12 ideas
| 11257 | The Pythagoreans were the first to offer definitions [Politis, by Politis] |
| Full Idea: Aristotle praises the Pythagoreans for being the first to offer definitions. | |
| From: report of Vassilis Politis (Aristotle and the Metaphysics [2004]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 2.4 | |
| A reaction: This sounds like a hugely important step in the development of Greek philosophy which is hardly ever mentioned. |
| 11235 | 'True of' is applicable to things, while 'true' is applicable to words [Politis] |
| Full Idea: It is crucial not to confuse 'true' with 'true of'. 'True of' is applicable to things, while 'true' is applicable to words. | |
| From: Vassilis Politis (Aristotle and the Metaphysics [2004], 1.4) | |
| A reaction: A beautifully simple distinction which had never occurred to me, and which (being a thoroughgoing realist) I really like. |
| 11277 | Maybe 'What is being? is confusing because we can't ask what non-being is like [Politis] |
| Full Idea: We may be unfamiliar with the question 'What is being?' because there appear to be no contrastive questions of the form: how do beings differ from things that are not beings? | |
| From: Vassilis Politis (Aristotle and the Metaphysics [2004], 4.1) | |
| A reaction: We can, of course, contrast actual beings with possible beings, or imaginary beings, or even logically impossible beings, but in those cases 'being' strikes me as an entirely inappropriate word. |
| 11248 | Necessary truths can be two-way relational, where essential truths are one-way or intrinsic [Politis] |
| Full Idea: An essence is true in virtue of what the thing is in itself, but a necessary truth may be relational, as the consequence of the relation between two things and their essence. The necessary relation may be two-way, but the essential relation one-way. | |
| From: Vassilis Politis (Aristotle and the Metaphysics [2004], 2.3) | |
| A reaction: He is writing about Aristotle, but has in mind Kit Fine 1994 (qv). Politis cites Plato's answer to the Euthyphro Question as a good example. The necessity comes from the intrinsic nature of goodness/piety, not from the desire of the gods. |
| 3978 | Associations are held to connect Ideas together in the way the world is connected together [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: The laws of associations were held to explicate the semantic coherence of intentional processes, which adjust the causal relations among Ideas to reflect corresponding relations among the things that they're ideas of. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (Jerry A. Fodor on himself [1994], p.296) | |
| A reaction: With the support of evolution, and the backing of a correspondence theory of truth, plus more sophistication in the associations, this might work. |
| 5960 | When the soul is intelligent and harmonious, it is part of god and derives from god [Plutarch] |
| Full Idea: The soul, when it has partaken of intelligence and reason and concord, is not merely a work but also a part of god and has come to be not by his agency but both from him as source and out of his substance. | |
| From: Plutarch (67: Platonic Questions [c.85], II.1001) | |
| A reaction: A most intriguing shift of view from earlier concepts of the psuché. How did this come about? This man is a pagan. The history is in the evolution of Platonism. See 'The Middle Platonists' by John Dillon. Davidson is also very impressed by reason. |
| 3976 | Intentional science needs objects with semantic and causal properties, and which obey laws [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: If there is to be an intentional science, there must be semantically evaluable things which have causal powers, and there must be laws relating beliefs and desires to one another, and to actions. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (Jerry A. Fodor on himself [1994], p.293) | |
| A reaction: The semantics and causation sound fair enough, but the prospect of finding laws looks bleak (though, contrary to Davidson, I don't see why they can't exist). |
| 3980 | Intentional states and processes may be causal relations among mental symbols [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: It may be that intentional states are relations to mental symbols, and mental processes are implemented by causal relations among these symbols. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (Jerry A. Fodor on himself [1994], p.296) | |
| A reaction: It is hard to see how something could have causal powers just by being a symbol. The theory needs something else to drive the causation. |
| 3981 | Most psychological properties seem to be multiply realisable [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: These days most philosophers of mind suppose that most psychological properties are multiply realisable. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (Jerry A. Fodor on himself [1994], p.298) | |
| A reaction: This is just speculation. The physical part may seem very different, but turn out to be identical in the ways that matter (like a knife made of two different metals). |
| 3975 | Folk psychology explains behaviour by reference to intentional states like belief and desire [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: Folk psychology is primarily intentional explanation; it's the idea that people's behaviour can be explained by reference to the contents of their beliefs and desires. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (Jerry A. Fodor on himself [1994], p.292) | |
| A reaction: Sounds good. To reject folk psychology (as reductivists tend to) is to reject the existence of significant intentional states which have causal properties |
| 3982 | How could the extrinsic properties of thoughts supervene on their intrinsic properties? [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: It is hard to see how the extrinsic properties of thoughts could supervene on their intrinsic properties. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (Jerry A. Fodor on himself [1994], p.299) | |
| A reaction: This doesn't seem a big problem. Sometimes represented experiences establish the match; sometimes the match is not very good, or even wrong. |
| 3977 | Laws are true generalisations which support counterfactuals and are confirmed by instances [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: Laws are true generalisations that support counterfactuals and are confirmed by their instances. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (Jerry A. Fodor on himself [1994], p.293) | |
| A reaction: This seems correct, but it doesn't disentangle laws as mental states from laws as features of nature |