34 ideas
| 16123 | Whenever you perceive a community of things, you should also hunt out differences in the group [Plato] |
| Full Idea: The rule is that when one perceives first the community between the members of a group of many things, one should not desist until one sees in it all those differences that are located in classes. | |
| From: Plato (The Statesman [c.356 BCE], 285b) | |
| A reaction: He goes on to recommend the opposite as well - see community even when there appears to be nothing but differences. I take this to be analysis, just as much as modern linguistic approaches are. Analyse the world, not language. |
| 23728 | Analysis aims to express the full set of platitudes surrounding a given concept [Smith,M] |
| Full Idea: The aim of analysis is to give us knowledge of all and only the platitudes surrounding our use of the concept that is up for analysis. | |
| From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 1.10) | |
| A reaction: His earlier specimen concept is 'redness'. For other concepts there might be considerable disagreement about which propositions are or are not the relevant platitudes. Smith emphasises that analysis need not be reductive. |
| 6806 | Do not multiply entities beyond necessity [William of Ockham] |
| Full Idea: Do not multiply entities beyond necessity. | |
| From: William of Ockham (works [1335]) | |
| A reaction: This is the classic statement of Ockham's Razor, though it is not found in his printed works. It appears to be mainly aimed at Plato's Theory of Forms. It is taken to refer to types of entities, not numbers. One seraph is as bad as a hundred. |
| 23744 | Defining a set of things by paradigms doesn't pin them down enough [Smith,M] |
| Full Idea: The discussion of colour concepts shows that permutation problems arise when a set of concepts, acquired inter alia via the presentation of paradigms, is largely interdefined. | |
| From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 5.9) | |
| A reaction: Smith says that our normative moral concepts are largely interdefined in this way. The 'permutation' problem is that they can change places in the definition set, and so their intrinsic individual character is not pinned down. Sounds right. |
| 16125 | To reveal a nature, divide down, and strip away what it has in common with other things [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Let's take the kind posited and cut it in two, .then follow the righthand part of what we've cut, and hold onto things that the sophist is associated with until we strip away everything he has in common with other things, then display his peculiar nature. | |
| From: Plato (The Statesman [c.356 BCE], 264e) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be close to Aristotle's account of definition, when he is trying to get at what-it-is-to-be some thing. But if you strip away everything the definiendum has in common with other things, will anything remain? |
| 16124 | No one wants to define 'weaving' just for the sake of weaving [Plato] |
| Full Idea: I don't suppose that anyone with any sense would want to hunt down the definition of 'weaving' for the sake of weaving itself. | |
| From: Plato (The Statesman [c.356 BCE], 285d) | |
| A reaction: The point seems to be that the definition brings out the connections between weaving and other activities and objects, thus enlarging our understanding. |
| 22132 | Species and genera are individual concepts which naturally signify many individuals [William of Ockham] |
| Full Idea: In his mature nominalism, species and genera are identified with certain mental qualities called concepts or intentions of the mind. Ontologically they are individuals too, like everthing else, ...but they naturally signify many different individuals. | |
| From: William of Ockham (works [1335]), quoted by Claude Panaccio - William of Ockham p.1056 | |
| A reaction: 'Naturally' is the key word, because the concepts are not fictions, but natural responses to encountering individuals in the world. I am an Ockhamist. |
| 5961 | The soul gets its goodness from god, and its evil from previous existence. [Plato] |
| Full Idea: From its composer the soul possesses all beautiful things, but from its former condition, everything that proves to be harsh and unjust in heaven. | |
| From: Plato (The Statesman [c.356 BCE], 273b) | |
| A reaction: A neat move to explain the origins of evil (or rather, to shift the problem of evil to a long long way from here). This view presumably traces back to the views of Empedocles on good and evil. Can the soul acquire evil in its current existence? |
| 23743 | Capturing all the common sense facts about rationality is almost impossible [Smith,M] |
| Full Idea: It would be a superhuman task just to write down an explicit, non-summary style, statement of the platitudes that capture our idea of what it is to be fully rational. | |
| From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 5.9) | |
| A reaction: Well said. Philosophers are inclined to make simplistic binary judgements about whether persons or animals are rational. A visit to YouTube will show fish acting extremely rationally. |
| 283 | The question of whether or not to persuade comes before the science of persuasion [Plato] |
| Full Idea: The science of whether one must persuade or not must rule over the science capable of persuading. | |
| From: Plato (The Statesman [c.356 BCE], 304c) | |
| A reaction: Plato probably thinks that reason has to be top of the pyramid, but there is always the Nietzschean/romantic question of why we should place such a value on what is rational. |
| 23739 | Goals need desires, and so only desires can motivate us [Smith,M] |
| Full Idea: Only an agent's desires may constitute her having certain goals, and it follows from this that only her desires may constitute her motivating reasons. | |
| From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 4.8) | |
| A reaction: We might distinguish between reasons which direct us towards certain ends, and reasons which motivate us to pursue those ends. Most mornings I have a reason to get out of bed, which precedes my motivation to actually do it. |
| 23724 | A pure desire could be criticised if it were based on a false belief [Smith,M] |
| Full Idea: There is a minor proviso to Hume's view, which is that desires are subject to rational criticism, but only insofar as they are based on beliefs that are subject to rational criticism. | |
| From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 1.3) | |
| A reaction: He says this is not a refutation of the basic Humean claim. He has in mind a desire such as to consume cyanide because you believe it will be good for you. |
| 23736 | A person can have a desire without feeling it [Smith,M] |
| Full Idea: We should concede that a desire may be had in the absence of its being felt. | |
| From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 4.5) | |
| A reaction: A nice observation. An example he gives is a father's desire that his child does well. Smith is discussing Hume's account of motivation in terms of desires and beliefs. |
| 23723 | In the Humean account, desires are not true/false, or subject to any rational criticism [Smith,M] |
| Full Idea: According to the standard picture of human psychology that we get from Hume, not only are desires not assessable in terms of truth and falsehood, they are not subject to any sort of rational criticism at all. | |
| From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 1.3) | |
| A reaction: This is where action theory meets metaethics. The separation of facts from values underlies this, because a desire is a fact, but the wickedness of a desire is not. Surely a desire could be a failure of practical reason? |
| 23735 | Subjects may be fallible about the desires which explain their actions [Smith,M] |
| Full Idea: It is an adequacy constraint on any conception of desire that the epistemology of desire it recommends allows that subjects may be fallible about the desires they have. | |
| From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 4.5) | |
| A reaction: [I do wish authors would write my short versions instead of their rambling sentences!] Even after the event we may be unsure why we did something. If someone observes self-interest when I thought my action was altruistic, I don't know how to respond. |
| 23738 | Humeans (unlike their opponents) say that desires and judgements can separate [Smith,M] |
| Full Idea: Humeans claim that agents who believe they should act may nevertheless lack the desire to do so, where anti-Humeans must say the two go together, and someone with the belief thereby has the desire. | |
| From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 4.7) | |
| A reaction: [very compressed] A very helpful distinction about the classic debates over the motivations of action. Smith defends the Humean view, and makes it very plausible. No mere sense of rightness or duty can compel us to act. |
| 23742 | If first- and second-order desires conflict, harmony does not require the second-order to win [Smith,M] |
| Full Idea: Even if we assume that reason prefers harmony between first- and second-order desires, there is no reason to assume that reason is on the side of achieving that harmony by changing first-order desires to suit second-order, rather than vice versa. | |
| From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 5.7) | |
| A reaction: [Smith is discussing David Lewis 1989 on second-order desires] Smith says that on the Humean view the rational winner should simply be the stronger of the two. Since this sounds like an endorsement for weakness of will, Smith relies on beliefs. |
| 23746 | Objective reasons to act might be the systematic desires of a fully rational person [Smith,M] |
| Full Idea: One way to decide what we have normative reasons to do …is by trying to find a set of desires that is systematically justifiable, which is our best assessment of the desires we would have under conditions of full rationality. | |
| From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 5.9) | |
| A reaction: This is Smith accepting the Humean view that desires are essential for motivation, but trying to find a marriage of desires with reason to produce the more objective aspects of morality. An interesting aspiration… |
| 23733 | Motivating reasons are psychological, while normative reasons are external [Smith,M] |
| Full Idea: There are motivating reasons for action, which are psychological states, and normative reasons, which are propositions of the general form 'a person's doing this is desirable or required'. | |
| From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 4.2) | |
| A reaction: Motivating reasons are locatable entities in minds, whereas normative reasons are either abstract, or perhaps motivating reasons expressed by other people. Smith says the two types are unconnected. |
| 23740 | Humeans take maximising desire satisfaction as the normative reasons for actions [Smith,M] |
| Full Idea: The distinctive Humean view of normative reasons for action is that the rational thing for an agent to do is simply to act so as to maximally satisfy her desires, whatever the content of those desires. | |
| From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 5.1) | |
| A reaction: Smith disagrees with this view (though he agrees with Hume about motivating reasons). An obvious problem for the Humean view would be a strong desire to do something excessively dangerous. |
| 23745 | We cannot expect even fully rational people to converge on having the same desires for action [Smith,M] |
| Full Idea: We cannot expect that, even under conditions of full rationality, agents would all converge on the same desires about what is to be done in the various circumstances they might face. | |
| From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 5.9) | |
| A reaction: A very good argument in favour of the Humean view that desires are an essential part of moral motivation. Possible convergence of view is a standard hallmark of communal rationality. |
| 282 | Non-physical beauty can only be shown clearly by speech [Plato] |
| Full Idea: The bodiless things, being the most beautiful and the greatest, are only shown with clarity by speech and nothing else. | |
| From: Plato (The Statesman [c.356 BCE], 286a) | |
| A reaction: Unfortunately this will be true of warped and ugly ideas as well. |
| 23731 | 'Externalists' say moral judgements are not reasons, and maybe not even motives [Smith,M] |
| Full Idea: The 'externalist' view of morality says either that judgements of rightness are motives but not reasons, or (more strongly) that they are neither, meaning that moral judgements do not have practical implications. | |
| From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 3.1) | |
| A reaction: [Philippa Foot's untypical 1972 article is cited for the strong view. Hare and Blackburn are typical of the first view]. I would say that such judgements are both reasons and motives - but not necessarily for me! 'Someone should do something about this!'. |
| 23732 | A person could make a moral judgement without being in any way motivated by it [Smith,M] |
| Full Idea: Amoralists make moral judgements without being motivated accordingly, and without suffering any sort of practical irrationality either; the practicality requirement of moral judgement is thus false. | |
| From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 3.3) | |
| A reaction: It is hard to imagine an immoralist with this nihilistic attitude bothering to make any moral judgements at all. Why would someone indifferent to art make aesthetic judgements? What could a 'judgement of rightness' mean to an amoralist? |
| 23729 | Moral internalism says a judgement of rightness is thereby motivating [Smith,M] |
| Full Idea: Moral 'internalism' says if an agent judges an action as right in some circumstance, then they are either thereby motivated to do it, or they are irrational (e.g. their will is weak). | |
| From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 3.1) | |
| A reaction: [Somewhat reworded] So the motivation comes from an internal judgement, not from external factors. Is it not tautological that 'this is the right thing to do' means it should be done (ceteris paribus)? |
| 23730 | 'Rationalism' says the rightness of an action is a reason to perform it [Smith,M] |
| Full Idea: Moral 'rationalism' says if an action is right for agents in some circumstances, then there is a reason for the agents to do it. | |
| From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 3.1) | |
| A reaction: That is, there is not merely a motivation to act (the 'internalist' view), but there is a reason to act. Smith calls both views the 'practicality requirement' of normal moral judgements. Smith defends the rationalist view. |
| 23727 | Expressivists count attitudes as 'moral' if they concern features of things, rather than their mere existence [Smith,M] |
| Full Idea: The pro- and con- attitudes of the expressivists count as 'moral' only if they are had towards particular people, actions or states of affairs in virtue of their natural features, ….rather than in virtue of being the particulars that they are. | |
| From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 2.4) | |
| A reaction: So whereas emotivists don't have to have any reasons for their moral feelings, other expressivists seem to require reasons (i.e. indicating features of things) to endorse their attitudes. What of reasonless emotionless attitudes? |
| 23741 | Is valuing something a matter of believing or a matter of desiring? [Smith,M] |
| Full Idea: What is it to value something? That is, equivalently, what is it to accept that we have a normative reason to do something? In Hume's terms, is it a matter of believing? Or is it a matter of desiring? We seem to face a dilemma. | |
| From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 5.4) | |
| A reaction: Smith is discussing moral motivation, and there is obviously more to valuing something than acting on it. Nice question, though. Personally I value St Paul's Cathedral, but I don't desire it. I value heart surgeons, but don't want to emulate them. |
| 281 | The arts produce good and beautiful things by preserving the mean [Plato] |
| Full Idea: It is by preserving the mean that arts produce everything that is good and beautiful. | |
| From: Plato (The Statesman [c.356 BCE], 284b) |
| 22559 | Democracy is the worst of good constitutions, but the best of bad constitutions [Plato, by Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Plato judged that when the constitution is decent, democracy is the worst of them, but when they are bad it is the best. | |
| From: report of Plato (The Statesman [c.356 BCE], 302e) by Aristotle - Politics 1289b07 | |
| A reaction: Aristotle denies that a good oligarchy is superior. What of technocracy? The challenge is to set up institutions which ensure the health of the democracy. The big modern problem is populists who lie. |
| 19381 | The past has ceased to exist, and the future does not yet exist, so time does not exist [William of Ockham] |
| Full Idea: Time is composed of non-entities, because it is composed of the past which does not exist now, although it did exist, and of the future, which does not yet exist; therefore time does not exist. | |
| From: William of Ockham (works [1335], 6:496), quoted by Richard T.W. Arthur - Leibniz 7 'Nominalist' | |
| A reaction: I've a lot of sympathy with this! I favour Presentism, so the past is gone and the future is yet to arrive. But we have no coherent concept of a present moment of any duration to contain reality. We are just completely bogglificated by it all. |
| 279 | Only divine things can always stay the same, and bodies are not like that [Plato] |
| Full Idea: It is fitting for only the most divine things of all to be always the same and in the same state and in the same respects, and the nature of body is not of this ordering. | |
| From: Plato (The Statesman [c.356 BCE], 269b) |
| 8010 | William of Ockham is the main spokesman for God's commands being the source of morality [William of Ockham] |
| Full Idea: The most notable philosopher who makes God's commandment the basis of goodness, rather than God's goodness a reason for obeying him, is William of Occam. | |
| From: William of Ockham (works [1335]), quoted by Alasdair MacIntyre - A Short History of Ethics Ch.9 | |
| A reaction: Either view has problems. Why choose God to obey? Obey anyone who is powerful? But how do you decide that God is good? How do we know the nature of God's commands, or the nature of God's goodness? Etc. |
| 16679 | Even an angel must have some location [William of Ockham, by Pasnau] |
| Full Idea: Ockham dismisses the possibility of non-location out of hand, remarking that even an angel has some location. | |
| From: report of William of Ockham (works [1335]) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 14.4 |