Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Clitophon', 'The Ways of Paradox' and 'III.10 On Restraining your Will'

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12 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / d. Naïve logical sets
The set scheme discredited by paradoxes is actually the most natural one [Quine]
     Full Idea: Each proposed revision of set theory is unnatural, because the natural scheme is the unrestricted one that the antinomies discredit.
     From: Willard Quine (The Ways of Paradox [1961], p.16)
     A reaction: You can either takes this free-far-all version of set theory, and gradually restrain it for each specific problem, or start from scratch and build up in safe steps. The latter is (I think) the 'iterated' approach.
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 7. Natural Sets
Russell's antinomy challenged the idea that any condition can produce a set [Quine]
     Full Idea: In the case of Russell's antinomy, the tacit and trusted pattern of reasoning that is found wanting is this: for any condition you can formulate, there is a class whose members are the things meeting the condition.
     From: Willard Quine (The Ways of Paradox [1961], p.11)
     A reaction: This is why Russell's Paradox is so important for set theory, which in turn makes it important for the foundations of mathematics.
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 3. Antinomies
Antinomies contradict accepted ways of reasoning, and demand revisions [Quine]
     Full Idea: An 'antinomy' produces a self-contradiction by accepted ways of reasoning. It establishes that some tacit and trusted pattern of reasoning must be made explicit and henceforward be avoided or revised.
     From: Willard Quine (The Ways of Paradox [1961], p.05)
     A reaction: Quine treats antinomies as of much greater importance than mere paradoxes. It is often possible to give simple explanations of paradoxes, but antinomies go to the root of our belief system. This was presumably Kant's intended meaning.
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / a. Achilles paradox
Whenever the pursuer reaches the spot where the pursuer has been, the pursued has moved on [Quine]
     Full Idea: The Achilles argument is that (if the front runner keeps running) each time the pursuer reaches a spot where the pursuer has been, the pursued has moved a bit beyond.
     From: Willard Quine (The Ways of Paradox [1961], p.03)
     A reaction: Quine is always wonderfully lucid, and this is the clearest simple statement of the paradox.
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / d. Russell's paradox
A barber shaves only those who do not shave themselves. So does he shave himself? [Quine]
     Full Idea: In a certain village there is a barber, who shaves all and only those men in the village who do not shave themselves. So does the barber shave himself? The barber shaves himself if and only if he does not shave himself.
     From: Willard Quine (The Ways of Paradox [1961], p.02)
     A reaction: [Russell himself quoted this version of his paradox, from an unnamed source] Quine treats his as trivial because it only concerns barbers, but the full Russell paradox is a major 'antinomy', because it concerns sets.
Membership conditions which involve membership and non-membership are paradoxical [Quine]
     Full Idea: With Russell's antinomy, ...each tie the trouble comes of taking a membership condition that itself talks in turn of membership and non-membership.
     From: Willard Quine (The Ways of Paradox [1961], p.13)
     A reaction: Hence various stipulations to rule out vicious circles or referring to sets of the 'wrong type' are invoked to cure the problem. The big question is how strong to make the restrictions.
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
If we write it as '"this sentence is false" is false', there is no paradox [Quine]
     Full Idea: If we supplant the sentence 'this sentence is false' with one saying what it refers to, we get '"this sentence is false" is false'. But then the whole outside sentence attributes falsity no longer to itself but to something else, so there is no paradox.
     From: Willard Quine (The Ways of Paradox [1961], p.07)
     A reaction: Quine is pointing us towards type theory and meta-languages to solve the problem. We now have the Revenge Liar, and the problem has not been fully settled.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
The just man does not harm his enemies, but benefits everyone [Plato]
     Full Idea: First, Socrates, you told me justice is harming your enemies and helping your friends. But later it seemed that the just man, since everything he does is for someone's benefit, never harms anyone.
     From: Plato (Clitophon [c.372 BCE], 410b)
     A reaction: Socrates certainly didn't subscribe to the first view, which is the traditional consensus in Greek culture. In general Socrates agreed with the views later promoted by Jesus.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
Virtue inspires Stoics, but I want a good temperament [Montaigne]
     Full Idea: What Stoics did from virtue I teach myself to do from temperament.
     From: Michel de Montaigne (III.10 On Restraining your Will [1580], p.1153)
     A reaction: I take this to be an Aristotelian criticism of Stoicism. They venerate virtue above everything, but Aristotle says you must integrate virtue into your very being, so that right actions flow from you, with very little need for premeditation.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
There is not much point in only becoming good near the end of your life [Montaigne]
     Full Idea: It is almost better never to become a good man at all than to do so tardily, understanding how to live when you have no life left.
     From: Michel de Montaigne (III.10 On Restraining your Will [1580], p.1142)
     A reaction: A very nice perspective, which I don't recall Aristotle mentioning. It does, though, reinforce Aristotle's belief that early training is essential.
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 3. Free speech
Nothing we say can be worse than unsaying it in the face of authority [Montaigne]
     Full Idea: Nothing which a gentleman says can seem worse than the shame of his unsaying it under duress from authority.
     From: Michel de Montaigne (III.10 On Restraining your Will [1580], p.1153)
     A reaction: The point is that you have to fight every day for free speech, because no matter what the law says, there are always people in power who want to shut you up.
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / c. Combatants
People at home care far more than soldiers risking death about the outcome of wars [Montaigne]
     Full Idea: How many soldiers put themselves at risk every day in wars which they care little about, rushing into danger in battles the loss of which will not make them lose a night's sleep. Meanwhile a man at home is more passionate about the war than the soldier.
     From: Michel de Montaigne (III.10 On Restraining your Will [1580], p.1139)
     A reaction: It depends whether you are a mercenary (which the majority probably were in 1680), and what are the implications of defeat.