71 ideas
23183 | Different abilities are needed for living in an incomplete and undogmatic system [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: There is an entirely different strength and mobility to maintaining oneself in an incomplete system, with free, open vistas, than in a dogmatic world. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1885-86 [1886], 34[025]) | |
A reaction: This is like Keats's 'negative capability' - the ability to live in a state of uncertainty. I'm a fan of attempts to create a philosophical system, but dogmatism would seem to be the death of such a project. How would you live with your system? Nice. |
23188 | Bad writers use shapeless floating splotches of concepts [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Bad writers have only shapeless floating splotches of concepts in their heads. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1885-86 [1886], 34[083]) | |
A reaction: Under 'conceptual analyis' not because he analyses concepts, but because he recognises their foundation importance in philosophy. I get more irritated by unchallenged concepts than by drifting concepts. Writer must know and challenge their key concepts. |
23212 | A text has many interpretations, but no 'correct' one [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The same text allows innumerable interpretations: there is no 'correct' interpretation. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1885-86 [1886], 1[120]) | |
A reaction: It is hard to defend a 'correct' interpretation, but I think it is obvious to students of literature that some interpretations are very silly, such as reading things allegorically when there was no such intention. |
224 | When questions are doubtful we should concentrate not on objects but on ideas of the intellect [Plato] |
Full Idea: Doubtful questions should not be discussed in terms of visible objects or in relation to them, but only with reference to ideas conceived by the intellect. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 135e) |
232 | Opposites are as unlike as possible [Plato] |
Full Idea: Opposites are as unlike as possible. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 159a) |
8937 | Plato's 'Parmenides' is the greatest artistic achievement of the ancient dialectic [Hegel on Plato] |
Full Idea: Plato's 'Parmenides' is the greatest artistic achievement of the ancient dialectic. | |
From: comment on Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Georg W.F.Hegel - Phenomenology of Spirit Pref 71 | |
A reaction: It is a long way from the analytic tradition of philosophy to be singling out a classic text for its 'artistic' achievement. Eventually we may even look back on, say, Kripke's 'Naming and Necessity' and see it in that light. |
23199 | What is the search for truth if it isn't moral? [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: What is searching for truth, truthfulness, honesty if not something moral? | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1885-86 [1886], 35[05]) | |
A reaction: Feels right to me. It might be an effect of the virtue of respect. If you respect a person you tell them the truth (assuming they want the truth). Lying to someone is a sort of contempt. |
23202 | Like all philosophers, I love truth [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: I, too, love truth, like all philosophers. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1885-86 [1886], 37[02]) | |
A reaction: Please pay attention to this remark! His perspectivalism is not a denial of truth. It is an epistemological phenomenon, not a metaphysical one. The perspectives are the nearest we can get to truth. Humanity therefore needs teamwork. |
23196 | Logic is a fiction, which invents the view that one thought causes another [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The model of a complete fiction is logic. Here a thinking is made up where a thought is posited as the cause of another thought. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1885-86 [1886], 34[249]) | |
A reaction: He could almost be referring to Frege's Third Realm. Most hard core analytic philosophers seem to think that propositions have tight logical relationships which are nothing to do with the people who think them. |
13986 | Plato found antinomies in ideas, Kant in space and time, and Bradley in relations [Plato, by Ryle] |
Full Idea: Plato (in 'Parmenides') shows that the theory that 'Eide' are substances, and Kant that space and time are substances, and Bradley that relations are substances, all lead to aninomies. | |
From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Gilbert Ryle - Are there propositions? 'Objections' |
14150 | Plato's 'Parmenides' is perhaps the best collection of antinomies ever made [Russell on Plato] |
Full Idea: Plato's 'Parmenides' is perhaps the best collection of antinomies ever made. | |
From: comment on Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Bertrand Russell - The Principles of Mathematics §337 |
23186 | Numbers enable us to manage the world - to the limits of counting [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Numbers are our major means of making the world manageable. We comprehend as far as we can count, i.e. as far as a constancy can be perceived. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1885-86 [1886], 34[058]) | |
A reaction: I don't agree with 'major', but it is a nice thought. The intermediate concept is a 'unit', which means identifying something as a 'thing', which is how we seem to grasp the world. So to what extent do we comprehend the infinite. Enter Cantor… |
16150 | One is, so numbers exist, so endless numbers exist, and each one must partake of being [Plato] |
Full Idea: If one is, there must also necessarily be number - Necessarily - But if there is number, there would be many, and an unlimited multitude of beings. ..So if all partakes of being, each part of number would also partake of it. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 144a) | |
A reaction: This seems to commit to numbers having being, then to too many numbers, and hence to too much being - but without backing down and wondering whether numbers had being after all. Aristotle disagreed. |
229 | The one was and is and will be and was becoming and is becoming and will become [Plato] |
Full Idea: The one was and is and will be and was becoming and is becoming and will become. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 155d) | |
A reaction: This seems to be rhetorical, rather a precise theory, given that the One is said to be eternal and unchanging. The One is not just what we call 'reality'. |
21821 | Plato's Parmenides has a three-part theory, of Primal One, a One-Many, and a One-and-Many [Plato, by Plotinus] |
Full Idea: The Platonic Parmenides is more exact [than Parmenides himself]; the distinction is made between the Primal One, a strictly pure Unity, and a secondary One which is a One-Many, and a third which is a One-and-Many. | |
From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Plotinus - The Enneads 5.1.08 | |
A reaction: Plotinus approves of this three-part theory. Parmenides has the problem that the highest Being contains no movement. By placing the One outside Being you can give it powers which an existent thing cannot have. Cf the concept of God. |
23211 | Events are just interpretations of groups of appearances [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: There is no event in itself. What happens is a group of appearances selected and summarised by an interpreting being. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1885-86 [1886], 1[115]) | |
A reaction: Since innumerable events are nested within one another, such as the events at a carnival, this is obviously true. A primitive 'Kim event' (an object changes a property) might have objective existence. Carnivals happen, though. |
221 | Absolute ideas, such as the Good and the Beautiful, cannot be known by us [Plato] |
Full Idea: The absolute good and the beautiful and all which we conceive to be absolute ideas are unknown to us. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 134c) | |
A reaction: These seems to thoroughly pre-empt Plato's Theory of Forms a century before he created it. Which shows (as Simone Weil says) that Plato was just part of a long tradition. |
227 | You must always mean the same thing when you utter the same name [Plato] |
Full Idea: You must always mean the same thing when you utter the same name. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 147d) |
223 | If you deny that each thing always stays the same, you destroy the possibility of discussion [Plato] |
Full Idea: If a person denies that the idea of each thing is always the same, he will utterly destroy the power of carrying on discussion. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 135c) |
210 | It would be absurd to think there were abstract Forms for vile things like hair, mud and dirt [Plato] |
Full Idea: Are there abstract ideas for such things as hair, mud and dirt, which are particularly vile and worthless? That would be quite absurd. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 130d) |
219 | If absolute ideas existed in us, they would cease to be absolute [Plato] |
Full Idea: None of the absolute ideas exists in us, because then it would no longer be absolute. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 133c) |
228 | Greatness and smallness must exist, to be opposed to one another, and come into being in things [Plato] |
Full Idea: These two ideas, greatness and smallness, exist, do they not? For if they did not exist, they could not be opposites of one another, and could not come into being in things. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 149e) |
211 | If admirable things have Forms, maybe everything else does as well [Plato] |
Full Idea: It is troubling that if admirable things have abstract ideas, then perhaps everything else must have ideas as well. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 130d) |
220 | The concept of a master includes the concept of a slave [Plato] |
Full Idea: Mastership in the abstract is mastership of slavery in the abstract. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 133e) |
16151 | Plato moves from Forms to a theory of genera and principles in his later work [Plato, by Frede,M] |
Full Idea: It seems to me that Plato in the later dialogues, beginning with the second half of 'Parmenides', wants to substitute a theory of genera and theory of principles that constitute these genera for the earlier theory of forms. | |
From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Michael Frede - Title, Unity, Authenticity of the 'Categories' V | |
A reaction: My theory is that the later Plato came under the influence of the brilliant young Aristotle, and this idea is a symptom of it. The theory of 'principles' sounds like hylomorphism to me. |
216 | If things are made alike by participating in something, that thing will be the absolute idea [Plato] |
Full Idea: That by participation in which like things are made like, will be the absolute idea, will it not? | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 132e) |
218 | Participation is not by means of similarity, so we are looking for some other method of participation [Plato] |
Full Idea: Participation is not by means of likeness, so we must seek some other method of participation. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 133a) |
215 | If things partake of ideas, this implies either that everything thinks, or that everything actually is thought [Plato] |
Full Idea: If all things partake of ideas, must either everything be made of thoughts and everything thinks, or everything is thought, and so can't think? | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 132c) |
212 | The whole idea of each Form must be found in each thing which participates in it [Plato] |
Full Idea: The whole idea of each form (of beauty, justice etc) must be found in each thing which participates in it. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 131a) |
213 | Each idea is in all its participants at once, just as daytime is a unity but in many separate places at once [Plato] |
Full Idea: Just as day is in many places at once, but not separated from itself, so each idea might be in all its participants at once. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 131b) |
217 | Nothing can be like an absolute idea, because a third idea intervenes to make them alike (leading to a regress) [Plato] |
Full Idea: It is impossible for anything to be like an absolute idea, because a third idea will appear to make them alike, and if that is like anything, it will lead to another idea, and so on. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 133a) |
214 | If absolute greatness and great things are seen as the same, another thing appears which makes them seem great [Plato] |
Full Idea: If you regard the absolute great and the many great things in the same way, will not another appear beyond, by which all these must appear to be great? | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 132a) |
15851 | Parts must belong to a created thing with a distinct form [Plato] |
Full Idea: The part would not be the part of many things or all, but of some one character ['ideas'] and of some one thing, which we call a 'whole', since it has come to be one complete [perfected] thing composed [created] of all. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 157d) | |
A reaction: A serious shot by Plato at what identity is. Harte quotes it (125) and shows that 'character' is Gk 'idea', and 'composed' will translate as 'created'. 'Form' links this Platonic passage to Aristotle's hylomorphism. |
15846 | In Parmenides, if composition is identity, a whole is nothing more than its parts [Plato, by Harte,V] |
Full Idea: At the heart of the 'Parmenides' puzzles about composition is the thesis that composition is identity. Considered thus, a whole adds nothing to an ontology that already includes its parts | |
From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Verity Harte - Plato on Parts and Wholes 2.5 | |
A reaction: There has to be more to a unified identity that mere proximity of the parts. When do parts come together, and when do they actually 'compose' something? |
15849 | Plato says only a one has parts, and a many does not [Plato, by Harte,V] |
Full Idea: In 'Parmenides' it is argued that a part cannot be part of a many, but must be part of something one. | |
From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 157c) by Verity Harte - Plato on Parts and Wholes 3.2 | |
A reaction: This looks like the right way to go with the term 'part'. We presuppose a unity before we even talk of its parts, so we can't get into contradictions and paradoxes about their relationships. |
15850 | Anything which has parts must be one thing, and parts are of a one, not of a many [Plato] |
Full Idea: The whole of which the parts are parts must be one thing composed of many; for each of the parts must be part, not of a many, but of a whole. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 157c) | |
A reaction: This is a key move of metaphysics, and we should hang on to it. The other way madness lies. |
13259 | It seems that the One must be composed of parts, which contradicts its being one [Plato] |
Full Idea: The One must be composed of parts, both being a whole and having parts. So on both grounds the One would thus be many and not one. But it must be not many, but one. So if the One will be one, it will neither be a whole, nor have parts. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 137c09), quoted by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 5.2 | |
A reaction: This is the starting point for Plato's metaphysical discussion of objects. It seems to begin a line of thought which is completed by Aristotle, surmising that only an essential structure can bestow identity on a bunch of parts. |
15847 | Two things relate either as same or different, or part of a whole, or the whole of the part [Plato] |
Full Idea: Everything is surely related to everything as follows: either it is the same or different; or, if it is not the same or different, it would be related as part to whole or as whole to part. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 146b) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as a really helpful first step in trying to analyse the nature of identity. Two things are either two or (actually) one, or related mereologically. |
23207 | Appearance is the sole reality of things, to which all predicates refer [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Appearance as I understand it is the actual and single reality of things - that which first merits all existing predicates. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1885-86 [1886], 40[53]) | |
A reaction: This is the view espoused by John Stuart Mill (a fact which would shock Nietzsche!). Elsewhere he laughs at the concept of the thing-in-itself as a fiction. |
23197 | Memory is essential, and is only possible by means of abbreviation signs [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Experience is only possible with the help of memory; memory is only possible by virtue of an abbreviation of an intellectual event as a sign. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1885-86 [1886], 34[249]) | |
A reaction: My memory of a town is not formed as a sign, but as a bunch of miscellaneous fragments about it. I think mental files gives a better account of this than do 'signs'. |
23206 | Schematic minds think thoughts are truer if they slot into a scheme [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: There are schematic minds, those who hold a thought-complex to be truer if it can be sketched into previously drafted schemata or categorical tables. There are countless self-deceptions in this area: nearly all the great 'systems' belong here. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1885-86 [1886], 40[09]) | |
A reaction: Why 'nearly all'? Aristotle might be a candidate for such a person. Leibniz, perhaps. Nietzsche identified with Becoming and Heraclitus, as opposed to Being and Parmenides. |
23209 | Each of our personal drives has its own perspective [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: From the standpoint of each of our fundamental drives there is a different perspectival assessment of all events and experiences. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1885-86 [1886], 1[058]) | |
A reaction: Revealing. Perspectives are not just each individual person's viewpoint, but something more fine-grained than that. Our understanding and response are ambiguous, because we ourselves are intrinsically ambiguous. Super-relativism! |
23184 | The mind is a simplifying apparatus [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The intellect and the senses are above all a simplifying apparatus. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1885-86 [1886], 34[046]) | |
A reaction: Very plausible, and not an idea I have met elsewhere. There's a PhD here for someone. It fits with my view as universals in language (which is most of language), which capture diverse things by ironing out their differences. |
23190 | Consciousness is our awareness of our own mental life [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: We have a double brain: our capacity to will, to feel and to think of our willing, feeling, thinking ourselves is what we summarise with the word 'consciousness'. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1885-86 [1886], 34[087]) | |
A reaction: Pretty much the modern HOT (higher order thought) theory of consciousness. Higher order thought distinguishes us from the other animals, but I think they too are probably conscious, so I don't agree. Why is level 2 conscious of level 1? |
23191 | Minds have an excluding drive to scare things off, and a selecting one to filter facts [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: In our conscious intellect there must be an excluding drive that scares things away, a selecting one, which only permits certain facts to present themselves. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1885-86 [1886], 34[131]) | |
A reaction: I like this because he is endorsing the idea that philosophy needs faculties, which may not match the views of psychologists and neuroscientists. Quite nice to think of faculties as drives. |
23213 | The greatest drive of life is to discharge strength, rather than preservation [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Something that lives wants above all to discharge its strength: 'preservation' is only one of the consequences of this. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1885-86 [1886], 2[063]) | |
A reaction: This seems to fit a dynamic man like Nietzsche, rather than someone who opts for a quiet and comfortable life. |
23210 | That all events are necessary does not mean they are compelled [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The absolute necessity of all events contains nothing of a compulsion. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1885-86 [1886], 1[114]) | |
A reaction: I like to look for necessity-makers behind necessities. So if the event is not necessary because of its cause, where does it come from? Is it that the whole sequence is a unified necessity? |
23189 | Concepts are rough groups of simultaneous sensations [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Concepts are more or less definite groups of sensations that arrive together. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1885-86 [1886], 34[086]) | |
A reaction: I like this because I favour accounts of concepts which root them in experience, and largely growing unthinking out of communcal experience. Nietzsche is very empirical here. Hume would probably agree. |
23192 | Concepts don’t match one thing, but many things a little bit [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: A concept is an invention that doesn't correspond entirely to anything; but to many things a little bit. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1885-86 [1886], 34[131]) | |
A reaction: This seems to cover some concepts quite well, but others not at all. What else does 'square' correspond to? |
23187 | Whatever their origin, concepts survive by being useful [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The most useful concepts have survived: however falsely they may have originated. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1885-86 [1886], 34[063]) | |
A reaction: The germ of both pragmatism, and of meaning-as-use, here. The alternative views must be that the concepts are accurate or true, or that they are simply a matter of whim, maintained by authority. |
23205 | Thought starts as ambiguity, in need of interpretation and narrowing [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: A thought in the shape in which it comes is an ambiguous sign that needs interpretation, more precisely, needs an arbitrary narrowing-down and limitation, until it finally becomes unambiguous. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1885-86 [1886], 38[01]) | |
A reaction: This is exactly my view of propositions, as mental events. Introspect your thinking process. Track the progress from the first glimmer of a thought to its formulation in a finished sentence. Language, unlike propositions, can be ambiguous. |
23198 | Aesthetics can be more basic than morality, in our pleasure in certain patterns of experience [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Some of the aesthetic valuations are more fundamental than the moral ones e.g. the pleasure in what is ordered, surveyable, limited, in repetition. The logical, arithmetical and geometrical good feelings form the ground floor of aesthetic valuations. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1885-86 [1886], 35[02]) | |
A reaction: Nietzsche's originality is so striking because his novel suggestions are always plausible. Lots of modern philosophers (especially, I fear, in the continental tradition) throw out startling ideas which then fail on closer inspection. |
8108 | Aesthetics presupposes a distinctive sort of experience, and a unified essence for art [Gardner] |
Full Idea: Aesthetics traditionally has two presuppositions: the first is that there is a distinctive form of experience which is common to the appreciation of art and natural beauty; the second is that art has an essence or some sort of underlying unity. | |
From: Sebastian Gardner (Aesthetics [1995], Intro) | |
A reaction: Both must come up for discussion. I think the biggest problem for the first one is the place of sexual attraction, or even fancying a prawn sandwich. The second has been weakened by Marcel Duchamp's urinal, and modern fringe arts. |
8112 | Art works originate in the artist's mind, and appreciation is re-creating this mental object [Gardner] |
Full Idea: A strong tradition in aesthetics (the 'idealist' view) regards works of art as existing originally in the artist's mind, and the appreciation of art as a matter of re-creating the artist's mental object. | |
From: Sebastian Gardner (Aesthetics [1995], 2.2) | |
A reaction: He mentions Collingwood and Croce. Against this is the view (Idea 7268) that what goes on in the artist's mind is just irrelevant. Freud is important here, suggesting that the artist doesn't quite know what he or she is doing. |
8111 | Aesthetic objectivists must explain pleasure being essential, but not in the object [Gardner] |
Full Idea: The aesthetic objectivist faces the difficulty of accounting for the fact that pleasure is not in the object, and is necessary for, and not just a contingent accompaniment to, aesthetic response. | |
From: Sebastian Gardner (Aesthetics [1995], 1.2.3) | |
A reaction: The objectivist has to claim, not utterly implausibly, that if you don't get pleasure from certain works, then you 'ought' to. You can ignore a good work, but to deny that it gives pleasure is a failing in you. |
23208 | Caesar and Napoleon point to the future, when they pursue their task regardless of human sacrifice [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: In nature's such as Caesar and Napoleon we intuit something of a 'disinterested' laboring on one's marble, regardless of any sacrifice of human beings. The future of the highest humans lies on this path: to bear responsibility and not collapse under it. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1885-86 [1886], 1[056]) | |
A reaction: Hideous. Nietzsche at his absolute worst. You would think there was some wonderful higher good to which they were leading the human race, when they just strike me as people who liked fighting, and adored winning. |
23193 | Napoleon was very focused, and rightly ignored compassion [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: With Napoleon only the essential instincts of humanity came into consideration during his calculations, and he had a right not to take notice of the exceptional ones e.g. of compassion. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1885-86 [1886], 34[131]) | |
A reaction: Napoleon was notoriously indifferent to casualties, and I find it depressing that Nietzsche supports him. Napoleon brought misery to Europe for nearly twenties, mainly because he loved winning battles. Nothing über about that. |
8109 | Aesthetic judgements necessarily require first-hand experience, unlike moral judgements [Gardner] |
Full Idea: I am not within my rights to declare an object beautiful until I have seen it myself, ..unlike moral judgement, which (arguably) does not presuppose either a felt response or personal acquaintance. | |
From: Sebastian Gardner (Aesthetics [1995], 1.1) | |
A reaction: Particularists might argue that moral judgements also require exposure to the actual situation, if they are to be authentic and authoritative. We can also discuss principles of aesthetics in the absence of examples. |
23214 | For the strongest people, nihilism gives you wings! [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: In the hands of the strongest every kind of pessimism and nihilism becomes only one more hammer and tool with which one mounts a new pair of wings on oneself. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1885-86 [1886], 2[101]) | |
A reaction: Not sure how this works. Why is great strength needed? Strength implies forceful overcoming. The wings come from rejecting nihilism, but why does that need strength? Aren't there people with wings who never even thought of nihilism? |
23203 | The great question is approaching, of how to govern the earth as a whole [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: It is approaching, irrefutably, hesitatingly, terrible as fate, the great task and fate: how should the earth as a whole be governed? | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1885-86 [1886], 37[08]) | |
A reaction: Two issues have accelerated the question, though we have yet to properly face it. One is the incredible increase in military destructiveness, and other is the damage to the planet caused by the relentless pursuit of wealth. |
23200 | The controlling morality of aristocracy is the desire to resemble their ancestors [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The foundation of all aristocracies …is to resemble the ancestors as much as possible, which serves as the controlling morality: mourning at the thought of change and variation. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1885-86 [1886], 35[22]) | |
A reaction: This makes sense of the permanent residence of the family, full of portraits and family trees. Aristocrats preserve records of their predecessors, in a way that most of us don't, going back before grandparents. |
23194 | People feel united as a nation by one language, but then want a common ancestry and history [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: People who speak one language and read the same newspapers today call themselves 'nations', and also want much too eagerly to be of common ancestry and history. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1885-86 [1886], 34[203]) | |
A reaction: This sort of nationalism is still with us, as white supremacy, and as history as mythology. But we can't just shake off a sense of which gene pools we come from, and which lines of history are our personal inheritance. |
23204 | To be someone you need property, and wanting more is healthy [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Property owners are to a man of one belief: 'you have to own something to be something'. But this is the oldest and healthiest of all instincts: I would add 'you have to want more than you have in order to become more'. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1885-86 [1886], 37[11]) | |
A reaction: An odd idea from someone who spent his later years living in one room in a guest house. The context of this is a rejection of socialism. The love of and need for property and possessions must be taken into account in any politics. |
222 | Only a great person can understand the essence of things, and an even greater person can teach it [Plato] |
Full Idea: Only a man of very great natural gifts will be able to understand that everything has a class and absolute essence, and an even more wonderful man can teach this. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 135a) |
225 | The unlimited has no shape and is endless [Plato] |
Full Idea: The unlimited partakes neither of the round nor of the straight, because it has no ends nor edges. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 137e) |
233 | Some things do not partake of the One [Plato] |
Full Idea: The others cannot partake of the one in any way; they can neither partake of it nor of the whole. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 159d) | |
A reaction: Compare Idea 231 |
2062 | The only movement possible for the One is in space or in alteration [Plato] |
Full Idea: If the One moves it either moves spatially or it is altered, since these are the only motions. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 138b) |
231 | Everything partakes of the One in some way [Plato] |
Full Idea: The others are not altogether deprived of the one, for they partake of it in some way. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 157c) | |
A reaction: Compare Idea 233. |
23195 | Laws of nature are actually formulas of power relations [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The alleged 'laws of nature' are formulas for power relationships… | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1885-86 [1886], 34[247]) | |
A reaction: Love it. This is precisely the powers ontology of modern philosophy of science. His Will to Power is not often recognised as closely related to this view. |
23185 | In chemistry every substance pushes, and thus creates new substances [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: In chemistry is revealed that every substance pushes its force as far as it can, then a third something emerges. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1885-86 [1886], 34[51]) | |
A reaction: This is the ontology of powers as the basis of science, of which I am a fan. It is Nietzsche's Will to Power in action, which is often mistakenly taken to only refer to human affairs. |
234 | We couldn't discuss the non-existence of the One without knowledge of it [Plato] |
Full Idea: There must be knowledge of the one, or else not even the meaning of the words 'if the one does not exist' would be known. | |
From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 160d) |