68 ideas
23890 | For Plato true wisdom is supernatural [Plato, by Weil] |
Full Idea: It is evident that Plato regards true wisdom as something supernatural. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Simone Weil - God in Plato p.61 | |
A reaction: Taken literally, I assume this is wrong, but we can empathise with the thought. Wisdom has the feeling of rising above the level of mere knowledge, to achieve the overview I associate with philosophy. |
3060 | Plato never mentions Democritus, and wished to burn his books [Plato, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Plato, who mentions nearly all the ancient philosophers, nowhere speaks of Democritus; he wished to burn all of his books, but was persuaded that it was futile. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.7.8 |
17621 | What matters in mathematics is its objectivity, not the existence of the objects [Dummett] |
Full Idea: As Kreisel has remarked, what is important is not the existence of mathematical objects, but the objectivity of mathematical statements. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973], Ch.14) | |
A reaction: [see Maddy 2011:115 for the history of this idea] It seems rather unclear where Frege stands on objectivity. Maddy embraces it, following up this idea, and Tyler Burge's fat book on objectivity. |
23891 | Two contradictories force us to find a relation which will correlate them [Plato, by Weil] |
Full Idea: Where contradictions appear there is a correlation of contraries, which is relation. If a contradiction is imposed on the intelligence, it is forced to think of a relation to transform the contradiction into a correlation, which draws the soul higher. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Simone Weil - God in Plato p.70 | |
A reaction: A much better account of the dialectic than anything I have yet seen in Hegel. For the first time I see some sense in it. A contradiction is not a falsehood, and it must be addressed rather than side-stepped. A kink in the system, that needs ironing. |
10537 | The ordered pairs <x,y> can be reduced to the class of sets of the form {{x},{x,y}} [Dummett] |
Full Idea: A classic reduction is the class of ordered pairs <x,y> being reduced to the class of sets of the form {{x},{x,y}}. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973], Ch.14) |
10542 | To associate a cardinal with each set, we need the Axiom of Choice to find a representative [Dummett] |
Full Idea: We may suppose that with each set is associated an object as its cardinal number, but we have no systematic way, without appeal to the Axiom of Choice, of selecting a representative set of each cardinality. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973], Ch.14) |
10554 | Intuitionists find the Incompleteness Theorem unsurprising, since proof is intuitive, not formal [Dummett] |
Full Idea: In the intuitionist view, the notion of an intuitive proof cannot be expected to coincide with that of a proof in a formal system, and Gödel's incompleteness theorem is thus unsurprising from an intuitionist point of view. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973], Ch.14) |
10552 | Intuitionism says that totality of numbers is only potential, but is still determinate [Dummett] |
Full Idea: From the intuitionist point of view natural numbers are mental constructions, so their totality is only potential, but it is neverthless a fully determinate totality. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973], Ch.14) | |
A reaction: This could only be if the means of constructing the numbers was fully determinate, so how does that situation come about? |
10515 | Ostension is possible for concreta; abstracta can only be referred to via other objects [Dummett, by Hale] |
Full Idea: Dummett distinguishes, roughly, between those concrete objects which can be possible objects of ostension, and abstract objects which can only be referred to by functional expressions whose argument is some other object. | |
From: report of Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973], Ch.14) by Bob Hale - Abstract Objects Ch.3.II | |
A reaction: At least someone has proposed a theory! Hale gives a nice critical discussion of the proposal. It is a moot point whether in the second case, when you pick out the 'other object', you are thereby able to refer to some new abstract object. |
10544 | The concrete/abstract distinction seems crude: in which category is the Mistral? [Dummett] |
Full Idea: The dichotomy between concrete and abstract objects comes to seem far too crude: to which of the two categories should we assign the Mistral, for instance? | |
From: Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973], Ch.14) | |
A reaction: He has previously given colours and points as difficult borderline cases. We can generalise this particular problem case as the question of whether a potentiality or possibility is abstract or concrete. |
10546 | We don't need a sharp concrete/abstract distinction [Dummett] |
Full Idea: There is no reason for wanting a sharp distinction between concrete and abstract objects. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973], Ch.14) | |
A reaction: This rather depends on your ontology. If you are happy for reality to be full of weird non-physical entities, then the blurring won't bother you. If the boundary is blurred but still real, it is a very interesting one. |
10540 | We can't say that light is concrete but radio waves abstract [Dummett] |
Full Idea: If abstractions were defined by whether they could affect human sense-organs, light-waves would be concrete but radio waves abstract. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973], Ch.14) | |
A reaction: This is a pretty good baseline example. No account should draw an abstract/concrete line through the electromagnetic spectrum. |
10548 | The context principle for names rules out a special philosophical sense for 'existence' [Dummett] |
Full Idea: The dictum that a name has meaning only in the context of a sentence repudiates the conception of a special philosophical sense of 'existence', which claims that numbers do not exist while affirming existential statements about them. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973], Ch.14) | |
A reaction: He refers to Frege's Context Principle. Personally I would say you could make plenty of 'affirmations' about arithmetic without them having to be 'existential'. I can say there 'is' a number between 6 and 8, without huge existential claims. |
10281 | The objects we recognise the world as containing depends on the structure of our language [Dummett] |
Full Idea: What objects we recognise the world as containing depends upon the structure of our language. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973], Ch.14) | |
A reaction: The background to this claim is the Fregean idea that there are no objects for us if there are no concepts. Dummett is adding that there are no concepts if there is no language. I say animals have concepts and recognise objects. |
14502 | Plato's idea of 'structure' tends to be mathematically expressed [Plato, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: 'Structure' tends to be characterized by Plato as something that is mathematically expressed. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects V.3 iv | |
A reaction: [Koslicki is drawing on Verity Harte here] |
10532 | We can understand universals by studying predication [Dummett] |
Full Idea: It is by the study of the character of predication that we shall come to understand the essential nature of universals. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973], Ch.14) | |
A reaction: I haven't founded a clearer manifesto for linguistic philosophy than that! Personally I find it highly dubious, given the shifting nature of linguistic forms, and the enormous variation between remote languages. |
17948 | Plato's Forms meant that the sophists only taught the appearance of wisdom and virtue [Plato, by Nehamas] |
Full Idea: Plato's theory of Forms allowed him to claim that the sophists and other opponents were trapped in the world of appearance. What they therefore taught was only apparent wisdom and virtue. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Alexander Nehamas - Eristic,Antilogic,Sophistic,Dialectic p.118 |
3039 | When Diogenes said he could only see objects but not their forms, Plato said it was because he had eyes but no intellect [Plato, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: When Diogenes told Plato he saw tables and cups, but not 'tableness' and 'cupness', Plato replied that this was because Diogenes had eyes but no intellect. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 06.2.6 |
20906 | Platonists argue for the indivisible triangle-in-itself [Plato, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The Platonists, on the basis of purely logical arguments, posit the existence of an indivisible 'triangle in itself'. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) 316a15 | |
A reaction: A helpful confirmation that geometrical figures really are among the Forms (bearing in mind that numbers are not, because they contain one another). What shape is the Form of the triangle? |
556 | If there is one Form for both the Form and its participants, they must have something in common [Aristotle on Plato] |
Full Idea: If there is the same Form for the Forms and for their participants, then they must have something in common. | |
From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 991a |
563 | If gods are like men, they are just eternal men; similarly, Forms must differ from particulars [Aristotle on Plato] |
Full Idea: We say there is the form of man, horse and health, but nothing else, making the same mistake as those who say that there are gods but that they are in the form of men. They just posit eternal men, and here we are not positing forms but eternal sensibles. | |
From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 997b |
565 | The Forms cannot be changeless if they are in changing things [Aristotle on Plato] |
Full Idea: The Forms could not be changeless if they were in changing things. | |
From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 998a |
557 | A Form is a cause of things only in the way that white mixed with white is a cause [Aristotle on Plato] |
Full Idea: A Form is a cause of things only in the way that white mixed with white is a cause. | |
From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 991a |
10534 | 'Nominalism' used to mean denial of universals, but now means denial of abstract objects [Dummett] |
Full Idea: The original sense of 'nominalism' is the denial of universals, that is the denial of reference to either predicates or to abstract nouns. The modern sense (of Nelson Goodman) is the denial of the existence of abstract objects. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973], Ch.14) | |
A reaction: This is why you find loads of modern philosophers vigorous attacking nominalism, only to gradually realise that they don't actually believe in universals, as traditionally understood. It's hard to keep up, when words shift their meaning. |
10541 | Concrete objects such as sounds and smells may not be possible objects of ostension [Dummett] |
Full Idea: We cannot simply distinguish concrete objects as objects of ostension, if it literally involves a pointing gesture, as this would exclude a colourless gas, a sound or a smell. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973], Ch.14) | |
A reaction: He shifts to verbal ostension as a result, since we can talk of 'this smell'. On p.491 he suggests that affecting our senses is a sufficient condition to be concrete, but not a necessary one. |
9607 | The greatest discovery in human thought is Plato's discovery of abstract objects [Brown,JR on Plato] |
Full Idea: The greatest discovery in the history of human thought is Plato's discovery of abstract objects. | |
From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by James Robert Brown - Philosophy of Mathematics Ch. 2 | |
A reaction: Compare Idea 2860! Given the diametrically opposed views, it is clearly likely that Plato's central view is the most important idea in the history of human thought, even if it is wrong. |
10545 | Abstract objects may not cause changes, but they can be the subject of change [Dummett] |
Full Idea: To say that an abstract object cannot be the cause of change seems plausible enough, but the thesis that it cannot be the subject of change is problematic. The shape of an object can change, or the number of sheep on a hill. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973], Ch.14) | |
A reaction: This seems a pretty crucial difficulty for the standard notion of abstracta as non-causal. I would say that it is an acid which could eat away the whole edifice if you thought about it for long enough. He shifts shape-change to the physical object. |
10555 | If we can intuitively apprehend abstract objects, this makes them observable and causally active [Dummett] |
Full Idea: For intuitionists, it ceases to be true that abstract objects are not observable and cannot be involved in causal interaction, since such intuitive apprehension of them may be regarded as just such an interaction. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973], Ch.14) | |
A reaction: I would say that since abstract objects can be involved in causal interactions, in the mind, and since the mind is entirely physical (oh yes), this makes abstract objects entirely physical, which may come as a shock to some people. |
10543 | Abstract objects must have names that fall within the range of some functional expression [Dummett] |
Full Idea: For an object to be abstract, we require only that an understanding of any name of that object involves a recognition that the object is in the range of some functional expression. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973], Ch.14) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure I understand this, but a function must involve a relation between some objects, such that a unique object is consequently picked out. |
10320 | If a genuine singular term needs a criterion of identity, we must exclude abstract nouns [Dummett, by Hale] |
Full Idea: Dummett's best argument for excluding abstract nouns relies upon the entirely Fregean requirement that with any genuine singular term there must be associated a criterion of identity. | |
From: report of Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973]) by Bob Hale - Abstract Objects Ch.2.II | |
A reaction: This sounds a rather rigid test. Must the criteria be logically precise, or must you just have some vague idea of what you are talking about? |
10547 | Abstract objects can never be confronted, and need verbal phrases for reference [Dummett] |
Full Idea: An abstract object can be referred to only by means of a verbal phrase, ...and no confrontation with an abstract object is possible. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973], Ch.14) | |
A reaction: So does this mean that animals are incapable of entertaining abstract concepts? Some research suggests otherwise. Does a dog understand what a 'walk' is, without use of the word? Dummett disgracefully neglects animals in his theories. |
10531 | There is a modern philosophical notion of 'object', first introduced by Frege [Dummett] |
Full Idea: The notion of 'object', as it is now commonly used in philosophical contexts, is a modern notion, one first introduced by Frege. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973], Ch.14) | |
A reaction: If we say 'objects exist', I think it is crucial that if we are going to introduce 'object' as a term of art, then 'exist' had better stick to normal usage. If that drifts into a term of art as well (incorporating 'subsist', or some such) we have no hope! |
13263 | We can grasp whole things in science, because they have a mathematics and a teleology [Plato, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Due to the mathematical nature of structure and the teleological cause underlying the creation of Platonic wholes, these wholes are intelligible, and are in fact the proper objects of science. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 5.3 | |
A reaction: I like this idea, because it pays attention to the connection between how we conceive objects to be, and how we are able to think about objects. Only examining these two together enables us to grasp metaphysics. |
13261 | Plato sees an object's structure as expressible in mathematics [Plato, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: The 'structure' of an object tends to be characterised by Plato as something that is mathematically expressible. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 5.3 | |
A reaction: This seems to be pure Pythagoreanism (see Idea 644). Plato is pursuing Pythagoras's research programme, of trying to find mathematics buried in every aspect of reality. |
13265 | Plato was less concerned than Aristotle with the source of unity in a complex object [Plato, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Plato was less concerned than Aristotle with the project of how to account, in completely general terms, for the source of unity within a mereologically complex object. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 5.5 | |
A reaction: Plato seems to have simply asserted that some sort of harmony held things together. Aristotles puts the forms [eidos] within objects, rather than external, so he has to give a fuller account of what is going on in an object. He never managed it! |
593 | Plato's holds that there are three substances: Forms, mathematical entities, and perceptible bodies [Plato, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Plato's doctrine was that the Forms and mathematicals are two substances and that the third substance is that of perceptible bodies. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 1028b |
13260 | Plato says wholes are either containers, or they're atomic, or they don't exist [Plato, by Koslicki] |
Full Idea: Plato considers a 'container' model for wholes (which are disjoint from their parts) [Parm 144e3-], and a 'nihilist' model, in which only wholes are mereological atoms, and a 'bare pluralities' view, in which wholes are not really one at all. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects 5.2 | |
A reaction: [She cites Verity Harte for this analysis of Plato] The fourth, and best, seems to be that wholes are parts which fall under some unifying force or structure or principle. |
11237 | Only universals have essence [Plato, by Politis] |
Full Idea: Plato argues that only universals have essence. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 1.4 |
11238 | Plato and Aristotle take essence to make a thing what it is [Plato, by Politis] |
Full Idea: Plato and Aristotle have a shared general conception of essence: the essence of a thing is what that thing is simply in virtue of itself and in virtue of being the very thing it is. It answers the question 'What is this very thing?' | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 1.4 |
17085 | A good explanation totally rules out the opposite explanation (so Forms are required) [Plato, by Ruben] |
Full Idea: For Plato, an acceptable explanation is one such that there is no possibility of there being the opposite explanation at all, and he thought that only explanations in terms of the Forms, but never physical explanations, could meet this requirement. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by David-Hillel Ruben - Explaining Explanation Ch 2 | |
A reaction: [Republic 436c is cited] |
1651 | Plato wanted to somehow control and purify the passions [Vlastos on Plato] |
Full Idea: Plato put high on his agenda a project which did not figure in Socrates' programme at all: the hygienic conditioning of the passions. This cannot be an intellectual process, as argument cannot touch them. | |
From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Gregory Vlastos - Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher p.88 | |
A reaction: This is the standard traditional view of any thinker who exaggerates the importance and potential of reason in our lives. |
19168 | Concepts only have a 'functional character', because they map to truth values, not objects [Dummett, by Davidson] |
Full Idea: Real functions map objects onto objects, but concepts map objects onto truth value, ...so Dummett says that concepts are not functions, but that they have a 'functional character'. | |
From: report of Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973]) by Donald Davidson - Truth and Predication 6 |
10549 | Since abstract objects cannot be picked out, we must rely on identity statements [Dummett] |
Full Idea: Since we cannot pick an abstract object out from its surrounding, all that we need to master is the use of statements of identity between objects of a certain kind. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973], Ch.14) | |
A reaction: This is the necessary Fregean preliminary to using a principle of abstraction to identify two objects which are abstract (when the two objects are in an equivalence relation). Presumably circular squares and square circles are identical? |
10516 | A realistic view of reference is possible for concrete objects, but not for abstract objects [Dummett, by Hale] |
Full Idea: Dummett claims that a realistic conception of reference can be sustained for concrete objects (possible objects of ostension), but breaks down for (putative) names of (pure) abstract objects. | |
From: report of Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973], Ch.14) by Bob Hale - Abstract Objects Ch.3.II | |
A reaction: An extremely hard claim to evaluate, because a case must first be made for abstract objects which are fundamentally different in kind. Realistic reference must certainly deal with these hard cases. Field rejects Dummett's abstract points. |
3324 | Plato's whole philosophy may be based on being duped by reification - a figure of speech [Benardete,JA on Plato] |
Full Idea: Plato is liable to the charge of having been duped by a figure of speech, albeit the most profound of all, the trope of reification. | |
From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.12 | |
A reaction: That might be a plausible account if his view was ridiculous, but given how many powerful friends Plato has, especially in the philosophy of mathematics, we should assume he was cleverer than that. |
20014 | Actions include: the involuntary, the purposeful, the intentional, and the self-consciously autonomous [Wilson/Schpall] |
Full Idea: There are different levels of action, including at least: unconscious and/or involuntary behaviour, purposeful or goal-directed activity, intentional action, and the autonomous acts or actions of self-consciously active human agents. | |
From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 1) | |
A reaction: The fourth class is obviously designed to distinguish us from the other animals. It immediately strikes me as very optimistic to distinguish four (at least) clear categories, but you have to start somewhere. |
20019 | Maybe bodily movements are not actions, but only part of an agent's action of moving [Wilson/Schpall] |
Full Idea: Some say that the movement's of agent's body are never actions. It is only the agent's direct moving of, say, his leg that constitutes a physical action; the leg movement is merely caused by and/or incorporated as part of the act of moving. | |
From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 1.2) | |
A reaction: [they cite Jennifer Hornsby 1980] It seems normal to deny a twitch the accolade of an 'action', so I suppose that is right. Does the continual movement of my tongue count as action? Only if I bring it under control? Does it matter? Only in forensics. |
20021 | Is the action the arm movement, the whole causal process, or just the trying to do it? [Wilson/Schpall] |
Full Idea: Some philosophers have favored the overt arm movement the agent performs, some favor the extended causal process he initiates, and some prefer the relevant event of trying that precedes and 'generates' the rest. | |
From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 1.2) | |
A reaction: [Davidson argues for the second, Hornsby for the third] There seems no way to settle this, and a compromise looks best. Mere movement won't do, and mere trying won't do, and whole processes get out of control. |
20022 | To be intentional, an action must succeed in the manner in which it was planned [Wilson/Schpall] |
Full Idea: If someone fires a bullet to kill someone, misses, and dislodges hornets that sting him to death, this implies that an intentional action must include succeeding in a manner according to the original plan. | |
From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 2) | |
A reaction: [their example, compressed] This resembles Gettier's problem cases for knowledge. If the shooter deliberately and maliciously brought down the hornet's nest, that would be intentional murder. Sounds right. |
20023 | If someone believes they can control the lottery, and then wins, the relevant skill is missing [Wilson/Schpall] |
Full Idea: If someone enters the lottery with the bizarre belief that they can control who wins, and then wins it, that suggest that intentional actions must not depend on sheer luck, but needs competent exercise of the relevant skill. | |
From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 2) | |
A reaction: A nice companion to Idea 20022, which show that a mere intention is not sufficient to motivate and explain an action. |
20025 | We might intend two ways to acting, knowing only one of them can succeed [Wilson/Schpall] |
Full Idea: If an agent tries to do something by two different means, only one of which can succeed, then the behaviour is rational, even though one of them is an attempt to do an action which cannot succeed. | |
From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 2) | |
A reaction: [a concise account of a laborious account of an example from Bratman 1984, 1987] Bratman uses this to challenge the 'Simple View', that intention leads straightforwardly to action. |
20031 | On one model, an intention is belief-desire states, and intentional actions relate to beliefs and desires [Wilson/Schpall] |
Full Idea: On the simple desire-belief model, an intention is a combination of desire-belief states, and an action is intentional in virtue of standing in the appropriate relation to these simpler terms. | |
From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 4) | |
A reaction: This is the traditional view found in Hume, and is probably endemic to folk psychology. They cite Bratman 1987 as the main opponent of the view. |
20028 | Groups may act for reasons held by none of the members, so maybe groups are agents [Wilson/Schpall] |
Full Idea: Rational group action may involve a 'collectivising of reasons', with participants acting in ways that are not rationally recommended from the individual viewpoint. This suggests that groups can be rational, intentional agents. | |
From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 2) | |
A reaction: [Pettit 2003] is the source for this. Gilbert says individuals can have joint commitment; Pettit says the group can be an independent agent. The matter of shared intentions is interesting, but there is no need for the ontology to go berserk. |
20027 | If there are shared obligations and intentions, we may need a primitive notion of 'joint commitment' [Wilson/Schpall] |
Full Idea: An account of mutual obligation to do something may require that we give up reductive individualist accounts of shared activity and posit a primitive notion of 'joint commitment'. | |
From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 2) | |
A reaction: [attributed to Margaret Gilbert 2000] If 'we' are trying to do something, that seems to give an externalist picture of intentions, rather like all the other externalisms floating around these days. I don't buy any of it, me. |
20016 | Strong Cognitivism identifies an intention to act with a belief [Wilson/Schpall] |
Full Idea: A Strong Cognitivist is someone who identifies an intention with a certain pertinent belief about what she is doing or about to do. | |
From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 1.1) | |
A reaction: (Sarah Paul 2009 makes this distinction) The belief, if so, seems to be as much counterfactual as factual. Hope seems to come into it, which isn't exactly a belief. |
20017 | Weak Cognitivism says intentions are only partly constituted by a belief [Wilson/Schpall] |
Full Idea: A Weak Cognitivist holds that intentions are partly constituted by, but are not identical with, relevant beliefs about the action. Grice (1971) said an intention is willing an action, combined with a belief that this will lead to the action. | |
From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 1.1) | |
A reaction: [compressed] I didn't find Strong Cognitivism appealing, but it seems hard to argue with some form of the weak version. |
20018 | Strong Cognitivism implies a mode of 'practical' knowledge, not based on observation [Wilson/Schpall] |
Full Idea: Strong Cognitivists say intentions/beliefs are not based on observation or evidence, and are causally reliable in leading to appropriate actions, so this is a mode of 'practical' knowledge that has not been derived from observation. | |
From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 1.1) | |
A reaction: [compressed - Stanford unnecessarily verbose!] I see no mention in this discussion of 'hoping' that your action will turn out OK. We are usually right to hope, but it would be foolish to say that when we reach for the salt we know we won't knock it over. |
20012 | Maybe the explanation of an action is in the reasons that make it intelligible to the agent [Wilson/Schpall] |
Full Idea: Some have maintained that we explain why an agent acted as he did when we explicate how the agent's normative reasons rendered the action intelligible in his eyes. | |
From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], Intro) | |
A reaction: Modern psychology is moving against this, by showing how hidden biases can predominate over conscious reasons (as in Kahnemann's work). I would say this mode of explanation works better for highly educated people (but you can chuckle at that). |
20029 | Causalists allow purposive explanations, but then reduce the purpose to the action's cause [Wilson/Schpall] |
Full Idea: Most causalists allow that reason explanations are teleological, but say that such purposive explanations are analysable causally, where the primary reasons for the act are the guiding causes of the act. | |
From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 3) | |
A reaction: The authors observe that it is hard to adjudicate on this matter, and that the concept of the 'cause' of an action is unclear. |
20013 | It is generally assumed that reason explanations are causal [Wilson/Schpall] |
Full Idea: The view that reason explanations are somehow causal explanations remains the dominant position. | |
From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], Intro) | |
A reaction: I suspect that this is only because no philosopher has a better idea, and the whole issue is being slowly outflanked by psychology. |
7503 | Plato never refers to examining the conscience [Plato, by Foucault] |
Full Idea: Plato never speaks of the examination of conscience - never! | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Michel Foucault - On the Genealogy of Ethics p.276 | |
A reaction: Plato does imply some sort of self-evident direct knowledge about that nature of a healthy soul. Presumably the full-blown concept of conscience is something given from outside, from God. In 'Euthyphro', Plato asserts the primacy of morality (Idea 337). |
2173 | As religion and convention collapsed, Plato sought morals not just in knowledge, but in the soul [Williams,B on Plato] |
Full Idea: Once gods and fate and social expectation were no longer there, Plato felt it necessary to discover ethics inside human nature, not just as ethical knowledge (Socrates' view), but in the structure of the soul. | |
From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Bernard Williams - Shame and Necessity II - p.43 | |
A reaction: anti Charles Taylor |
9274 | Plato's legacy to European thought was the Good, the Beautiful and the True [Plato, by Gray] |
Full Idea: Plato's legacy to European thought was a trio of capital letters - the Good, the Beautiful and the True. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by John Gray - Straw Dogs 2.8 | |
A reaction: It seems to have been Baumgarten who turned this into a slogan (Idea 8117). Gray says these ideals are lethal, but I identify with them very strongly, and am quite happy to see the good life as an attempt to find the right balance between them. |
94 | Pleasure is better with the addition of intelligence, so pleasure is not the good [Plato, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Plato says the life of pleasure is more desirable with the addition of intelligence, and if the combination is better, pleasure is not the good. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Nicomachean Ethics 1172b27 | |
A reaction: It is obvious why we like pleasure, but not why intelligence makes it 'better'. Maybe it is just because we enjoy intelligence? |
17947 | Plato decided that the virtuous and happy life was the philosophical life [Plato, by Nehamas] |
Full Idea: Plato came to the conclusion that virtue and happiness consist in the life of philosophy itself. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Alexander Nehamas - Eristic,Antilogic,Sophistic,Dialectic p.117 | |
A reaction: This view is obviously ridiculous, because it largely excludes almost the entire human race, which sees philosophy as a cul-de-sac, even if it is good. But virtue and happiness need some serious thought. |
6015 | Plato, unusually, said that theoretical and practical wisdom are inseparable [Plato, by Kraut] |
Full Idea: Two virtues that are ordinarily kept distinct - theoretical and practical wisdom - are joined by Plato; he thinks that neither one can be fully possessed unless it is combined with the other. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Richard Kraut - Plato | |
A reaction: I get the impression that this doctrine comes from Socrates, whose position is widely reported as 'intellectualist'. Aristotle certainly held the opposite view. |
2912 | Plato is boring [Nietzsche on Plato] |
Full Idea: Plato is boring. | |
From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Friedrich Nietzsche - Twilight of the Idols 9.2 |
1526 | Almost everyone except Plato thinks that time could not have been generated [Plato, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: With a single exception (Plato) everyone agrees about time - that it is not generated. Democritus says time is an obvious example of something not generated. | |
From: report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Physics 251b14 |