisdom as something supernatural. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Simone Weil - God in Plato p.61 | |
A reaction: Taken literally, I assume this is wrong, but we can empathise with the thought. Wisdom has the feeling of rising above the level of mere knowledge, to achieve the overview I associate with philosophy. |
3060 | Plato never mentions Democritus, and wished to burn his books [Plato, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Plato, who mentions nearly all the ancient philosophers, nowhere speaks of Democritus; he wished to burn all of his books, but was persuaded that it was futile. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.7.8 |
23891 | Two contradictories force us to find a relation which will correlate them [Plato, by Weil] |
Full Idea: Where contradictions appear there is a correlation of contraries, which is relation. If a contradiction is imposed on the intelligence, it is forced to think of a relation to transform the contradiction into a correlation, which draws the soul higher. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Simone Weil - God in Plato p.70 | |
A reaction: A much better account of the dialectic than anything I have yet seen in Hegel. For the first time I see some sense in it. A contradiction is not a falsehood, and it must be addressed rather than side-stepped. A kink in the system, that needs ironing. |
9641 | Definitions should be replaceable by primitives, and should not be creative [Brown,JR] |
Full Idea: The standard requirement of definitions involves 'eliminability' (any defined terms must be replaceable by primitives) and 'non-creativity' (proofs of theorems should not depend on the definition). | |
From: James Robert Brown (Philosophy of Mathematics [1999], Ch. 7) | |
A reaction: [He cites Russell and Whitehead as a source for this view] This is the austere view of the mathematician or logician. But almost every abstract concept that we use was actually defined in a creative way. |
9634 | Set theory says that natural numbers are an actual infinity (to accommodate their powerset) [Brown,JR] |
Full Idea: The set-theory account of infinity doesn't just say that we can keep on counting, but that the natural numbers are an actual infinite set. This is necessary to make sense of the powerset of ω, as the set of all its subsets, and thus even bigger. | |
From: James Robert Brown (Philosophy of Mathematics [1999], Ch. 5) | |
A reaction: I don't personally find this to be sufficient reason to commit myself to the existence of actual infinities. In fact I have growing doubts about the whole role of set theory in philosophy of mathematics. Shows how much I know. |
9613 | Naïve set theory assumed that there is a set for every condition [Brown,JR] |
Full Idea: In the early versions of set theory ('naïve' set theory), the axiom of comprehension assumed that for any condition there is a set of objects satisfying that condition (so P(x)↔x∈{x:P(x)}), but this led directly to Russell's Paradox. | |
From: James Robert Brown (Philosophy of Mathematics [1999], Ch. 2) | |
A reaction: How rarely any philosophers state this problem clearly (as Brown does here). This is incredibly important for our understanding of how we classify the world. I'm tempted to just ignore Russell, and treat sets in a natural and sensible way. |
9615 | Nowadays conditions are only defined on existing sets [Brown,JR] |
Full Idea: In current set theory Russell's Paradox is avoided by saying that a condition can only be defined on already existing sets. | |
From: James Robert Brown (Philosophy of Mathematics [1999], Ch. 2) | |
A reaction: A response to Idea 9613. This leaves us with no account of how sets are created, so we have the modern notion that absolutely any grouping of daft things is a perfectly good set. The logicians seem to have hijacked common sense. |
9617 | The 'iterative' view says sets start with the empty set and build up [Brown,JR] |
Full Idea: The modern 'iterative' concept of a set starts with the empty set φ (or unsetted individuals), then uses set-forming operations (characterized by the axioms) to build up ever more complex sets. | |
From: James Robert Brown (Philosophy of Mathematics [1999], Ch. 2) | |
A reaction: The only sets in our system will be those we can construct, rather than anything accepted intuitively. It is more about building an elaborate machine that works than about giving a good model of reality. |
9642 | A flock of birds is not a set, because a set cannot go anywhere [Brown,JR] |
Full Idea: Neither a flock of birds nor a pack of wolves is strictly a set, since a flock can fly south, and a pack can be on the prowl, whereas sets go nowhere and menace no one. | |
From: James Robert Brown (Philosophy of Mathematics [1999], Ch. 7) | |
A reaction: To say that the pack menaced you would presumably be to commit the fallacy of composition. Doesn't the number 64 have properties which its set-theoretic elements (whatever we decide they are) will lack? |
9605 | If a proposition is false, then its negation is true [Brown,JR] |
Full Idea: The law of excluded middle says if a proposition is false, then its negation is true | |
From: James Robert Brown (Philosophy of Mathematics [1999], Ch. 1) | |
A reaction: Surely that is the best statement of the law? How do you write that down? ¬(P)→¬P? No, because it is a semantic claim, not a syntactic claim, so a truth table captures it. Semantic claims are bigger than syntactic claims. |
9649 | Axioms are either self-evident, or stipulations, or fallible attempts [Brown,JR] |
Full Idea: The three views one could adopt concerning axioms are that they are self-evident truths, or that they are arbitrary stipulations, or that they are fallible attempts to describe how things are. | |
From: James Robert Brown (Philosophy of Mathematics [1999], Ch.10) | |
A reaction: Presumably modern platonists like the third version, with others choosing the second, and hardly anyone now having the confidence to embrace the first. |
9638 | Berry's Paradox finds a contradiction in the naming of huge numbers [Brown,JR] |
Full Idea: Berry's Paradox refers to 'the least integer not namable in fewer than nineteen syllables' - a paradox because it has just been named in eighteen syllables. | |
From: James Robert Brown (Philosophy of Mathematics [1999], Ch. 5) | |
A reaction: Apparently George Boolos used this quirky idea as a basis for a new and more streamlined proof of Gödel's Theorem. Don't tell me you don't find that impressive. |
9604 | Mathematics is the only place where we are sure we are right [Brown,JR] |
Full Idea: Mathematics seems to be the one and only place where we humans can be absolutely sure that we got it right. | |
From: James Robert Brown (Philosophy of Mathematics [1999], Ch. 1) | |
A reaction: Apart from death and taxes, that is. Personally I am more certain of the keyboard I am typing on than I am of Pythagoras's Theorem, but the experts seem pretty confident about the number stuff. |
9622 | 'There are two apples' can be expressed logically, with no mention of numbers [Brown,JR] |
Full Idea: 'There are two apples' can be recast as 'x is an apple and y is an apple, and x isn't y, and if z is an apple it is the same as x or y', which makes no appeal at all to mathematics. | |
From: James Robert Brown (Philosophy of Mathematics [1999], Ch. 4) | |
A reaction: He cites this as the basis of Hartry Field's claim that science can be done without numbers. The logic is ∃x∃y∀z(Ax&Ay&(x¬=y)&(Az→z=x∨z=y)). |
9648 | π is a 'transcendental' number, because it is not the solution of an equation [Brown,JR] |
Full Idea: The number π is not only irrational, but it is also (unlike √2) a 'transcendental' number, because it is not the solution of an algebraic equation. | |
From: James Robert Brown (Philosophy of Mathematics [1999], Ch.10) | |
A reaction: So is that a superficial property, or a profound one? Answers on a post card. |
9621 | Mathematics represents the world through structurally similar models. [Brown,JR] |
Full Idea: Mathematics hooks onto the world by providing representations in the form of structurally similar models. | |
From: James Robert Brown (Philosophy of Mathematics [1999], Ch. 4) | |
A reaction: This is Brown's conclusion. It needs notions of mapping, one-to-one correspondence, and similarity. I like the idea of a 'model', as used in both logic and mathematics, and children's hobbies. The mind is a model-making machine. |
9646 | There is no limit to how many ways something can be proved in mathematics [Brown,JR] |
Full Idea: I'm tempted to say that mathematics is so rich that there are indefinitely many ways to prove anything - verbal/symbolic derivations and pictures are just two. | |
From: James Robert Brown (Philosophy of Mathematics [1999], Ch. 9) | |
A reaction: Brown has been defending pictures as a form of proof. I wonder how long his list would be, if we challenged him to give more details? Some people have very low standards of proof. |
9647 | Computers played an essential role in proving the four-colour theorem of maps [Brown,JR] |
Full Idea: The celebrity of the famous proof in 1976 of the four-colour theorem of maps is that a computer played an essential role in the proof. | |
From: James Robert Brown (Philosophy of Mathematics [1999], Ch.10) | |
A reaction: The problem concerns the reliability of the computers, but then all the people who check a traditional proof might also be unreliable. Quis custodet custodies? |
9643 | Set theory may represent all of mathematics, without actually being mathematics [Brown,JR] |
Full Idea: Maybe all of mathematics can be represented in set theory, but we should not think that mathematics is set theory. Functions can be represented as order pairs, but perhaps that is not what functions really are. | |
From: James Robert Brown (Philosophy of Mathematics [1999], Ch. 7) | |
A reaction: This seems to me to be the correct view of the situation. If 2 is represented as {φ,{φ}}, why is that asymmetrical? The first digit seems to be the senior and original partner, but how could the digits of 2 differ from one another? |
9644 | When graphs are defined set-theoretically, that won't cover unlabelled graphs [Brown,JR] |
Full Idea: The basic definition of a graph can be given in set-theoretic terms,...but then what could an unlabelled graph be? | |
From: James Robert Brown (Philosophy of Mathematics [1999], Ch. 7) | |
A reaction: An unlabelled graph will at least need a verbal description for it to have any significance at all. My daily mood-swings look like this.... |
9625 | To see a structure in something, we must already have the idea of the structure [Brown,JR] |
Full Idea: Epistemology is a big worry for structuralists. ..To conjecture that something has a particular structure, we must already have conceived of the idea of the structure itself; we cannot be discovering structures by conjecturing them. | |
From: James Robert Brown (Philosophy of Mathematics [1999], Ch. 4) | |
A reaction: This has to be a crucial area of discussion. Do we have our heads full of abstract structures before we look out of the window? Externalism about the mind is important here; mind and world are not utterly distinct things. |
9628 | Sets seem basic to mathematics, but they don't suit structuralism [Brown,JR] |
Full Idea: Set theory is at the very heart of mathematics; it may even be all there is to mathematics. The notion of set, however, seems quite contrary to the spirit of structuralism. | |
From: James Robert Brown (Philosophy of Mathematics [1999], Ch. 4) | |
A reaction: So much the worse for sets, I say. You can, for example, define ordinality in terms of sets, but that is no good if ordinality is basic to the nature of numbers, rather than a later addition. |
9606 | The irrationality of root-2 was achieved by intellect, not experience [Brown,JR] |
Full Idea: We could not discover irrational numbers by physical measurement. The discovery of the irrationality of the square root of two was an intellectual achievement, not at all connected to sense experience. | |
From: James Robert Brown (Philosophy of Mathematics [1999], Ch. 1) | |
A reaction: Brown declares himself a platonist, and this is clearly a key argument for him, and rather a good one. Hm. I'll get back to you on this one... |
9612 | There is an infinity of mathematical objects, so they can't be physical [Brown,JR] |
Full Idea: A simple argument makes it clear that all mathematical arguments are abstract: there are infinitely many numbers, but only a finite number of physical entities, so most mathematical objects are non-physical. The best assumption is that they all are. | |
From: James Robert Brown (Philosophy of Mathematics [1999], Ch. 2) | |
A reaction: This, it seems to me, is where constructivists score well (cf. Idea 9608). I don't have an infinity of bricks to build an infinity of houses, but I can imagine that the bricks just keep coming if I need them. Imagination is what is unbounded. |
9610 | Numbers are not abstracted from particulars, because each number is a particular [Brown,JR] |
Full Idea: Numbers are not 'abstract' (in the old sense, of universals abstracted from particulars), since each of the integers is a unique individual, a particular, not a universal. | |
From: James Robert Brown (Philosophy of Mathematics [1999], Ch. 2) | |
A reaction: An interesting observation which I have not seen directly stated before. Compare Idea 645. I suspect that numbers should be thought of as higher-order abstractions, which don't behave like normal universals (i.e. they're not distributed). |
9620 | Empiricists base numbers on objects, Platonists base them on properties [Brown,JR] |
Full Idea: Perhaps, instead of objects, numbers are associated with properties of objects. Basing them on objects is strongly empiricist and uses first-order logic, whereas the latter view is somewhat Platonistic, and uses second-order logic. | |
From: James Robert Brown (Philosophy of Mathematics [1999], Ch. 4) | |
A reaction: I don't seem to have a view on this. You can count tomatoes, or you can count red objects, or even 'instances of red'. Numbers refer to whatever can be individuated. No individuation, no arithmetic. (It's also Hume v Armstrong on laws on nature). |
9639 | Does some mathematics depend entirely on notation? [Brown,JR] |
Full Idea: Are there mathematical properties which can only be discovered using a particular notation? | |
From: James Robert Brown (Philosophy of Mathematics [1999], Ch. 6) | |
A reaction: If so, this would seem to be a serious difficulty for platonists. Brown has just been exploring the mathematical theory of knots. |
9629 | For nomalists there are no numbers, only numerals [Brown,JR] |
Full Idea: For the instinctive nominalist in mathematics, there are no numbers, only numerals. | |
From: James Robert Brown (Philosophy of Mathematics [1999], Ch. 5) | |
A reaction: Maybe. A numeral is a specific sign, sometimes in a specific natural language, so this seems to miss the fact that cardinality etc are features of reality, not just conventions. |
9630 | The most brilliant formalist was Hilbert [Brown,JR] |
Full Idea: In mathematics, the most brilliant formalist of all was Hilbert | |
From: James Robert Brown (Philosophy of Mathematics [1999], Ch. 5) | |
A reaction: He seems to have developed his fully formalist views later in his career. See Mathematics|Basis of Mathematic|Formalism in our thematic section. Kreisel denies that Hilbert was a true formalist. |
9608 | There are no constructions for many highly desirable results in mathematics [Brown,JR] |
Full Idea: Constuctivists link truth with constructive proof, but necessarily lack constructions for many highly desirable results of classical mathematics, making their account of mathematical truth rather implausible. | |
From: James Robert Brown (Philosophy of Mathematics [1999], Ch. 2) | |
A reaction: The tricky word here is 'desirable', which is an odd criterion for mathematical truth. Nevertheless this sounds like a good objection. How flexible might the concept of a 'construction' be? |
9645 | Constructivists say p has no value, if the value depends on Goldbach's Conjecture [Brown,JR] |
Full Idea: If we define p as '3 if Goldbach's Conjecture is true' and '5 if Goldbach's Conjecture is false', it seems that p must be a prime number, but, amazingly, constructivists would not accept this without a proof of Goldbach's Conjecture. | |
From: James Robert Brown (Philosophy of Mathematics [1999], Ch. 8) | |
A reaction: A very similar argument structure to Schrödinger's Cat. This seems (as Brown implies) to be a devastating knock-down argument, but I'll keep an open mind for now. |
9619 | David's 'Napoleon' is about something concrete and something abstract [Brown,JR] |
Full Idea: David's painting of Napoleon (on a white horse) is a 'picture' of Napoleon, and a 'symbol' of leadership, courage, adventure. It manages to be about something concrete and something abstract. | |
From: James Robert Brown (Philosophy of Mathematics [1999], Ch. 3) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as the germ of an extremely important idea - that abstraction is involved in our perception of the concrete, so that they are not two entirely separate realms. Seeing 'as' involves abstraction. |
14502 | Plato's idea of 'structure' tends to be mathematically expressed [Plato, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: 'Structure' tends to be characterized by Plato as something that is mathematically expressed. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects V.3 iv | |
A reaction: [Koslicki is drawing on Verity Harte here] |
3039 | When Diogenes said he could only see objects but not their forms, Plato said it was because he had eyes but no intellect [Plato, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: When Diogenes told Plato he saw tables and cups, but not 'tableness' and 'cupness', Plato replied that this was because Diogenes had eyes but no intellect. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 06.2.6 |
20906 | Platonists argue for the indivisible triangle-in-itself [Plato, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The Platonists, on the basis of purely logical arguments, posit the existence of an indivisible 'triangle in itself'. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) 316a15 | |
A reaction: A helpful confirmation that geometrical figures really are among the Forms (bearing in mind that numbers are not, because they contain one another). What shape is the Form of the triangle? |
17948 | Plato's Forms meant that the sophists only taught the appearance of wisdom and virtue [Plato, by Nehamas] |
Full Idea: Plato's theory of Forms allowed him to claim that the sophists and other opponents were trapped in the world of appearance. What they therefore taught was only apparent wisdom and virtue. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Alexander Nehamas - Eristic,Antilogic,Sophistic,Dialectic p.118 |
556 | If there is one Form for both the Form and its participants, they must have something in common [Aristotle on Plato] |
Full Idea: If there is the same Form for the Forms and for their participants, then they must have something in common. | |
From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 991a |
563 | If gods are like men, they are just eternal men; similarly, Forms must differ from particulars [Aristotle on Plato] |
Full Idea: We say there is the form of man, horse and health, but nothing else, making the same mistake as those who say that there are gods but that they are in the form of men. They just posit eternal men, and here we are not positing forms but eternal sensibles. | |
From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 997b |
565 | The Forms cannot be changeless if they are in changing things [Aristotle on Plato] |
Full Idea: The Forms could not be changeless if they were in changing things. | |
From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 998a |
557 | A Form is a cause of things only in the way that white mixed with white is a cause [Aristotle on Plato] |
Full Idea: A Form is a cause of things only in the way that white mixed with white is a cause. | |
From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 991a |
9607 | The greatest discovery in human thought is Plato's discovery of abstract objects [Brown,JR on Plato] |
Full Idea: The greatest discovery in the history of human thought is Plato's discovery of abstract objects. | |
From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by James Robert Brown - Philosophy of Mathematics Ch. 2 | |
A reaction: Compare Idea 2860! Given the diametrically opposed views, it is clearly likely that Plato's central view is the most important idea in the history of human thought, even if it is wrong. |
13263 | We can grasp whole things in science, because they have a mathematics and a teleology [Plato, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Due to the mathematical nature of structure and the teleological cause underlying the creation of Platonic wholes, these wholes are intelligible, and are in fact the proper objects of science. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 5.3 | |
A reaction: I like this idea, because it pays attention to the connection between how we conceive objects to be, and how we are able to think about objects. Only examining these two together enables us to grasp metaphysics. |
13261 | Plato sees an object's structure as expressible in mathematics [Plato, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: The 'structure' of an object tends to be characterised by Plato as something that is mathematically expressible. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 5.3 | |
A reaction: This seems to be pure Pythagoreanism (see Idea 644). Plato is pursuing Pythagoras's research programme, of trying to find mathematics buried in every aspect of reality. |
13265 | Plato was less concerned than Aristotle with the source of unity in a complex object [Plato, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Plato was less concerned than Aristotle with the project of how to account, in completely general terms, for the source of unity within a mereologically complex object. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 5.5 | |
A reaction: Plato seems to have simply asserted that some sort of harmony held things together. Aristotles puts the forms [eidos] within objects, rather than external, so he has to give a fuller account of what is going on in an object. He never managed it! |
593 | Plato's holds that there are three substances: Forms, mathematical entities, and perceptible bodies [Plato, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Plato's doctrine was that the Forms and mathematicals are two substances and that the third substance is that of perceptible bodies. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 1028b |
13260 | Plato says wholes are either containers, or they're atomic, or they don't exist [Plato, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Plato considers a 'container' model for wholes (which are disjoint from their parts) [Parm 144e3-], and a 'nihilist' model, in which only wholes are mereological atoms, and a 'bare pluralities' view, in which wholes are not really one at all. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 5.2 | |
A reaction: [She cites Verity Harte for this analysis of Plato] The fourth, and best, seems to be that wholes are parts which fall under some unifying force or structure or principle. |
11237 | Only universals have essence [Plato, by Politis] |
Full Idea: Plato argues that only universals have essence. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 1.4 |
11238 | Plato and Aristotle take essence to make a thing what it is [Plato, by Politis] |
Full Idea: Plato and Aristotle have a shared general conception of essence: the essence of a thing is what that thing is simply in virtue of itself and in virtue of being the very thing it is. It answers the question 'What is this very thing?' | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 1.4 |
17085 | A good explanation totally rules out the opposite explanation (so Forms are required) [Plato, by Ruben] |
Full Idea: For Plato, an acceptable explanation is one such that there is no possibility of there being the opposite explanation at all, and he thought that only explanations in terms of the Forms, but never physical explanations, could meet this requirement. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by David-Hillel Ruben - Explaining Explanation Ch 2 | |
A reaction: [Republic 436c is cited] |
5504 | Maybe we should see persons in four dimensions, with stages or time-slices at an instant [Martin/Barresi] |
Full Idea: Some recent philosophers have argued that we should replace the three-dimensional view of persons with a four-dimensional view according to which only time-slices, or 'stages', of persons exist at short intervals of time. | |
From: R Martin / J Barresi (Introduction to 'Personal Identity' [2003], p.3) | |
A reaction: At first glance this seems to neatly eliminate lots of traditional worries. But why would I want to retain my identity, if someone threatened to brainwash me. I also want to disown my inadequate earlier selves. Interesting, though. Lewis. |
5503 | Maybe personal identity is not vital in survival, and other continuations would suffice [Martin/Barresi] |
Full Idea: A modern question is whether personal identity is primarily what matters in survival; that is, people might cease and be continued by others whose continuation the original people would value as much. | |
From: R Martin / J Barresi (Introduction to 'Personal Identity' [2003], p.3) | |
A reaction: When put like this, the proposal seems hard to grasp. It only makes sense if you don't really believe in a thing called 'personal identity'. I don't see how you can believe in it without also believing that for you it has central importance. |
5502 | Locke's intrinsic view of personal identity has been replaced by an externalist view [Martin/Barresi] |
Full Idea: In modern times the Lockean intrinsic relations view of personal identity has been superseded by an extrinsic relations view (also called the 'closest-continuer' or 'externalist' view). | |
From: R Martin / J Barresi (Introduction to 'Personal Identity' [2003], p.1) | |
A reaction: Sounds sweeping. My suspicion is that there is a raging fashion for externalist views of everything (justification, content etc.), but this will pass. I take Parfit to be the source of the modern views. |
1651 | Plato wanted to somehow control and purify the passions [Vlastos on Plato] |
Full Idea: Plato put high on his agenda a project which did not figure in Socrates' programme at all: the hygienic conditioning of the passions. This cannot be an intellectual process, as argument cannot touch them. | |
From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Gregory Vlastos - Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher p.88 | |
A reaction: This is the standard traditional view of any thinker who exaggerates the importance and potential of reason in our lives. |
9611 | 'Abstract' nowadays means outside space and time, not concrete, not physical [Brown,JR] |
Full Idea: The current usage of 'abstract' simply means outside space and time, not concrete, not physical. | |
From: James Robert Brown (Philosophy of Mathematics [1999], Ch. 2) | |
A reaction: This is in contrast to Idea 9609 (the older notion of being abstracted). It seems odd that our ancestors had a theory about where such ideas came from, but modern thinkers have no theory at all. Blame Frege for that. |
9609 | The older sense of 'abstract' is where 'redness' or 'group' is abstracted from particulars [Brown,JR] |
Full Idea: The older sense of 'abstract' applies to universals, where a universal like 'redness' is abstracted from red particulars; it is the one associated with the many. In mathematics, the notion of 'group' or 'vector space' perhaps fits this pattern. | |
From: James Robert Brown (Philosophy of Mathematics [1999], Ch. 2) | |
A reaction: I am currently investigating whether this 'older' concept is in fact dead. It seems to me that it is needed, as part of cognitive science, and as the crucial link between a materialist metaphysic and the world of ideas. |
9640 | A term can have not only a sense and a reference, but also a 'computational role' [Brown,JR] |
Full Idea: In addition to the sense and reference of term, there is the 'computational' role. The name '2' has a sense (successor of 1) and a reference (the number 2). But the word 'two' has little computational power, Roman 'II' is better, and '2' is a marvel. | |
From: James Robert Brown (Philosophy of Mathematics [1999], Ch. 6) | |
A reaction: Very interesting, and the point might transfer to natural languages. Synonymous terms carry with them not just different expressive powers, but the capacity to play different roles (e.g. slang and formal terms, gob and mouth). |
3324 | Plato's whole philosophy may be based on being duped by reification - a figure of speech [Benardete,JA on Plato] |
Full Idea: Plato is liable to the charge of having been duped by a figure of speech, albeit the most profound of all, the trope of reification. | |
From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.12 | |
A reaction: That might be a plausible account if his view was ridiculous, but given how many powerful friends Plato has, especially in the philosophy of mathematics, we should assume he was cleverer than that. |
7503 | Plato never refers to examining the conscience [Plato, by Foucault] |
Full Idea: Plato never speaks of the examination of conscience - never! | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Michel Foucault - On the Genealogy of Ethics p.276 | |
A reaction: Plato does imply some sort of self-evident direct knowledge about that nature of a healthy soul. Presumably the full-blown concept of conscience is something given from outside, from God. In 'Euthyphro', Plato asserts the primacy of morality (Idea 337). |
2173 | As religion and convention collapsed, Plato sought morals not just in knowledge, but in the soul [Williams,B on Plato] |
Full Idea: Once gods and fate and social expectation were no longer there, Plato felt it necessary to discover ethics inside human nature, not just as ethical knowledge (Socrates' view), but in the structure of the soul. | |
From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Bernard Williams - Shame and Necessity II - p.43 | |
A reaction: anti Charles Taylor |
9274 | Plato's legacy to European thought was the Good, the Beautiful and the True [Plato, by Gray] |
Full Idea: Plato's legacy to European thought was a trio of capital letters - the Good, the Beautiful and the True. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by John Gray - Straw Dogs 2.8 | |
A reaction: It seems to have been Baumgarten who turned this into a slogan (Idea 8117). Gray says these ideals are lethal, but I identify with them very strongly, and am quite happy to see the good life as an attempt to find the right balance between them. |
94 | Pleasure is better with the addition of intelligence, so pleasure is not the good [Plato, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Plato says the life of pleasure is more desirable with the addition of intelligence, and if the combination is better, pleasure is not the good. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Nicomachean Ethics 1172b27 | |
A reaction: It is obvious why we like pleasure, but not why intelligence makes it 'better'. Maybe it is just because we enjoy intelligence? |
17947 | Plato decided that the virtuous and happy life was the philosophical life [Plato, by Nehamas] |
Full Idea: Plato came to the conclusion that virtue and happiness consist in the life of philosophy itself. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Alexander Nehamas - Eristic,Antilogic,Sophistic,Dialectic p.117 | |
A reaction: This view is obviously ridiculous, because it largely excludes almost the entire human race, which sees philosophy as a cul-de-sac, even if it is good. But virtue and happiness need some serious thought. |
6015 | Plato, unusually, said that theoretical and practical wisdom are inseparable [Plato, by Kraut] |
Full Idea: Two virtues that are ordinarily kept distinct - theoretical and practical wisdom - are joined by Plato; he thinks that neither one can be fully possessed unless it is combined with the other. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Richard Kraut - Plato | |
A reaction: I get the impression that this doctrine comes from Socrates, whose position is widely reported as 'intellectualist'. Aristotle certainly held the opposite view. |
2912 | Plato is boring [Nietzsche on Plato] |
Full Idea: Plato is boring. | |
From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Friedrich Nietzsche - Twilight of the Idols 9.2 |
9635 | Given atomism at one end, and a finite universe at the other, there are no physical infinities [Brown,JR] |
Full Idea: There seem to be no actual infinites in the physical realm. Given the correctness of atomism, there are no infinitely small things, no infinite divisibility. And General Relativity says that the universe is only finitely large. | |
From: James Robert Brown (Philosophy of Mathematics [1999], Ch. 5) | |
A reaction: If time was infinite, you could travel round in a circle forever. An atom has size, so it has a left, middle and right to it. Etc. They seem to be physical, so we will count those too. |
1526 | Almost everyone except Plato thinks that time could not have been generated [Plato, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: With a single exception (Plato) everyone agrees about time - that it is not generated. Democritus says time is an obvious example of something not generated. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Physics 251b14 |
5505 | For Aristotle the psyche perishes with the body (except possibly 'nous') [Martin/Barresi] |
Full Idea: In Aristotle's view, with the possible exception of 'nous' the psyche and all its parts come into being at the same time as its associated body; it is inseparable from the body, and perishes along with it. | |
From: R Martin / J Barresi (Introduction to 'Personal Identity' [2003], p.8) | |
A reaction: It is suggested that he thought there was only one 'nous', which all humans share (p.9). If he wants to claim that one part is immortal, he doesn't have much evidence. If psyche is the form of the body, it is bound to perish. |