Combining Texts

All the ideas for '67: Platonic Questions', 'Reals by Abstraction' and 'Philosophy without Intuitions'

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4 ideas

2. Reason / E. Argument / 7. Thought Experiments
So-called 'though experiments' are just philosophers observing features of the world [Cappelen]
     Full Idea: What are called 'thought experiments' in philosophy are in effect just philosophers drawing our attention to interesting features of the world.
     From: Herman Cappelen (Philosophy without Intuitions [2012], 11.3)
     A reaction: Thought experiments are said to rely (perhaps excessively) on 'intuition', but Cappelen says intuition is irrelevant, because we are merely making judgements. It think they ARE experiments, if one feature varies while the rest is held steady.
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
The real numbers may be introduced by abstraction as ratios of quantities [Hale, by Hale/Wright]
     Full Idea: The real numbers may be introduced by abstraction as ratios of quantities. ..They are not defined by Dedekind cuts; rather, the cuts constitute a domain with the properties that are a necessary precondition.
     From: report of Bob Hale (Reals by Abstraction [1998]) by B Hale / C Wright - Intro to 'The Reason's Proper Study' 3.3
     A reaction: This is Hale's neo-logicist attempt to derive the real numbers from Hume's Principle.
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
The word 'intuitive' often plays not role at all in arguments, and can be removed [Cappelen]
     Full Idea: Careful study of uses of 'intuitive' will reveal that it often plays no significant argumentative role, and that removal will improve overall argumentative transparency.
     From: Herman Cappelen (Philosophy without Intuitions [2012], 04.1)
     A reaction: This is a key part of Cappelen's argument that 'intuition' is a rather empty concept, and that philosophers do not really rely on it. In effect, he is consigning it to mere rhetoric. He gives lots of examples in support.
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 2. Psuche
When the soul is intelligent and harmonious, it is part of god and derives from god [Plutarch]
     Full Idea: The soul, when it has partaken of intelligence and reason and concord, is not merely a work but also a part of god and has come to be not by his agency but both from him as source and out of his substance.
     From: Plutarch (67: Platonic Questions [c.85], II.1001)
     A reaction: A most intriguing shift of view from earlier concepts of the psuché. How did this come about? This man is a pagan. The history is in the evolution of Platonism. See 'The Middle Platonists' by John Dillon. Davidson is also very impressed by reason.