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All the ideas for 'Parmenides', 'Epistemology: contemporary introduction' and 'Treatise 2: Virtue or Moral Good'

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76 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
When questions are doubtful we should concentrate not on objects but on ideas of the intellect [Plato]
     Full Idea: Doubtful questions should not be discussed in terms of visible objects or in relation to them, but only with reference to ideas conceived by the intellect.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 135e)
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 5. Opposites
Opposites are as unlike as possible [Plato]
     Full Idea: Opposites are as unlike as possible.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 159a)
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Plato's 'Parmenides' is the greatest artistic achievement of the ancient dialectic [Hegel on Plato]
     Full Idea: Plato's 'Parmenides' is the greatest artistic achievement of the ancient dialectic.
     From: comment on Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Georg W.F.Hegel - Phenomenology of Spirit Pref 71
     A reaction: It is a long way from the analytic tradition of philosophy to be singling out a classic text for its 'artistic' achievement. Eventually we may even look back on, say, Kripke's 'Naming and Necessity' and see it in that light.
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 3. Antinomies
Plato found antinomies in ideas, Kant in space and time, and Bradley in relations [Plato, by Ryle]
     Full Idea: Plato (in 'Parmenides') shows that the theory that 'Eide' are substances, and Kant that space and time are substances, and Bradley that relations are substances, all lead to aninomies.
     From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Gilbert Ryle - Are there propositions? 'Objections'
Plato's 'Parmenides' is perhaps the best collection of antinomies ever made [Russell on Plato]
     Full Idea: Plato's 'Parmenides' is perhaps the best collection of antinomies ever made.
     From: comment on Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Bertrand Russell - The Principles of Mathematics §337
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
One is, so numbers exist, so endless numbers exist, and each one must partake of being [Plato]
     Full Idea: If one is, there must also necessarily be number - Necessarily - But if there is number, there would be many, and an unlimited multitude of beings. ..So if all partakes of being, each part of number would also partake of it.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 144a)
     A reaction: This seems to commit to numbers having being, then to too many numbers, and hence to too much being - but without backing down and wondering whether numbers had being after all. Aristotle disagreed.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / c. Becoming
The one was and is and will be and was becoming and is becoming and will become [Plato]
     Full Idea: The one was and is and will be and was becoming and is becoming and will become.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 155d)
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / f. Primary being
Plato's Parmenides has a three-part theory, of Primal One, a One-Many, and a One-and-Many [Plato, by Plotinus]
     Full Idea: The Platonic Parmenides is more exact [than Parmenides himself]; the distinction is made between the Primal One, a strictly pure Unity, and a secondary One which is a One-Many, and a third which is a One-and-Many.
     From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Plotinus - The Enneads 5.1.08
     A reaction: Plotinus approves of this three-part theory. Parmenides has the problem that the highest Being contains no movement. By placing the One outside Being you can give it powers which an existent thing cannot have. Cf the concept of God.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Absolute ideas, such as the Good and the Beautiful, cannot be known by us [Plato]
     Full Idea: The absolute good and the beautiful and all which we conceive to be absolute ideas are unknown to us.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 134c)
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
You must always mean the same thing when you utter the same name [Plato]
     Full Idea: You must always mean the same thing when you utter the same name.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 147d)
If you deny that each thing always stays the same, you destroy the possibility of discussion [Plato]
     Full Idea: If a person denies that the idea of each thing is always the same, he will utterly destroy the power of carrying on discussion.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 135c)
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
If admirable things have Forms, maybe everything else does as well [Plato]
     Full Idea: It is troubling that if admirable things have abstract ideas, then perhaps everything else must have ideas as well.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 130d)
If absolute ideas existed in us, they would cease to be absolute [Plato]
     Full Idea: None of the absolute ideas exists in us, because then it would no longer be absolute.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 133c)
Greatness and smallness must exist, to be opposed to one another, and come into being in things [Plato]
     Full Idea: These two ideas, greatness and smallness, exist, do they not? For if they did not exist, they could not be opposites of one another, and could not come into being in things.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 149e)
Plato moves from Forms to a theory of genera and principles in his later work [Plato, by Frede,M]
     Full Idea: It seems to me that Plato in the later dialogues, beginning with the second half of 'Parmenides', wants to substitute a theory of genera and theory of principles that constitute these genera for the earlier theory of forms.
     From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Michael Frede - Title, Unity, Authenticity of the 'Categories' V
     A reaction: My theory is that the later Plato came under the influence of the brilliant young Aristotle, and this idea is a symptom of it. The theory of 'principles' sounds like hylomorphism to me.
It would be absurd to think there were abstract Forms for vile things like hair, mud and dirt [Plato]
     Full Idea: Are there abstract ideas for such things as hair, mud and dirt, which are particularly vile and worthless? That would be quite absurd.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 130d)
The concept of a master includes the concept of a slave [Plato]
     Full Idea: Mastership in the abstract is mastership of slavery in the abstract.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 133e)
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
Participation is not by means of similarity, so we are looking for some other method of participation [Plato]
     Full Idea: Participation is not by means of likeness, so we must seek some other method of participation.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 133a)
Each idea is in all its participants at once, just as daytime is a unity but in many separate places at once [Plato]
     Full Idea: Just as day is in many places at once, but not separated from itself, so each idea might be in all its participants at once.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 131b)
If things are made alike by participating in something, that thing will be the absolute idea [Plato]
     Full Idea: That by participation in which like things are made like, will be the absolute idea, will it not?
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 132e)
If things partake of ideas, this implies either that everything thinks, or that everything actually is thought [Plato]
     Full Idea: If all things partake of ideas, must either everything be made of thoughts and everything thinks, or everything is thought, and so can't think?
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 132c)
The whole idea of each Form must be found in each thing which participates in it [Plato]
     Full Idea: The whole idea of each form (of beauty, justice etc) must be found in each thing which participates in it.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 131a)
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / c. Self-predication
If absolute greatness and great things are seen as the same, another thing appears which makes them seem great [Plato]
     Full Idea: If you regard the absolute great and the many great things in the same way, will not another appear beyond, by which all these must appear to be great?
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 132a)
Nothing can be like an absolute idea, because a third idea intervenes to make them alike (leading to a regress) [Plato]
     Full Idea: It is impossible for anything to be like an absolute idea, because a third idea will appear to make them alike, and if that is like anything, it will lead to another idea, and so on.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 133a)
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
Parts must belong to a created thing with a distinct form [Plato]
     Full Idea: The part would not be the part of many things or all, but of some one character ['ideas'] and of some one thing, which we call a 'whole', since it has come to be one complete [perfected] thing composed [created] of all.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 157d)
     A reaction: A serious shot by Plato at what identity is. Harte quotes it (125) and shows that 'character' is Gk 'idea', and 'composed' will translate as 'created'. 'Form' links this Platonic passage to Aristotle's hylomorphism.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
In Parmenides, if composition is identity, a whole is nothing more than its parts [Plato, by Harte,V]
     Full Idea: At the heart of the 'Parmenides' puzzles about composition is the thesis that composition is identity. Considered thus, a whole adds nothing to an ontology that already includes its parts
     From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Verity Harte - Plato on Parts and Wholes 2.5
     A reaction: There has to be more to a unified identity that mere proximity of the parts. When do parts come together, and when do they actually 'compose' something?
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
Plato says only a one has parts, and a many does not [Plato, by Harte,V]
     Full Idea: In 'Parmenides' it is argued that a part cannot be part of a many, but must be part of something one.
     From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 157c) by Verity Harte - Plato on Parts and Wholes 3.2
     A reaction: This looks like the right way to go with the term 'part'. We presuppose a unity before we even talk of its parts, so we can't get into contradictions and paradoxes about their relationships.
Anything which has parts must be one thing, and parts are of a one, not of a many [Plato]
     Full Idea: The whole of which the parts are parts must be one thing composed of many; for each of the parts must be part, not of a many, but of a whole.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 157c)
     A reaction: This is a key move of metaphysics, and we should hang on to it. The other way madness lies.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
It seems that the One must be composed of parts, which contradicts its being one [Plato]
     Full Idea: The One must be composed of parts, both being a whole and having parts. So on both grounds the One would thus be many and not one. But it must be not many, but one. So if the One will be one, it will neither be a whole, nor have parts.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 137c09), quoted by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 5.2
     A reaction: This is the starting point for Plato's metaphysical discussion of objects. It seems to begin a line of thought which is completed by Aristotle, surmising that only an essential structure can bestow identity on a bunch of parts.
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
Two things relate either as same or different, or part of a whole, or the whole of the part [Plato]
     Full Idea: Everything is surely related to everything as follows: either it is the same or different; or, if it is not the same or different, it would be related as part to whole or as whole to part.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 146b)
     A reaction: This strikes me as a really helpful first step in trying to analyse the nature of identity. Two things are either two or (actually) one, or related mereologically.
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
Because 'gold is malleable' is necessary does not mean that it is analytic [Audi,R]
     Full Idea: Taking the proposition that gold is malleable to be necessary does not commit one to considering it analytic.
     From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], IV p.116)
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
Beliefs are based on perception, memory, introspection or reason [Audi,R]
     Full Idea: The four basic kinds of belief are rooted in perception, memory, introspective consciousness, and reason.
     From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], Intr.p.7)
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / e. Belief holism
Could you have a single belief on its own? [Audi,R]
     Full Idea: Could one have just a single belief?
     From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], VII p.198)
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
We can make certain of what we know, so knowing does not entail certainty [Audi,R]
     Full Idea: The possibility of making certain of what we already know suggests that knowing a proposition does not entail its being certain.
     From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], VIII p.220)
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
If you gradually remove a book's sensory properties, what is left at the end? [Audi,R]
     Full Idea: If you imagine subtracting a book's sensory properties one by one, what is left of it?
     From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], I p.42)
Sense-data theory is indirect realism, but phenomenalism is direct irrealism [Audi,R]
     Full Idea: Where the sense-datum theory is an indirect realism, phenomenalism is a direct irrealism.
     From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], I p.43)
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
The concepts needed for a priori thought may come from experience [Audi,R]
     Full Idea: I may well need experience to acquire the concepts needed for knowledge of the a priori, such as the concept of a colour.
     From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], IV p.103)
Red and green being exclusive colours seems to be rationally graspable but not analytic [Audi,R]
     Full Idea: The proposition that nothing is red and green all over at once is not analytic, but it is rationally graspable, so it seems to be an a priori synthetic proposition.
     From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], IV p.100)
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
To see something as a field, I obviously need the concept of a field [Audi,R]
     Full Idea: The propositional belief which portrays what I see in front of me AS a field requires my having a concept of one.
     From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], I p.17)
     A reaction: To me this immediately invites the question of what a cow or horse experiences when they look at a familiar field. They know how to leave and enter it, and register its boundaries and qualities. Concepts?
How could I see a field and believe nothing regarding it? [Audi,R]
     Full Idea: How could I see a field and believe nothing regarding it?
     From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], I p.20)
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
Sense data imply representative realism, possibly only representing primary qualities [Audi,R]
     Full Idea: A sense-datum theory might be called a representative realism because it conceives perception as a relation in which sense-data represent perceived external (hence real) objects to us. For Locke they were resemblances only of primary qualities.
     From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], I p.33)
Sense-data (and the rival 'adverbial' theory) are to explain illusions and hallucinations [Audi,R]
     Full Idea: The sense-datum theory is mainly to explain hallucinations and illusions, though there might be other theories, such as the 'adverbial' theory.
     From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], I p.36)
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
Perception is first simple, then objectual (with concepts) and then propositional [Audi,R]
     Full Idea: Simple perceiving gives rise to objectual perceiving (attaching concepts to the object), which gives rise to propositional perceiving.
     From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], I p.23)
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
Virtually all rationalists assert that we can have knowledge of synthetic a priori truths [Audi,R]
     Full Idea: Rationalists virtually always assert or imply that, in addition to knowledge of analytic truths, there is knowledge of synthetic a priori truths.
     From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], IV p.105)
The principles of justification have to be a priori [Audi,R]
     Full Idea: The crucial principles of justification are a priori.
     From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], X p.311)
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
To remember something is to know it [Audi,R]
     Full Idea: Remembering something is so entails knowing that it is so.
     From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], II p.68)
     A reaction: Clearly I can say I "remember" x, but be wrong. Presumably we then say that I didn't really remember, which requires success, like "I know". It is true (as with "know") that as soon as I say that the something is false, I can't claim to remember it.
I might remember someone I can't recall or image, by recognising them on meeting [Audi,R]
     Full Idea: If I can neither recall nor image Jane I can still remember her, for on seeing her I might recognise her, and might remember, and even recall, our last meeting.
     From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], II p.66)
     A reaction: Hm. I can hardly claim to remember her if I have no concept of her, and don't recall our last meeting. If seeing her triggers recognition, I would say that I NOW remember her, but I didn't before. Memory is more conscious than Audi claims.
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
Justification is either unanchored (infinite or circular), or anchored (in knowledge or non-knowledge) [Audi,R]
     Full Idea: There are four possible kinds of epistemic chain: infinite and unanchored, circular and unanchored, anchored in a belief which is not knowledge, and anchored in a belief which is bedrock knowledge.
     From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], VII p.183)
     A reaction: About right, though I don't think 'chain' is the right word for what is proposed if justification is to be coherent. The justifications float like lilies in the pond of reason, and a Self (Monet?) seems needed to assess the picture
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
Internalism about justification implies that there is a right to believe something [Audi,R]
     Full Idea: Internalists about justification tend to conceive of it as a matter of having a right to believe something.
     From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], VIII p.234)
     A reaction: I'm an internalist, but I don't understand this, unless it refers to the social aspect of justification. Can I grant myself internal rights? I can justify my belief to other people.
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
Maths may be consistent with observations, but not coherent [Audi,R]
     Full Idea: That 7+5=12 and that carrots are nourishing are mutually consistent, but do not exhibit coherence.
     From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], VII p.192)
     A reaction: This shows how difficult it would be to define 'coherent'. Is 'carrots are nourishing' coherent with 'fish are nourishing'? Is the battle of Hastings coherent with the battle of Waterloo?
It is very hard to show how much coherence is needed for justification [Audi,R]
     Full Idea: It is very difficult to specify when an explanatory relation generates enough coherence to create justification.
     From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], VII p.193)
     A reaction: I take coherence to be the key concept in epistemology, and quite impossible to define. This is why the 'space of reasons' is a useful concept. It is a courtroom, in which each case is different.
A consistent madman could have a very coherent belief system [Audi,R]
     Full Idea: A schizophrenic who thinks he is Napoleon, if he has a completely consistent story with enough interlocking details, may have a belief system that is superbly coherent.
     From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], VII p.194)
     A reaction: This is an exaggeration, but the fact is that one isolated lie is totally coherent, so coherence can only emerge when a system is large. Sense experience must be central to coherence.
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
Consistent accurate prediction looks like knowledge without justified belief [Audi,R]
     Full Idea: If someone consistently prophesied the winners of horse races, it appears that this man knows who will win the races, but surely he does not have justified beliefs as to who will win?
     From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], VIII p.229)
     A reaction: This is where internalists and externalists (notably reliabilists) sharply part company. IF a reliable clairvoyant appeared, we would eventually accept them as a knower. But they DON'T appear, because knowledge needs justification!
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
A reliability theory of knowledge seems to involve truth as correspondence [Audi,R]
     Full Idea: If one favours a reliability theory of knowledge (which is externalist) the correspondence theory of truth seems the most appropriate.
     From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], VIII p.243)
     A reaction: Sounds right. Coherence implies some sort of internal assessment, whereas correspondence just needs to plugged into the facts. I like coherence justification and correspondence truth.
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
'Reliable' is a very imprecise term, and may even mean 'justified' [Audi,R]
     Full Idea: Reliabilism cannot specify how reliable a process must be before it grounds knowledge, and it cannot specify what is reliable in the first place. 'Reliable' may become circular, and may mean 'justified'.
     From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], VIII p.225)
     A reaction: The first time you ever read an instrument, or talk to a stranger, you have no indication of reliability. Circularity looks like a big problem. Knowledge must precede reliability?
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 4. Errors in Introspection
We can be ignorant about ourselves, for example, our desires and motives [Audi,R]
     Full Idea: We can have false beliefs, or some degree of ignorance, about our own mental lives. For example, about our own dispositions, such as not believing that we have a certain ignoble desire.
     From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], III p.83)
     A reaction: This idea, that we don't know ourselves, has become a commonplace of recent philosophy, but I am unconvinced. Mostly we know only too well that we harbour a base desire, and we feel a creeping sense of shame. Total ignorance is very rare.
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
Reason is too slow and doubtful to guide all actions, which need external and moral senses [Hutcheson]
     Full Idea: We boast of our mighty reason above other animals, but its processes are too slow, too full of doubt, to serve us in every exigency, either for our preservation, without external senses, or to influence our actions for good without the moral sense.
     From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 2: Virtue or Moral Good [1725], §VII.III)
     A reaction: This idea was taken up by Hume, and it must have influence Hume's general scepticism about the importance of reason. What this idea misses is the enormous influence of prior reasoning on our quick decisions.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
We approve of actions by a superior moral sense [Hutcheson]
     Full Idea: By a superior sense, which I call a moral one, we approve the actions of others.
     From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 2: Virtue or Moral Good [1725], Intro)
     A reaction: This tries to present moral insight as being on a par with the famous five senses. This doesn't seem quite right to me; separate parts of me can operate individual senses, but the whole of me is required for moral judgements, based on evidence.
We dislike a traitor, even if they give us great benefit [Hutcheson]
     Full Idea: Let us consider if a traitor, who would sell his own country to us, may not often be as advantageous to us, as an hero who defends us: and yet we can love the treason, and hate the traitor.
     From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 2: Virtue or Moral Good [1725], §I.VI)
     A reaction: A nice example, which certainly refutes any claim that morality is entirely and directly self-interested. High-minded idealism, though, is not the only alternative explanation. We admire loyalty, but not loyalty to, say, Hitler.
The moral sense is not an innate idea, but an ability to approve or disapprove in a disinterested way [Hutcheson]
     Full Idea: The moral sense is not an innate idea or knowledge, but a determination of our minds to receive the simple ideas of approbation or condemnation, from actions observed, antecedent to any opinions of advantage or loss to redound to ourselves.
     From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 2: Virtue or Moral Good [1725], §I.VIII)
     A reaction: This may claim a pure moral intuition, but it is also close to Kantian universalising of the rules for behaviour. It is also a variation on Descartes' 'natural light' of reason. Of course, if we say the ideas are 'received', where are they received from?
We cannot choose our moral feelings, otherwise bribery could affect them [Hutcheson]
     Full Idea: Neither benevolence nor any other affection or desire can be directly raised by volition; if they could, then we could be bribed into any affection whatsoever toward any object.
     From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 2: Virtue or Moral Good [1725], §II.IV)
     A reaction: Of course, notoriously, the vast mass of people have often been bribed to love a politician, by low taxes, or bread and circuses. Still, you cannot choose to love or admire someone, you just do. Not much free will there.
Everyone feels uneasy when seeing others in pain, unless the others are evil [Hutcheson]
     Full Idea: Every mortal is made uneasy by any grievous misery he sees another involved in, unless the person be imagined morally evil.
     From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 2: Virtue or Moral Good [1725], §V.VIII)
     A reaction: This is the natural compassion on which Hume built his moral theory. This remark emphasises that a concern for justice is just as important as a compassion for pain. Kant was more interested in what we deserve than in what we get.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
Human nature seems incapable of universal malice, except what results from self-love [Hutcheson]
     Full Idea: Human nature seems scarce capable of malicious disinterested hatred, or an ultimate desire of the misery of others, when we imagine them not pernicious to us, or opposite to our interests; ..that is only the effect of self-love, not disinterested malice.
     From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 2: Virtue or Moral Good [1725], §II.VII)
     A reaction: I suppose it is true that even the worst criminals brooding in prison don't wish the entire population of some foreign country to die in pain. Only a very freakish person would wish the human race were extinct. A very nice observation.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
As death approaches, why do we still care about family, friends or country? [Hutcheson]
     Full Idea: How comes it that we do not lose, at the approach of death, all concern for our families, friends, or country?
     From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 2: Virtue or Moral Good [1725], §II.V)
     A reaction: A nice question. No doubt some people do cease to care, but on the whole it raises the 'last round' problem in social contract theory, which is why fulfil your part of a bargain if it is too late to receive the repayment afterwards?
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
My action is not made good by a good effect, if I did not foresee and intend it [Hutcheson]
     Full Idea: No good effect, which I did not actually foresee and intend, makes my action morally good.
     From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 2: Virtue or Moral Good [1725], §III.XII)
     A reaction: This is one of the parents of utilitarianism repudiating pure consequentialism. Bentham sharply divided the action (which is consequentialist) from the person (who has useful intentions, but is not particulary important); this division is misleading.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
Contempt of danger is just madness if it is not in some worthy cause [Hutcheson]
     Full Idea: Mere courage, or contempt of danger, if we conceive it to have no regard to the defence of the innocent, or repairing of wrongs or self-interest, would only entitle its possessor to bedlam.
     From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 2: Virtue or Moral Good [1725], §II.I)
     A reaction: If many criminals would love to rob a bank, but only a few have the nerve to attempt it, we can hardly deny that the latter exhibit a sort of courage. The Greeks say that good sense must be involved, but few of them were so moral about courage.
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
That action is best, which procures the greatest happiness for the greatest number [Hutcheson]
     Full Idea: That action is best, which procures the greatest happiness for the greatest number; and that worst, which, in like manner, occasions misery.
     From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 2: Virtue or Moral Good [1725], §III.VIII)
     A reaction: The first use of a phrase taken up by Bentham. This is not just an anticipation of utilitarianism, it is utilitarianism, with all its commitment to consequentialism (but see Idea 6246), and to the maximising of happiness. It is a brilliant idea.
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
The loss of perfect rights causes misery, but the loss of imperfect rights reduces social good [Hutcheson]
     Full Idea: Perfect rights are necessary to the public good, and it makes those miserable whose rights are thus violated; …imperfect rights tend to the improvement and increase of good in a society, but are not necessary to prevent universal misery.
     From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 2: Virtue or Moral Good [1725], §VII.VI)
     A reaction: This is a very utilitarian streak in Hutcheson, converting natural law into its tangible outcome in actual happiness or misery. The distinction here is interesting (taken up by Mill), but there is a very blurred borderline.
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
Only a great person can understand the essence of things, and an even greater person can teach it [Plato]
     Full Idea: Only a man of very great natural gifts will be able to understand that everything has a class and absolute essence, and an even more wonderful man can teach this.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 135a)
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / d. The unlimited
The unlimited has no shape and is endless [Plato]
     Full Idea: The unlimited partakes neither of the round nor of the straight, because it has no ends nor edges.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 137e)
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / e. The One
Some things do not partake of the One [Plato]
     Full Idea: The others cannot partake of the one in any way; they can neither partake of it nor of the whole.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 159d)
     A reaction: Compare Idea 231
The only movement possible for the One is in space or in alteration [Plato]
     Full Idea: If the One moves it either moves spatially or it is altered, since these are the only motions.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 138b)
Everything partakes of the One in some way [Plato]
     Full Idea: The others are not altogether deprived of the one, for they partake of it in some way.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 157c)
     A reaction: Compare Idea 233.
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / c. God is the good
We say God is good if we think everything he does aims at the happiness of his creatures [Hutcheson]
     Full Idea: We call the Deity morally good, when we apprehend that his whole providence tends to the universal happiness of his creatures.
     From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 2: Virtue or Moral Good [1725], §VII.V)
     A reaction: From the point of view of eternity, we might accept that God aims at some even greater good than the happiness of a bunch of miserable little creatures whose bad behaviour merits little reward. The greater good needs to be impressive, though.
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / d. God decrees morality
If goodness is constituted by God's will, it is a tautology to say God's will is good [Hutcheson]
     Full Idea: To call the laws of the supreme Deity good or holy or just, if these be constituted by laws, or the will of a superior, must be an insignificant tautology, amounting to no more than 'God wills what he wills' or 'His will is conformable to his will'.
     From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 2: Virtue or Moral Good [1725], §VII.V)
     A reaction: This argues not only against God as the source of morality, but also against any rules, such as those of the Categorical Imperative. Why should I follow the Categorical Imperative? What has value must dictate the rules. Is obedience the highest value?
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
We couldn't discuss the non-existence of the One without knowledge of it [Plato]
     Full Idea: There must be knowledge of the one, or else not even the meaning of the words 'if the one does not exist' would be known.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 160d)