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19424
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Knowledge needs clarity, distinctness, and adequacy, and it should be intuitive [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
Knowledge is either obscure or clear; clear ideas are either indistinct or distinct; distinct ideas are either adequate or inadequate, symbolic or intuitive; perfect knowledge is that which is both adequate and intuitive.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (Reflections on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas [1684], p.283)
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A reaction:
This is Leibniz's expansion of Descartes's idea that knowledge rests on 'clear and distinct conceptions'. The ultimate target seems to be close to an Aristotelian 'real definition', which is comprehensive and precise. Does 'intuitive' mean coherent?
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5952
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Rather than being the whole soul, maybe I am its chief part? [Plutarch]
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Full Idea:
Is each of us not the soul, but the chief part of the soul, by which we think and reason and act, all the other parts of soul as well as of body being mere instruments of its power?
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From:
Plutarch (74: Reply to Colotes [c.85], §1119)
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A reaction:
Socrates is associated with the idea that I am my whole soul (Idea 1650). Plutarch represents an interesting development, which may lead both to the Christian 'soul' and to the Cartesian 'ego'. I think Plutarch is right, but what is the 'soul'?
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5951
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If atoms have no qualities, they cannot possibly produce a mind [Plutarch]
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Full Idea:
Perception, mind, intelligence and thought cannot so much as be conceived, even with the best will, as arising among void and atoms, things which taken separately have no quality.
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From:
Plutarch (74: Reply to Colotes [c.85], §1112)
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A reaction:
A nice articulation of the intuition of all anti-physicalists. Plutarch would have to rethink his position carefully if he learned of the sheer number of connections in the brain, and of the theory of natural selection. His challenge remains, though.
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5948
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The good life involves social participation, loyalty, temperance and honesty [Plutarch]
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Full Idea:
To live the good life is to live a life of participation in society, of loyalty to friends, of temperance and honest dealing.
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From:
Plutarch (74: Reply to Colotes [c.85], §1108)
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A reaction:
'Participation in society' is the interesting one. This might translate as 'doing your duty', or as 'leading a well-rounded life'. Solitude is wrong if you are indebted to others, and it is unhealthy if you are not. Is solitude really immoral, though?
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19425
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In the schools the Four Causes are just lumped together in a very obscure way [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
In the schools the four causes are lumped together as material, formal, efficient, and final causes, but they have no clear definitions, and I would call such a judgment 'obscure'.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (Reflections on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas [1684], p.283)
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A reaction:
He picks this to illustrate what he means by 'obscure', so he must feel strongly about it. Elsewhere Leibniz embraces efficient and final causes, but says little of the other two. This immediately become clearer as the Four Modes of Explanation.
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5955
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No one will ever find a city that lacks religious practices [Plutarch]
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Full Idea:
A city without holy places and gods, without any observance of prayers, oaths, oracles, sacrifices for blessings received or rites to avert evils, no traveller has ever seen or will ever see.
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From:
Plutarch (74: Reply to Colotes [c.85], §1125)
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A reaction:
The nearest you might get would be Soviet Moscow, but in 1973 I saw a man there jeering at a woman who was kneeling in the street outside a closed church. Plutarch would be stunned at the decline in religious practices in modern Europe.
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