Combining Texts

All the ideas for '67: Platonic Questions', 'Intro to 'Creating the Kingdom of Ends'' and 'Propositional Objects'

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10 ideas

11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / e. Belief holism
18969 How do you distinguish three beliefs from four beliefs or two beliefs? [Quine]
     Full Idea: Suppose I say that I have given up precisely three beliefs since lunch. An over-coarse individuation could reduce the number to two, and an over-fine one could raise it to four.
     From: Willard Quine (Propositional Objects [1965], p.144)
     A reaction: Obviously if you ask how many beliefs I hold, it would be crazy to give a precise answer. But if I search for my cat, I give up my belief that it is in the kitchen, in the lounge and in the bathroom. That's precise enough to be three beliefs, I think.
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 2. Psuche
5960 When the soul is intelligent and harmonious, it is part of god and derives from god [Plutarch]
     Full Idea: The soul, when it has partaken of intelligence and reason and concord, is not merely a work but also a part of god and has come to be not by his agency but both from him as source and out of his substance.
     From: Plutarch (67: Platonic Questions [c.85], II.1001)
     A reaction: A most intriguing shift of view from earlier concepts of the psuché. How did this come about? This man is a pagan. The history is in the evolution of Platonism. See 'The Middle Platonists' by John Dillon. Davidson is also very impressed by reason.
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 4. Persons as Agents
9758 To make sense of personal identity, focus on agency rather than experience [Korsgaard]
     Full Idea: A focus on agency makes more sense of personal identity than a focus on experience.
     From: Christine M. Korsgaard (Intro to 'Creating the Kingdom of Ends' [1996], §2)
     A reaction: This strikes me as eminently sensible advice for the beginning of any discussion of personal identity. Her personal bęte noir is Parfit, who focuses on what we are conscious of.
9757 A person viewed as an agent makes no sense without its own future [Korsgaard]
     Full Idea: In forming a particular plan of life, you need to identify with your future in order to be what you are even now. When the person is viewed as an agent, no clear content can be given to the idea of a merely present self.
     From: Christine M. Korsgaard (Intro to 'Creating the Kingdom of Ends' [1996], §2)
     A reaction: I certainly like the notion that we should treat persons primarily as agents, since I take personhood to be more like a process than an existent entity. If a large brick is about to hit you, you actually have no future, though you think you have.
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
18967 A 'proposition' is said to be the timeless cognitive part of the meaning of a sentence [Quine]
     Full Idea: A 'proposition' is the meaning of a sentence. More precisely, since propositions are supposed to be true or false once and for all, it is the meaning of an eternal sentence. More precisely still, it is the 'cognitive' meaning, involving truth, not poetry.
     From: Willard Quine (Propositional Objects [1965], p.139)
     A reaction: Quine defines this in order to attack it. I equate a proposition with a thought, and take a sentence to be an attempt to express a proposition. I have no idea why they are supposed to be 'timeless'. Philosophers have some very odd ideas.
19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
18968 The problem with propositions is their individuation. When do two sentences express one proposition? [Quine]
     Full Idea: The trouble with propositions, as cognitive meanings of eternal sentences, is individuation. Given two eternal sentences, themselves visibly different linguistically, it is not sufficiently clear under when to say that they mean the same proposition.
     From: Willard Quine (Propositional Objects [1965], p.140)
     A reaction: If a group of people agree that two sentences mean the same thing, which happens all the time, I don't see what gives Quine the right to have a philosophical moan about some dubious activity called 'individuation'.
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
9759 Theory of action focuses on explanation and prediction; practical action on justification and choice [Korsgaard]
     Full Idea: When we look at our actions from the theoretical standpoint our concern is with their explanation and prediction. When we view them from the practical standpoint our concern is with their justification and choice.
     From: Christine M. Korsgaard (Intro to 'Creating the Kingdom of Ends' [1996], §4)
     A reaction: A nice distinction, which invites us to further subdivide action theory into two branches, with entirely different concerns.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
9760 Self-concern may be a source of pain, or a lack of self-respect, or a failure of responsibility [Korsgaard]
     Full Idea: For utilitarians, self-concern causes needless pain; for Kantians, it evinces a lack of respect for one's own humanity; for the religious moralist, it is a failure of responsibility for what has been placed in one's special care.
     From: Christine M. Korsgaard (Intro to 'Creating the Kingdom of Ends' [1996], §5)
     A reaction: Worryingly, given my heathenish views, I find the third one the most congenial. If we don't take responsibility for our own selves (e.g. for having a great talent), then no one (even parents) will take responsibility for anything.
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
9761 Personal concern for one's own self widens out into concern for the impersonal [Korsgaard]
     Full Idea: The personal concern which begins with one's life in a particular body finds its place in ever-widening spheres of agency and enterprise, developing finally into a personal concern for the impersonal.
     From: Christine M. Korsgaard (Intro to 'Creating the Kingdom of Ends' [1996], §5)
     A reaction: I am very struck by this nice thought, which comes from a very committed Kantian. It seems to me to capture the modern orthodoxy in ethical thinking - that concern for one's self, rather than altruism, is central, but altruism should follow from it.
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 3. Points in Space
18970 The concept of a 'point' makes no sense without the idea of absolute position [Quine]
     Full Idea: Unless we are prepared to believe that absolute position makes sense, the very idea of a point as an entity in its own right must be rejected as not merely mysterious but absurd.
     From: Willard Quine (Propositional Objects [1965], p.149)
     A reaction: The fact that without absolute position we can only think of 'points' as relative to a conceptual grid doesn't stop the grid from picking out actual locations in space, as shown by latitude and longitude.