Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Clitophon', 'Natural Minds' and 'Reflections on Liberty and Social Oppression'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


17 ideas

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
The taste of chocolate is a 'finer-grained' sensation than the taste of sweetness [Polger]
     Full Idea: The taste of chocolate is presumably a 'finer-grained' sensation than the taste of sweetness.
     From: Thomas W. Polger (Natural Minds [2004], Ch.1.4)
     A reaction: An interesting distinction when it comes to what they are like, and whether two very different brains can realise them. Sweetness might be the same for most creatures, but the tast of chocolate subtly different.
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 1. Self and Consciousness
The mind and the self are one, and the mind-self is a biological phenomenon [Polger]
     Full Idea: We should return to the old idea that the mind and the self are one and combine it with the new idea that the mind-self is a biological phenomenon.
     From: Thomas W. Polger (Natural Minds [2004], §8.3)
     A reaction: This doesn't make allowance for the fact that some parts of my mind seem like irritating visitors, and other parts seem like the home-owner. Personally I take the self to be the brain's central controller, or the centre (forum) of brain integration.
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 5. Teleological Functionalism
Teleological functions explain why a trait exists; causal-role functions say what it does [Polger]
     Full Idea: Teleological functions help explain why a trait has come to exist; causal-role functions tell what a trait does or is apt to do.
     From: Thomas W. Polger (Natural Minds [2004], §5.4)
     A reaction: The teleological view has the merit of nesting nicely with the theory of evolution, and with Aristotelian virtue ethics (which I like). Causal-role functionalism focuses better on what is actually happening inside the head.
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Identity theory says consciousness is an abstraction: a state, event, process or property [Polger]
     Full Idea: Identity theories locate consciousness at a certain order of abstraction, typically among neurophysiological states, events, processes, or properties.
     From: Thomas W. Polger (Natural Minds [2004], Ch.7.6)
     A reaction: I increasingly think that processes are the answer. My new analogy for the mind is a waterfall: its physical ontology is simple, it only exists because there is a sustained process, and it is far too complex to predict individual droplet outcomes.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
The just man does not harm his enemies, but benefits everyone [Plato]
     Full Idea: First, Socrates, you told me justice is harming your enemies and helping your friends. But later it seemed that the just man, since everything he does is for someone's benefit, never harms anyone.
     From: Plato (Clitophon* [c.372 BCE], 410b)
     A reaction: Socrates certainly didn't subscribe to the first view, which is the traditional consensus in Greek culture. In general Socrates agreed with the views later promoted by Jesus.
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
Morality would improve if people could pursue private interests [Weil]
     Full Idea: The common run of moralists complain that man is moved by his private interest: would to heaven it were so!
     From: Simone Weil (Reflections on Liberty and Social Oppression [1934], p.65)
     A reaction: Her point is that currently people have to sacrifice their own interests to communal activities which offer dubious benefits.
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 1. Social Power
In oppressive societies the scope of actual control is extended by a religion of power [Weil]
     Full Idea: Every oppressive society is cemented by a religion of power, which falsifies all social relations by enabling the powerful to command over and above what they are able to impose.
     From: Simone Weil (Reflections on Liberty and Social Oppression [1934], p.69)
     A reaction: A rather acute and accurate observation, I think. Flashy cars, grand uniforms, lots of medals, rituals of deference….. Sometimes I like the order and security this brings, but Simone Weil could quickly change my view.
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 4. Changing the State / a. Centralisation
No central authority can initiate decentralisation [Weil]
     Full Idea: It is quite patently impossible for decentralisation to be initiated by the central authority.
     From: Simone Weil (Reflections on Liberty and Social Oppression [1934], p.113)
     A reaction: This is contradicted by the creation of regional parliaments and mayors, but we see nothing beyond that. A state could crumble into small parts if there were'lots of autonomous regional groups. Easier for weird minorities to take control.
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 4. Changing the State / c. Revolution
After a bloody revolution the group which already had the power comes to the fore [Weil]
     Full Idea: There is no real break in continuity after a bloody struggle for regime change; for the victory just sanctions forces that before the struggle were the decisive factor in community life, patterns which were replacing those of the declining regime.
     From: Simone Weil (Reflections on Liberty and Social Oppression [1934], p.73)
     A reaction: [from Marx] I assume she has in mind the French Revolution, and perhaps the Russian Revolution, though in the latter the new bourgeois leaders also got swept away. So revolutions are not nearly as dramatic as they appear to be.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 2. Anarchism
Decentralisation is only possible by co-operation between strong and weak - which is absurd [Weil]
     Full Idea: The only possibility of salvation would lie in a co-operation between weak and strong, with a view to accomplishing a progressive decentralisation of social life; but the absurdity of such an idea strikes one immediately.
     From: Simone Weil (Reflections on Liberty and Social Oppression [1934], p.113)
     A reaction: I take this to be a judgement on the anarchist ideal, rather than a bit of modest devolution. The UK government set up regional parliaments. She says centralisation is remorseless.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / b. Liberal individualism
Only individual people of good will can achieve social progress [Weil]
     Full Idea: The enlightened goodwill of men acting in an individual capacity is the only possible principle of social progress.
     From: Simone Weil (Reflections on Liberty and Social Oppression [1934], p.57)
     A reaction: I identify with this. Virtually every admirable institution in a society can be traced back to the initiative of a few individuals. Every helpful technology was someone's brainwave.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / d. Liberal freedom
In the least evil societies people can think, control community life, and be autonomous [Weil]
     Full Idea: The least evil society is that in which the general run of men are most often obliged to think while acting, have the most opportunities for exercising control over collective life as a whole, and enjoy the greatest amount of independence.
     From: Simone Weil (Reflections on Liberty and Social Oppression [1934], p.97)
     A reaction: So Simone Weil was a liberal. How do you stop the most dynamic thinkers, social controllers, and exercisers of their own independence from coming to dominate the others? Only liberal institutions, such as the law and education, can do this.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 11. Capitalism
Marx showed that capitalist oppression, because of competition, is unstoppable [Weil]
     Full Idea: Marx gives a first-rate account of the mechanism of capitalist oppression; but so good is it that one finds it hard to visualise how this mechanism could cease to function. …The exploitation is the competitive need to expand as rapidly as possible.
     From: Simone Weil (Reflections on Liberty and Social Oppression [1934], p.39)
     A reaction: [Last bit compressed] This pinpoints the main motivation for desiring to overthrow capitalism. Resistance to that view is presumably the fear that an even worse oppression might replace it.
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 1. Slavery
The pleasure of completing tasks motivates just as well as the whip of slavery [Weil]
     Full Idea: The sight of the unfinished task attracts the free man as powerfully as the over-seer's whip stimulates the slave.
     From: Simone Weil (Reflections on Liberty and Social Oppression [1934], p.94)
     A reaction: This is Weil's key social idea - that freely performed productive work can be, and should be, a joy, as long as it is accompanied by respect and friendship, rather than oppression. Did this idea ever occur to a slave owner?
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
Inequality could easily be mitigated, if it were not for the struggle for power [Weil]
     Full Idea: Inequality could easily be mitigated by the resistance of the weak and the feeling for justice of the strong, …were it not for the intervention of a further factor, namely, the struggle for power.
     From: Simone Weil (Reflections on Liberty and Social Oppression [1934], p.62)
     A reaction: The implication is that many of 'the strong' are inclined to diminish inequality, but find themselves trapped and unable to do so, because of irresistable capitalist forces. Sounds plausible.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 3. Natural Function
A mummified heart has the teleological function of circulating blood [Polger]
     Full Idea: A preserved heart in a jar of formaldehyde has the teleological function of circulating blood.
     From: Thomas W. Polger (Natural Minds [2004], §5.4)
     A reaction: A nice illustration.
Teleological notions of function say what a thing is supposed to do [Polger]
     Full Idea: Teleological notions of function specify not just what a thing happens to do, but what it is supposed to do.
     From: Thomas W. Polger (Natural Minds [2004], Ch.5.3)
     A reaction: This is the basis of a distinct theory of the mind. It seems to be akin to the 'dispositions' of behaviourism, so that the mind becomes once more a theoretical and abstract entity, rather than a thing of occurrent events and processes.