52 ideas
23890 | For Plato true wisdom is supernatural [Plato, by Weil] |
Full Idea: It is evident that Plato regards true wisdom as something supernatural. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Simone Weil - God in Plato p.61 | |
A reaction: Taken literally, I assume this is wrong, but we can empathise with the thought. Wisdom has the feeling of rising above the level of mere knowledge, to achieve the overview I associate with philosophy. |
3060 | Plato never mentions Democritus, and wished to burn his books [Plato, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Plato, who mentions nearly all the ancient philosophers, nowhere speaks of Democritus; he wished to burn all of his books, but was persuaded that it was futile. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.7.8 |
18450 | Philosophy has its own mode of death, by separating soul from body [Porphyry] |
Full Idea: There is a double death. One, known by all men, consists in the separation of the body with the soul; the other, characteristic of philosophers, results in the separation of the soul from the body. | |
From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 1Enn9 3) |
23891 | Two contradictories force us to find a relation which will correlate them [Plato, by Weil] |
Full Idea: Where contradictions appear there is a correlation of contraries, which is relation. If a contradiction is imposed on the intelligence, it is forced to think of a relation to transform the contradiction into a correlation, which draws the soul higher. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Simone Weil - God in Plato p.70 | |
A reaction: A much better account of the dialectic than anything I have yet seen in Hegel. For the first time I see some sense in it. A contradiction is not a falsehood, and it must be addressed rather than side-stepped. A kink in the system, that needs ironing. |
14502 | Plato's idea of 'structure' tends to be mathematically expressed [Plato, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: 'Structure' tends to be characterized by Plato as something that is mathematically expressed. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects V.3 iv | |
A reaction: [Koslicki is drawing on Verity Harte here] |
18451 | The presence of the incorporeal is only known by certain kinds of disposition [Porphyry] |
Full Idea: Being everywhere and nowhere, the incorporeal, wherever it happens to be, betrays its presence only by a certain kind of disposition. | |
From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 4Enn3 21(20)) | |
A reaction: There is a mystical or dualist view of fundamental powers, as the spiritual engine which drives passive physical nature. It's rubbish of course, but if powers are primitive in a naturalistic theory, it is not a view which can be refuted. |
17948 | Plato's Forms meant that the sophists only taught the appearance of wisdom and virtue [Plato, by Nehamas] |
Full Idea: Plato's theory of Forms allowed him to claim that the sophists and other opponents were trapped in the world of appearance. What they therefore taught was only apparent wisdom and virtue. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Alexander Nehamas - Eristic,Antilogic,Sophistic,Dialectic p.118 |
3039 | When Diogenes said he could only see objects but not their forms, Plato said it was because he had eyes but no intellect [Plato, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: When Diogenes told Plato he saw tables and cups, but not 'tableness' and 'cupness', Plato replied that this was because Diogenes had eyes but no intellect. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 06.2.6 |
20906 | Platonists argue for the indivisible triangle-in-itself [Plato, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The Platonists, on the basis of purely logical arguments, posit the existence of an indivisible 'triangle in itself'. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) 316a15 | |
A reaction: A helpful confirmation that geometrical figures really are among the Forms (bearing in mind that numbers are not, because they contain one another). What shape is the Form of the triangle? |
556 | If there is one Form for both the Form and its participants, they must have something in common [Aristotle on Plato] |
Full Idea: If there is the same Form for the Forms and for their participants, then they must have something in common. | |
From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 991a |
563 | If gods are like men, they are just eternal men; similarly, Forms must differ from particulars [Aristotle on Plato] |
Full Idea: We say there is the form of man, horse and health, but nothing else, making the same mistake as those who say that there are gods but that they are in the form of men. They just posit eternal men, and here we are not positing forms but eternal sensibles. | |
From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 997b |
557 | A Form is a cause of things only in the way that white mixed with white is a cause [Aristotle on Plato] |
Full Idea: A Form is a cause of things only in the way that white mixed with white is a cause. | |
From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 991a |
565 | The Forms cannot be changeless if they are in changing things [Aristotle on Plato] |
Full Idea: The Forms could not be changeless if they were in changing things. | |
From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 998a |
9607 | The greatest discovery in human thought is Plato's discovery of abstract objects [Brown,JR on Plato] |
Full Idea: The greatest discovery in the history of human thought is Plato's discovery of abstract objects. | |
From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by James Robert Brown - Philosophy of Mathematics Ch. 2 | |
A reaction: Compare Idea 2860! Given the diametrically opposed views, it is clearly likely that Plato's central view is the most important idea in the history of human thought, even if it is wrong. |
13263 | We can grasp whole things in science, because they have a mathematics and a teleology [Plato, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Due to the mathematical nature of structure and the teleological cause underlying the creation of Platonic wholes, these wholes are intelligible, and are in fact the proper objects of science. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 5.3 | |
A reaction: I like this idea, because it pays attention to the connection between how we conceive objects to be, and how we are able to think about objects. Only examining these two together enables us to grasp metaphysics. |
13261 | Plato sees an object's structure as expressible in mathematics [Plato, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: The 'structure' of an object tends to be characterised by Plato as something that is mathematically expressible. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 5.3 | |
A reaction: This seems to be pure Pythagoreanism (see Idea 644). Plato is pursuing Pythagoras's research programme, of trying to find mathematics buried in every aspect of reality. |
13265 | Plato was less concerned than Aristotle with the source of unity in a complex object [Plato, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Plato was less concerned than Aristotle with the project of how to account, in completely general terms, for the source of unity within a mereologically complex object. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 5.5 | |
A reaction: Plato seems to have simply asserted that some sort of harmony held things together. Aristotles puts the forms [eidos] within objects, rather than external, so he has to give a fuller account of what is going on in an object. He never managed it! |
18459 | Diversity arises from the power of unity [Porphyry] |
Full Idea: Diversity is born of the development of the power of unity. | |
From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 6Enn5 42) | |
A reaction: I doubt whether even Porphyry understood this, but we might say that once the principle of unification enters into nature, it will inevitably result in diversity. One all-embracing unity would be indiscernible. |
593 | Plato's holds that there are three substances: Forms, mathematical entities, and perceptible bodies [Plato, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Plato's doctrine was that the Forms and mathematicals are two substances and that the third substance is that of perceptible bodies. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 1028b |
13260 | Plato says wholes are either containers, or they're atomic, or they don't exist [Plato, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Plato considers a 'container' model for wholes (which are disjoint from their parts) [Parm 144e3-], and a 'nihilist' model, in which only wholes are mereological atoms, and a 'bare pluralities' view, in which wholes are not really one at all. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 5.2 | |
A reaction: [She cites Verity Harte for this analysis of Plato] The fourth, and best, seems to be that wholes are parts which fall under some unifying force or structure or principle. |
11237 | Only universals have essence [Plato, by Politis] |
Full Idea: Plato argues that only universals have essence. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 1.4 |
11238 | Plato and Aristotle take essence to make a thing what it is [Plato, by Politis] |
Full Idea: Plato and Aristotle have a shared general conception of essence: the essence of a thing is what that thing is simply in virtue of itself and in virtue of being the very thing it is. It answers the question 'What is this very thing?' | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 1.4 |
18452 | Memory is not conserved images, but reproduction of previous thought [Porphyry] |
Full Idea: Memory does not consist in preserving images. It is a faculty of reproducing the conceptions with which our soul has been occupied. | |
From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 5Enn6 25(2)) |
17085 | A good explanation totally rules out the opposite explanation (so Forms are required) [Plato, by Ruben] |
Full Idea: For Plato, an acceptable explanation is one such that there is no possibility of there being the opposite explanation at all, and he thought that only explanations in terms of the Forms, but never physical explanations, could meet this requirement. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by David-Hillel Ruben - Explaining Explanation Ch 2 | |
A reaction: [Republic 436c is cited] |
18453 | Intelligence is aware of itself, so the intelligence is both the thinker and the thought [Porphyry] |
Full Idea: Since intelligence is intelligible for intelligence, intelligence is its own object. ...Intelligence, therefore, is simultaneously thinker and thought, all that thinks and all that is thought. | |
From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 5Enn3 32(5-7)) | |
A reaction: This is a bit of a problem for Descartes, if the Cogito is taken as offering evidence (thought) for the existence of a thinker ('I'). Porphyry implies that the separation Descartes requires is impossible. |
18462 | The soul is everywhere and nowhere in the body, and must be its cause [Porphyry] |
Full Idea: The soul is neither a body, nor in the body, but is only the cause of the body, because she is simultaneously everywhere and nowhere in the body. | |
From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 6Enn5 43) | |
A reaction: This is the rather bewildering phenomenology of consciousness which persuaded Descartes of dualism. |
18463 | Successful introspection reveals the substrate along with the object of thought [Porphyry] |
Full Idea: He who by thought can penetrate within his own substance, and can thus acquire knowledge of it, finds himself in this actualisation of knowledge and consciousness, where the substrate that knows is identical with the object that is known. | |
From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 6Enn5 44) | |
A reaction: It seems remarkably that this ability is confidently asserted by Porphyry, and flatly denied by Hume. Were they just different people, or were they looking for different things, or was one of them deluded? |
18458 | The soul is bound to matter by the force of its own disposition [Porphyry] |
Full Idea: The individual soul, which declines towards matter, is bound to the matter by the form which her disposition has made her choose. | |
From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 6Enn4 39) | |
A reaction: This sounds like the soul is boss over the matter, and yet the soul is 'made' to choose union with matter. The Universal Soul is seen by Porphyr as the controller of the situation. |
1651 | Plato wanted to somehow control and purify the passions [Vlastos on Plato] |
Full Idea: Plato put high on his agenda a project which did not figure in Socrates' programme at all: the hygienic conditioning of the passions. This cannot be an intellectual process, as argument cannot touch them. | |
From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Gregory Vlastos - Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher p.88 | |
A reaction: This is the standard traditional view of any thinker who exaggerates the importance and potential of reason in our lives. |
3324 | Plato's whole philosophy may be based on being duped by reification - a figure of speech [Benardete,JA on Plato] |
Full Idea: Plato is liable to the charge of having been duped by a figure of speech, albeit the most profound of all, the trope of reification. | |
From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.12 | |
A reaction: That might be a plausible account if his view was ridiculous, but given how many powerful friends Plato has, especially in the philosophy of mathematics, we should assume he was cleverer than that. |
19045 | Translation is too flimsy a notion to support theories of cultural incommensurability [Quine] |
Full Idea: Translation is a flimsy notion, unfit to bear the weight of the theories of cultural incommensurability that Davidson effectively and justly criticises. | |
From: Willard Quine (On the Very Idea of a Third Dogma [1981], p.42) | |
A reaction: I presume he means that a claim to accurately translate something is false, because there is no clear idea of what a good translation looks like it. I just don't believe him. The practice of daily life belies Quine's theories on this. |
7503 | Plato never refers to examining the conscience [Plato, by Foucault] |
Full Idea: Plato never speaks of the examination of conscience - never! | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Michel Foucault - On the Genealogy of Ethics p.276 | |
A reaction: Plato does imply some sort of self-evident direct knowledge about that nature of a healthy soul. Presumably the full-blown concept of conscience is something given from outside, from God. In 'Euthyphro', Plato asserts the primacy of morality (Idea 337). |
18464 | Justice is each person fulfilling his function [Porphyry] |
Full Idea: Justice, as has been rightly said, consists in each one fulfilling his [authentic and proper] function. | |
From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 6Enn5 44) | |
A reaction: This is presumably a direct reference to the theory in Plato's 'Republic'. It makes the connection between virtue and function which I take to be basic to virtue theory, giving it a naturalistic advantaged over other theories. |
2173 | As religion and convention collapsed, Plato sought morals not just in knowledge, but in the soul [Williams,B on Plato] |
Full Idea: Once gods and fate and social expectation were no longer there, Plato felt it necessary to discover ethics inside human nature, not just as ethical knowledge (Socrates' view), but in the structure of the soul. | |
From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Bernard Williams - Shame and Necessity II - p.43 | |
A reaction: anti Charles Taylor |
18448 | We should avoid the pleasures of love, or at least, should not enact our dreams [Porphyry] |
Full Idea: The pleasures of love will not even involuntarily be tasted, at least, she will not allow herself to be drawn beyond the lights of fancy that occur in dreams. | |
From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 1Enn2 I.4) | |
A reaction: Presumably erotic dreams are only tolerated because not much can be done about them. This brings out the puritanism of neo-platonism. |
9274 | Plato's legacy to European thought was the Good, the Beautiful and the True [Plato, by Gray] |
Full Idea: Plato's legacy to European thought was a trio of capital letters - the Good, the Beautiful and the True. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by John Gray - Straw Dogs 2.8 | |
A reaction: It seems to have been Baumgarten who turned this into a slogan (Idea 8117). Gray says these ideals are lethal, but I identify with them very strongly, and am quite happy to see the good life as an attempt to find the right balance between them. |
94 | Pleasure is better with the addition of intelligence, so pleasure is not the good [Plato, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Plato says the life of pleasure is more desirable with the addition of intelligence, and if the combination is better, pleasure is not the good. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Nicomachean Ethics 1172b27 | |
A reaction: It is obvious why we like pleasure, but not why intelligence makes it 'better'. Maybe it is just because we enjoy intelligence? |
17947 | Plato decided that the virtuous and happy life was the philosophical life [Plato, by Nehamas] |
Full Idea: Plato came to the conclusion that virtue and happiness consist in the life of philosophy itself. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Alexander Nehamas - Eristic,Antilogic,Sophistic,Dialectic p.117 | |
A reaction: This view is obviously ridiculous, because it largely excludes almost the entire human race, which sees philosophy as a cul-de-sac, even if it is good. But virtue and happiness need some serious thought. |
6015 | Plato, unusually, said that theoretical and practical wisdom are inseparable [Plato, by Kraut] |
Full Idea: Two virtues that are ordinarily kept distinct - theoretical and practical wisdom - are joined by Plato; he thinks that neither one can be fully possessed unless it is combined with the other. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Richard Kraut - Plato | |
A reaction: I get the impression that this doctrine comes from Socrates, whose position is widely reported as 'intellectualist'. Aristotle certainly held the opposite view. |
18444 | Civil virtues make us behave benevolently, and thereby unite citizens [Porphyry] |
Full Idea: The object of the civil virtues is to make us benevolent in our dealings with our fellow-human beings, and are so-called because they unite citizens. | |
From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 1Enn2 I.1) | |
A reaction: Modern commentators underestimate the close link between ancient virtue and citizenship. It is hard for one person to have much of a notion of virtue if they live on a desert island, beyond caring for personal health. |
18445 | Civil virtues control the passions, and make us conform to our nature [Porphyry] |
Full Idea: The civil virtues moderate the passions; their object is to teach us to live in conformity with the laws of human nature. | |
From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 1Enn2 I.2) | |
A reaction: The link with human nature is basic to virtue theory, but this proposal is rather too vague. Are passions not part of the laws of human nature? |
18446 | Purificatory virtues detach the soul completely from the passions [Porphyry] |
Full Idea: The object of the 'purificatory' virtues is to detach the soul completely from the passions. | |
From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 1Enn2 I.4) | |
A reaction: This is an aspect of virtue theory which doesn't appear in Aristotle. He is in favour of rational control of the passions, but not of totally abandoning them. The neo-platonists are much more puritanical. They seem to go against human nature. |
18447 | There are practical, purificatory, contemplative, and exemplary virtues [Porphyry] |
Full Idea: The practical virtues make man virtuous; the purificatory virtues make man divine....; the contemplative virtues defiy; while the exemplary virtues make a man the parent of divinities. | |
From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 1Enn2 I.4) | |
A reaction: I like the idea of the 'exemplary' virtues. I think an entire theory of morality could be built on the notion that we are all role-models for one another. |
2912 | Plato is boring [Nietzsche on Plato] |
Full Idea: Plato is boring. | |
From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Friedrich Nietzsche - Twilight of the Idols 9.2 |
18456 | Unified real existence is neither great nor small, though greatness and smallness participate in it [Porphyry] |
Full Idea: By its identity and numerical unity, real existence is neither great nor small, neither very large nor very small, though it causes even greatest and smallest to participate in its nature. | |
From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 6Enn4 37(5)) | |
A reaction: Note the platonic word 'participate' [metechein], suggesting that he is talking about the Form of Existence here. Note also that we have 'real' existence here, implying a lesser type of existence that participates in it. |
18454 | Time is the circular movement of the soul [Porphyry] |
Full Idea: It is the circular movement of the soul that constitutes time, just as the permanence of intelligence in itself constitutes eternity. | |
From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 5Enn3 32(5-7)) | |
A reaction: Plato loved circles. If you think time is subjective, this is trying to express your intuition. Personally I think it is nonsense |
18455 | Some think time is seen at rest, as well as in movement [Porphyry] |
Full Idea: Some have believed that time manifested in rest as well as in movement. | |
From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 5Enn3 32(5-7)) | |
A reaction: If you like this idea, you should see Shoemaker's lovely three-worlds thought experiment. |
1526 | Almost everyone except Plato thinks that time could not have been generated [Plato, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: With a single exception (Plato) everyone agrees about time - that it is not generated. Democritus says time is an obvious example of something not generated. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Physics 251b14 |
18460 | God is nowhere, and hence everywhere [Porphyry] |
Full Idea: The divinity is everywhere because it is nowhere. | |
From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 6Enn5 43) |
18461 | Everything existing proceeds from divinity, and is within divinity [Porphyry] |
Full Idea: All things that possess or do not possess existence proceed from divinity, and are within divinity. | |
From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 6Enn5 43) | |
A reaction: Nice to see Porphyry endorsing Meinongian objects. I doubt whether he counts as a pantheist, but this is a very pantheistic remark. |
18449 | Nature binds or detaches body to soul, but soul itself joins and detaches soul from body [Porphyry] |
Full Idea: Nature binds the body to the soul, but it is the soul herself that has bound herself to the body. It, therefore, belongs to nature to detach the body from the soul, while it is the soul herself that detaches herself from the body. | |
From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 1Enn9 2) | |
A reaction: Baffling. What happens if there is a conflict? I suppose either party can cancel the bargain, but who wins when they disagree? |
18457 | Individual souls are all connected, though distinct, and without dividing universal Soul [Porphyry] |
Full Idea: Individual souls are distinct without being separated from each other, and without dividing the universal Soul into a number of parts; they are united to each other without becoming confused. | |
From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 6Enn4 39) | |
A reaction: This sounds like Jung's theory that there is a universal subconscious which links us all together. Taken literally, I assume it is nonsense. As an invitation to acknowledge how much we all have in common, it is a nice corrective to liberal individualism. |