Combining Texts

All the ideas for '67: Platonic Questions', 'Letters to Foucher' and 'Reference and Contingency'

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5 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
Essence is primitive force, or a law of change [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: The essence of substances consists in the primitive force of action, or the law of the sequence of changes.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Foucher [1675], 1676)
     A reaction: [a 1676 note on Foucher's reply] It take these to be the two key distinctive Leibnizian contributions to the sort of metaphysic that is needed by modern science. Nature works with intrinsic essences, which are forces determining action.
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 5. Contingency
'Superficial' contingency: false in some world; 'Deep' contingency: no obvious verification [Evans, by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro]
     Full Idea: Evans says intuitively a sentence is 'superficially' contingent if the function from worlds to truth values assigns F to some world; it is 'deeply' contingent if understanding it does not guarantee that there is a verifying state of affairs.
     From: report of Gareth Evans (Reference and Contingency [1979]) by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro - Introduction to 'Two-Dimensional Semantics' 2
     A reaction: This distinction is used by Davies and Humberstone (1980) to construct an early version of 2-D semantics (see under Language|Semantics). The point is that part comes from understanding it, and another part from assigning truth values.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
Rigid designators can be meaningful even if empty [Evans, by Mackie,P]
     Full Idea: Evans argues that there can be rigid designators that are meaningful even if empty.
     From: report of Gareth Evans (Reference and Contingency [1979]) by Penelope Mackie - How Things Might Have Been 1.8
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 2. Psuche
When the soul is intelligent and harmonious, it is part of god and derives from god [Plutarch]
     Full Idea: The soul, when it has partaken of intelligence and reason and concord, is not merely a work but also a part of god and has come to be not by his agency but both from him as source and out of his substance.
     From: Plutarch (67: Platonic Questions [c.85], II.1001)
     A reaction: A most intriguing shift of view from earlier concepts of the psuché. How did this come about? This man is a pagan. The history is in the evolution of Platonism. See 'The Middle Platonists' by John Dillon. Davidson is also very impressed by reason.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
The connection in events enables us to successfully predict the future, so there must be a constant cause [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: There is a connection among our appearances that provides us the means to predict future appearances with success, and this connection must have a constant cause.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Foucher [1675])