35 ideas
2352 | The job of the philosopher is to distinguish facts about the world from conventions [Putnam] |
Full Idea: It is the job of the philosopher to distinguish what is fact and what is convention in our theorising about the world. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Representation and Reality [1988], §7 p.112) | |
A reaction: This may well be the entire truth about philosophy. It begins with the Nomos-Physis debate in ancient Athens, and it turns out to be the key issue in almost every area of metaphysics, epistemology, aesthetics and morality. |
16123 | Whenever you perceive a community of things, you should also hunt out differences in the group [Plato] |
Full Idea: The rule is that when one perceives first the community between the members of a group of many things, one should not desist until one sees in it all those differences that are located in classes. | |
From: Plato (The Statesman [c.356 BCE], 285b) | |
A reaction: He goes on to recommend the opposite as well - see community even when there appears to be nothing but differences. I take this to be analysis, just as much as modern linguistic approaches are. Analyse the world, not language. |
16125 | To reveal a nature, divide down, and strip away what it has in common with other things [Plato] |
Full Idea: Let's take the kind posited and cut it in two, .then follow the righthand part of what we've cut, and hold onto things that the sophist is associated with until we strip away everything he has in common with other things, then display his peculiar nature. | |
From: Plato (The Statesman [c.356 BCE], 264e) | |
A reaction: This seems to be close to Aristotle's account of definition, when he is trying to get at what-it-is-to-be some thing. But if you strip away everything the definiendum has in common with other things, will anything remain? |
16124 | No one wants to define 'weaving' just for the sake of weaving [Plato] |
Full Idea: I don't suppose that anyone with any sense would want to hunt down the definition of 'weaving' for the sake of weaving itself. | |
From: Plato (The Statesman [c.356 BCE], 285d) | |
A reaction: The point seems to be that the definition brings out the connections between weaving and other activities and objects, thus enlarging our understanding. |
2345 | Semantic notions do not occur in Tarski's definitions, but assessing their correctness involves translation [Putnam] |
Full Idea: Although no semantic notions are used in Tarski's truth definitions themselves, they are used in deciding when such a definition is correct, namely the notion of translation. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Representation and Reality [1988], §4 p.66) |
2347 | Asserting the truth of an indexical statement is not the same as uttering the statement [Putnam] |
Full Idea: If you say "I am going to drive this car", and I say "That's true", that is very different from my saying "I am going to drive this car". | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Representation and Reality [1988], §4 p.68) |
2349 | Realists believe truth is correspondence, independent of humans, is bivalent, and is unique [Putnam] |
Full Idea: Metaphysical realism about truth is a bundle of ideas: that it is a matter of Correspondence, that it exhibits Independence (of humans), Bivalence, and Uniqueness (there is only one ultimate truth). | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Representation and Reality [1988], §7 p.107) |
2351 | Aristotle says an object (e.g. a lamp) has identity if its parts stay together when it is moved [Putnam] |
Full Idea: The parts of a lamp stay together when it is moved (which is one of Aristotle's criteria for objecthood). | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Representation and Reality [1988], §7 p.110) | |
A reaction: Metaphysics 1052a26 (just after the cross-reference) says a thing may be unified 'if its movement is single'. |
5961 | The soul gets its goodness from god, and its evil from previous existence. [Plato] |
Full Idea: From its composer the soul possesses all beautiful things, but from its former condition, everything that proves to be harsh and unjust in heaven. | |
From: Plato (The Statesman [c.356 BCE], 273b) | |
A reaction: A neat move to explain the origins of evil (or rather, to shift the problem of evil to a long long way from here). This view presumably traces back to the views of Empedocles on good and evil. Can the soul acquire evil in its current existence? |
2331 | Functionalism says robots and people are the same at one level of abstraction [Putnam] |
Full Idea: My "functionalism" insisted that a robot, a human being, a silicon creature and a disembodied spirit could all work much the same way when described at the relevant level of abstraction, and it is wrong to think the essence of mind is hardware. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Representation and Reality [1988], Int p.xii) | |
A reaction: This is the key point about the theory - that it is an abstract theory of mind, saying nothing about substances. It drew, however, some misguided criticisms suggesting silly implementations. |
2071 | If concepts have external meaning, computational states won't explain psychology [Putnam] |
Full Idea: Computational models of the brain/mind will not suffice for cognitive psychology. We cannot individuate concepts and beliefs without reference to the environment. Meanings aren't "in the head". | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Representation and Reality [1988], p.73) | |
A reaction: Mr Functionalism quits! |
2332 | Functionalism can't explain reference and truth, which are needed for logic [Putnam] |
Full Idea: Functionalism has as much trouble with physical accounts of reference as of meaning. Reference is the main tool used in formal theories of truth. But 'truth' isn't folk psychology, it is central to logic, which everyone wants. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Representation and Reality [1988], Int p.xiv) | |
A reaction: All logic is defined in terms of truth and falsehood resulting from reasoning, but it could be that 'true' and 'false' have no more content that 1 and 0 in binary electronics. They are distinct, but empty. |
2348 | Is there just one computational state for each specific belief? [Putnam] |
Full Idea: The idea that there is one computational state that every being who believes that there are lots of cats in the neighbourhood is in must be false. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Representation and Reality [1988], §5 p.84) | |
A reaction: It is tempting to say that the mental states of such people must have SOMETHING in common, until you realise that all you can specify is that all their states are about cats. |
2344 | If we are going to eliminate folk psychology, we must also eliminate folk logic [Putnam] |
Full Idea: Why don't the eliminationists speak of "folk logic" as well as "folk psychology"? | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Representation and Reality [1988], §4 p.60) | |
A reaction: I think Putnam considers that if you can prove 'truth' to be a necessary feature of mental life, that connects mind and world, but marking a sentence as 'T' doesn't make any connections. |
2074 | Can we give a scientific, computational account of folk psychology? [Putnam] |
Full Idea: The desire that grips Fodor, as it once gripped me, is the desire to make belief-desire psychology "scientific" by simply identifying it outright with computational psychology. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Representation and Reality [1988], p.7) | |
A reaction: An "outright" identification looks very implausible. It seems that we should accept that belief-desire psychology is a very good guide to normal brain events, but a bad guide to unusual brain events. See Ideas 2987 and 7519. |
2343 | Reference may be different while mental representation is the same [Putnam] |
Full Idea: The 'mental representations' of Earth speakers and Twin Earth speakers were not in any way different; the reference was different because the substances were different. Reference is fixed by the environment itself. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Representation and Reality [1988], §2 p.32) | |
A reaction: There seems to be an elementary distinction here between what you think you are referring to, and what you are in fact referring to. "That man is the Prince of Wales" (pointing at the butler). |
2346 | Meaning and translation (which are needed to define truth) both presuppose the notion of reference [Putnam] |
Full Idea: The notion of meaning, and hence of translation (needed to define truth), presupposes the notion of reference. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Representation and Reality [1988], §4 p.67) | |
A reaction: It is plausible to see reference as the fundamental notion of language. With no anchors in reality, language would be 'private', in LW's sense. |
2354 | "Meaning is use" is not a definition of meaning [Putnam] |
Full Idea: "Meaning is use" is not a definition of meaning. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Representation and Reality [1988], §7 p.119) | |
A reaction: I agree. It probably fails to define meaning because it is false. A corkscrew is not the action of opening a wine bottle. |
2336 | Holism seems to make fixed definition more or less impossible [Putnam] |
Full Idea: Holism immediately suggests that most terms cannot be defined, at least not in a way that is fixed once and for all. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Representation and Reality [1988], §1 p.09) | |
A reaction: Perhaps there exists a single perfect definition for each holistic system, only graspable by a transcendent intellect. Or why can't there be a matching holistic system of definitions? |
2334 | Meaning holism tried to show that you can't get fixed meanings built out of observation terms [Putnam] |
Full Idea: The doctrine of Quine called "meaning holism" offered arguments refuting logical positivist attempts to show that every term we can understand can be defined using a limited group of "observation terms". | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Representation and Reality [1988], §1 p.08) | |
A reaction: To seems a rather large jump from saying that sentences come in groups to full-blown 'holism' (involving every sentence). |
2335 | Understanding a sentence involves background knowledge and can't be done in isolation [Putnam] |
Full Idea: If I say "Hawks fly", I do not intend my hearer to deduce that a hawk with a broken wing will fly. What we expect depends on the whole network of belief. Language describes experience as a network, not sentence by sentence. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Representation and Reality [1988], §1 p.09) | |
A reaction: The shortcut through this is 'exactly what did you mean when you said "Hawks fly"?'. That is, get me closer to your proposition. |
2340 | We should separate how the reference of 'gold' is fixed from its conceptual content [Putnam] |
Full Idea: The effect of my account, as of Kripke's, is to separate the question of how the reference of terms such as 'gold' is fixed from the question of their conceptual content. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Representation and Reality [1988], §2 p.38) | |
A reaction: Too simple. 'Gold' isn't a proper name, like 'Hilary', which needs no more content than a serial number. Baptising a gold sample needs much more information than baptising a person. |
2341 | Like names, natural kind terms have their meaning fixed by extension and reference [Putnam] |
Full Idea: It seems that the dominant "component" of natural kind words is the extension. The referential factor does almost all the work, and natural kind terms resemble names. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Representation and Reality [1988], §3 p.49) | |
A reaction: My concept of 'tiger' does not mainly consist of the tigers. Does the concept contract as the tiger population dwindles? Prototypes, exemplars etc. See 'Concepts' |
2338 | Reference (say to 'elms') is a social phenomenon which we can leave to experts [Putnam] |
Full Idea: Reference is a social phenomenon. Individual speakers do not have to know how to distinguish robins, or elms, or aluminium. They can always rely on experts to do this for them. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Representation and Reality [1988], §2 p.22) | |
A reaction: It can't just be a social phenomenon. The experts don't just enquire about standard usage, or defer to Hilary Putnam. |
2339 | Aristotle implies that we have the complete concepts of a language in our heads, but we don't [Putnam] |
Full Idea: What is wrong with the Aristotelian picture (of meaning and reference based on concepts) is that it suggest that everything that is necessary for the use of language is stored in each individual mind, but no individual language works this way. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Representation and Reality [1988], §2 p.25) | |
A reaction: Languages must partly work that way. You can't talk without a conceptual storehouse. In a small society I would expect every adult to know the full vocabulary. |
283 | The question of whether or not to persuade comes before the science of persuasion [Plato] |
Full Idea: The science of whether one must persuade or not must rule over the science capable of persuading. | |
From: Plato (The Statesman [c.356 BCE], 304c) | |
A reaction: Plato probably thinks that reason has to be top of the pyramid, but there is always the Nietzschean/romantic question of why we should place such a value on what is rational. |
8108 | Aesthetics presupposes a distinctive sort of experience, and a unified essence for art [Gardner] |
Full Idea: Aesthetics traditionally has two presuppositions: the first is that there is a distinctive form of experience which is common to the appreciation of art and natural beauty; the second is that art has an essence or some sort of underlying unity. | |
From: Sebastian Gardner (Aesthetics [1995], Intro) | |
A reaction: Both must come up for discussion. I think the biggest problem for the first one is the place of sexual attraction, or even fancying a prawn sandwich. The second has been weakened by Marcel Duchamp's urinal, and modern fringe arts. |
282 | Non-physical beauty can only be shown clearly by speech [Plato] |
Full Idea: The bodiless things, being the most beautiful and the greatest, are only shown with clarity by speech and nothing else. | |
From: Plato (The Statesman [c.356 BCE], 286a) | |
A reaction: Unfortunately this will be true of warped and ugly ideas as well. |
8112 | Art works originate in the artist's mind, and appreciation is re-creating this mental object [Gardner] |
Full Idea: A strong tradition in aesthetics (the 'idealist' view) regards works of art as existing originally in the artist's mind, and the appreciation of art as a matter of re-creating the artist's mental object. | |
From: Sebastian Gardner (Aesthetics [1995], 2.2) | |
A reaction: He mentions Collingwood and Croce. Against this is the view (Idea 7268) that what goes on in the artist's mind is just irrelevant. Freud is important here, suggesting that the artist doesn't quite know what he or she is doing. |
8111 | Aesthetic objectivists must explain pleasure being essential, but not in the object [Gardner] |
Full Idea: The aesthetic objectivist faces the difficulty of accounting for the fact that pleasure is not in the object, and is necessary for, and not just a contingent accompaniment to, aesthetic response. | |
From: Sebastian Gardner (Aesthetics [1995], 1.2.3) | |
A reaction: The objectivist has to claim, not utterly implausibly, that if you don't get pleasure from certain works, then you 'ought' to. You can ignore a good work, but to deny that it gives pleasure is a failing in you. |
8109 | Aesthetic judgements necessarily require first-hand experience, unlike moral judgements [Gardner] |
Full Idea: I am not within my rights to declare an object beautiful until I have seen it myself, ..unlike moral judgement, which (arguably) does not presuppose either a felt response or personal acquaintance. | |
From: Sebastian Gardner (Aesthetics [1995], 1.1) | |
A reaction: Particularists might argue that moral judgements also require exposure to the actual situation, if they are to be authentic and authoritative. We can also discuss principles of aesthetics in the absence of examples. |
281 | The arts produce good and beautiful things by preserving the mean [Plato] |
Full Idea: It is by preserving the mean that arts produce everything that is good and beautiful. | |
From: Plato (The Statesman [c.356 BCE], 284b) |
22559 | Democracy is the worst of good constitutions, but the best of bad constitutions [Plato, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Plato judged that when the constitution is decent, democracy is the worst of them, but when they are bad it is the best. | |
From: report of Plato (The Statesman [c.356 BCE], 302e) by Aristotle - Politics 1289b07 | |
A reaction: Aristotle denies that a good oligarchy is superior. What of technocracy? The challenge is to set up institutions which ensure the health of the democracy. The big modern problem is populists who lie. |
2342 | "Water" is a natural kind term, but "H2O" is a description [Putnam] |
Full Idea: "Water" functions as a natural kind term, but "H2O" is a description, synonymous with an account of its atoms. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Representation and Reality [1988], §3 p.50) |
279 | Only divine things can always stay the same, and bodies are not like that [Plato] |
Full Idea: It is fitting for only the most divine things of all to be always the same and in the same state and in the same respects, and the nature of body is not of this ordering. | |
From: Plato (The Statesman [c.356 BCE], 269b) |