Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Clitophon', 'On Providence' and 'The Theory of Knowledge'

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8 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
Logical constants seem to be entities in propositions, but are actually pure form [Russell]
     Full Idea: 'Logical constants', which might seem to be entities occurring in logical propositions, are really concerned with pure form, and are not actually constituents of the propositions in the verbal expressions of which their names occur.
     From: Bertrand Russell (The Theory of Knowledge [1913], 1.IX)
     A reaction: This seems to entirely deny the existence of logical constants, and yet he says that they are named. Russell was obviously under pressure here from Wittgenstein.
We use logical notions, so they must be objects - but I don't know what they really are [Russell]
     Full Idea: Such words as or, not, all, some, plainly involve logical notions; since we use these intelligently, we must be acquainted with the logical objects involved. But their isolation is difficult, and I do not know what the logical objects really are.
     From: Bertrand Russell (The Theory of Knowledge [1913], 1.IX)
     A reaction: See Idea 23476, from the previous page. Russell is struggling. Wittgenstein was telling him that the constants are rules (shown in truth tables), rather than objects.
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
Logical truths are known by their extreme generality [Russell]
     Full Idea: A touchstone by which logical propositions may be distinguished from all others is that they result from a process of generalisation which has been carried to its utmost limits.
     From: Bertrand Russell (The Theory of Knowledge [1913], p.129), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 7 'What'
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / d. Negative facts
There can't be a negative of a complex, which is negated by its non-existence [Potter on Russell]
     Full Idea: On Russell's pre-war conception it is obvious that a complex cannot be negative. If a complex were true, what would make it false would be its non-existence, not the existence of some other complex.
     From: comment on Bertrand Russell (The Theory of Knowledge [1913]) by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 41 'Neg'
     A reaction: It might be false because it doesn't exist, but also 'made' false by a rival complex (such as Desdemona loving Othello).
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
The just man does not harm his enemies, but benefits everyone [Plato]
     Full Idea: First, Socrates, you told me justice is harming your enemies and helping your friends. But later it seemed that the just man, since everything he does is for someone's benefit, never harms anyone.
     From: Plato (Clitophon [c.372 BCE], 410b)
     A reaction: Socrates certainly didn't subscribe to the first view, which is the traditional consensus in Greek culture. In general Socrates agreed with the views later promoted by Jesus.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
To be always happy is to lack knowledge of one half of nature [Seneca]
     Full Idea: To be always happy and to pass through life without any mental distress is to lack knowledge of one half of nature.
     From: Seneca the Younger (On Providence [c.60], §4)
     A reaction: These kind of paradoxes plague virtue theory, and any theory which aims at an ideal. Heaven, for example, seems to have no problems to solve, which spells boredom. The fascination of corrupt people is their superior knowledge of the world.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / a. External goods
Nothing bad can happen to a good man [Seneca]
     Full Idea: Nothing bad can happen to a good man.
     From: Seneca the Younger (On Providence [c.60], §2)
     A reaction: This is a pithy summary of a well know ancient attitude - one that is rejected by Aristotle, but defended by Socrates. It depends what you mean by 'bad' - but that is a rather modern response.
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
The ocean changes in volume in proportion to the attraction of the moon [Seneca]
     Full Idea: The waves increase by degrees, approaching to the hour and day proportionately larger or smaller in volume as they are attracted by the star we call the moon, whose power controls the ocean's surge.
     From: Seneca the Younger (On Providence [c.60], §1)
     A reaction: ....just in case anyone thought that Isaac Newton had invented gravity.