Combining Texts

All the ideas for '67: Platonic Questions', 'Internal and External Reasons' and 'Modal Realism at Work: Properties'

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3 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
4038 Properties are sets of their possible instances (which separates 'renate' from 'cordate') [Lewis, by Mellor/Oliver]
     Full Idea: Lewis agrees that properties cannot be sets of their actual instances, but claims they can be sets of their possible instances. This would distinguish coextensive properties like being cordate and renate, since they might be separated.
     From: report of David Lewis (Modal Realism at Work: Properties [1986]) by DH Mellor / A Oliver - Introduction to 'Properties' §10
     A reaction: Sounds wrong. Two properties could be obviously different even if they could never be separated. In this world a creature might briefly survive without kidneys.
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 2. Psuche
5960 When the soul is intelligent and harmonious, it is part of god and derives from god [Plutarch]
     Full Idea: The soul, when it has partaken of intelligence and reason and concord, is not merely a work but also a part of god and has come to be not by his agency but both from him as source and out of his substance.
     From: Plutarch (67: Platonic Questions [c.85], II.1001)
     A reaction: A most intriguing shift of view from earlier concepts of the psuché. How did this come about? This man is a pagan. The history is in the evolution of Platonism. See 'The Middle Platonists' by John Dillon. Davidson is also very impressed by reason.
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
9284 Reasons are 'internal' if they give a person a motive to act, but 'external' otherwise [Williams,B]
     Full Idea: Someone has 'internal reasons' to act when the person has some motive which will be served or furthered by the action; if this turns out not to be so, the reason is false. Reasons are 'external' when there is no such condition.
     From: Bernard Williams (Internal and External Reasons [1980], p.101)
     A reaction: [compressed] An external example given is a family tradition of joining the army, if the person doesn't want to. Williams says (p.111) external reason statements are actually false, and a misapplication of the concept of a 'reason to act'. See Idea 8815.