Combining Texts

All the ideas for '67: Platonic Questions', 'Toward a Philosophy of History' and 'Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

---

5 ideas

3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth

14713	Truth in a scenario is the negation in that scenario being a priori incoherent [Chalmers]
	Full Idea: The epistemic 1-intension for a sentence S is True at a scenario W iff (W and not-S) is a priori incoherent.
	From: David J.Chalmers (Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics [2004], p.180-4), quoted by Laura Schroeter - Two-Dimensional Semantics
	A reaction: See Two-Dimensional Semantics (in 'Language') and Chalmers for the background to this idea. I love the coherence view of justification, but get a bit nervous when people start defining truth in that way.

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / h. Dasein (being human)

20752	For man, being is not what he is, but what he is going to be [Ortega y Gassett]
	Full Idea: Being consists not in what it is already, but in what it is not yet, a being that consists in not-yet-being. Everything else in the world is what it is….Man is the entity that makes himself….He has to determine what he is going to be.
	From: José Ortega y Gassett (Toward a Philosophy of History [1941], p.112,201-2), quoted by Kevin Aho - Existentialism: an introduction 4 'Problem'
	A reaction: [p.112 and 201-2] This seems to be Ortega y Gasset's spin on Heidegger's concept, by adding a temporal dimension to it.

12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities

14712	A sentence is a priori if no possible way the world might actually be could make it false [Chalmers]
	Full Idea: The Core Thesis for rationalist 2D semantics is that for any sentence S, S is apriori iff S has a necessary 1-intension. (That is, there is no possible way the world might be that, if it actually obtained, would make S false).
	From: David J.Chalmers (Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics [2004], p.165), quoted by Laura Schroeter - Two-Dimensional Semantics 2.3.2
	A reaction: [The parenthesis is by Schroeter] A '1-intension' is defined by a diagonal on a 2D semantic matrix. Chalmers defends conceivability as the guide to possibility. This is a very traditional view of the a priori, expressed in modern terms.

15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 2. Psuche

5960	When the soul is intelligent and harmonious, it is part of god and derives from god [Plutarch]
	Full Idea: The soul, when it has partaken of intelligence and reason and concord, is not merely a work but also a part of god and has come to be not by his agency but both from him as source and out of his substance.
	From: Plutarch (67: Platonic Questions [c.85], II.1001)
	A reaction: A most intriguing shift of view from earlier concepts of the psuché. How did this come about? This man is a pagan. The history is in the evolution of Platonism. See 'The Middle Platonists' by John Dillon. Davidson is also very impressed by reason.

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature

20756	Instead of having a nature, man only has a history [Ortega y Gassett]
	Full Idea: Man lives in view of the past. Man, in a word, has no nature; what he has is history. Expressed differently: what nature is to things, history is to man.
	From: José Ortega y Gassett (Toward a Philosophy of History [1941], p.217), quoted by Kevin Aho - Existentialism: an introduction 5 'Situated'
	A reaction: Makes explicit the existentialist denial of human nature. The foundation of ethics can only be total freedom, to choose both yourself and your actions. What is inescapable is the social and culture contexts. What is the role of the 'history'?