Combining Texts

All the ideas for '67: Platonic Questions', 'A Defense of Abortion' and 'works'

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16 ideas

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
Descartes showed a one-one order-preserving match between points on a line and the real numbers [Descartes, by Hart,WD]
     Full Idea: Descartes founded analytic geometry on the assumption that there is a one-one order-preserving correspondence between the points on a line and the real numbers.
     From: report of René Descartes (works [1643]) by William D. Hart - The Evolution of Logic 1
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
Descartes thinks distinguishing substances from aggregates is pointless [Descartes, by Pasnau]
     Full Idea: Descartes thinks it is a pointless relic of scholastic metaphysics to dispute over the boundaries between substances and mere aggregates.
     From: report of René Descartes (works [1643]) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 25.6
     A reaction: This is Pasnau's carefully considered conclusion, with which others may not agree. It presumably captures the attitude of modern science generally to such issues.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
Descartes said images can refer to objects without resembling them (as words do) [Descartes, by Tuck]
     Full Idea: Descartes argued (in 'The World') that just as words refer to objects, but they do not resemble them, in the same way, visual images or other sensory inputs relate to objects without depicting them.
     From: report of René Descartes (works [1643]) by Richard Tuck - Hobbes
     A reaction: This strikes me as a rather significant and plausible claim, which might contain the germ of the idea of a language of thought. It is also the basis for the recent view that language is the best route to understanding the mind.
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 2. Psuche
When the soul is intelligent and harmonious, it is part of god and derives from god [Plutarch]
     Full Idea: The soul, when it has partaken of intelligence and reason and concord, is not merely a work but also a part of god and has come to be not by his agency but both from him as source and out of his substance.
     From: Plutarch (67: Platonic Questions [c.85], II.1001)
     A reaction: A most intriguing shift of view from earlier concepts of the psuché. How did this come about? This man is a pagan. The history is in the evolution of Platonism. See 'The Middle Platonists' by John Dillon. Davidson is also very impressed by reason.
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
We have inner awareness of our freedom [Descartes]
     Full Idea: We have inner awareness of our freedom.
     From: René Descartes (works [1643])
     A reaction: This begs a few questions. I may be directly aware that I have not been hypnotised, but no one would accept it as proof.
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
Descartes discussed the interaction problem, and compared it with gravity [Descartes, by Lycan]
     Full Idea: Descartes himself was well aware of the interaction problem, and corresponded uncomfortably with Princess Elizabeth on the matter; …he pointed out that gravity is causal despite not being a physical object.
     From: report of René Descartes (works [1643]) by William Lycan - Consciousness n1.3
     A reaction: Lycan observes that at least gravity is in space-time, unlike the Cartesian mind. Pierre Gassendi had pointed out the problem to Descartes in the Fifth Objection to the 'Meditations' (see Idea 3400).
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
The right to life does not bestow the right to use someone else's body to support that life [Thomson]
     Full Idea: Having a right to life does not guarantee having either a right to be given the use of or a right to be allowed continued use of another person's body.
     From: Judith (Jarvis) Thomson (A Defense of Abortion [1971], p.131)
     A reaction: A very nice point. You have a right to your life once you are the sole owner of it.
No one is morally required to make huge sacrifices to keep someone else alive for nine months [Thomson]
     Full Idea: No one is morally required to make large sacrifices, of health, and other interests and commitments, for nine months, in order to keep another person alive.
     From: Judith (Jarvis) Thomson (A Defense of Abortion [1971], p.135)
     A reaction: It is a trade-off. It might become a duty if society (or even a husband) urgently needed the baby.
Maybe abortion can be justified despite the foetus having full human rights [Thomson, by Foot]
     Full Idea: Thomson suggests that abortion can be justified without the need to deny that the foetus has the moral rights of a human person.
     From: report of Judith (Jarvis) Thomson (A Defense of Abortion [1971]) by Philippa Foot - Killing and Letting Die p.86
     A reaction: Thomson uses a dubious analogy between pregnancy and being hooked up to someone for life-support. Presumably killing an innocent person is occasionally justifiable, but the situation would normally be more abnormal than pregnancy.
The foetus is safe in the womb, so abortion initiates its death, with the mother as the agent. [Foot on Thomson]
     Full Idea: A fetus is not in jeopardy because it is in the womb, so an abortion originates the fatal sequence, and the mother is the agent. Hence Thomson's argument is invalid, and we must return to question of the moral status of the foetus.
     From: comment on Judith (Jarvis) Thomson (A Defense of Abortion [1971]) by Philippa Foot - Killing and Letting Die p.86
     A reaction: The problem would be if a 'person' was safe, but only if I continue some sustained effort which is not required of me by normal duties.
A newly fertilized ovum is no more a person than an acorn is an oak tree [Thomson]
     Full Idea: A newly fertilized ovum, a newly implanted clump of cells, is no more a person than an acorn is an oak tree.
     From: Judith (Jarvis) Thomson (A Defense of Abortion [1971], p.125)
     A reaction: This relies heavily on the philosopher's concept of a 'person', but it seems right to me.
Is someone's right to life diminished if they were conceived by a rape? [Thomson]
     Full Idea: Can we say that a person has a right to life only if they didn't come into existence through rape, or that the latter have less right to life?
     From: Judith (Jarvis) Thomson (A Defense of Abortion [1971], p.126)
     A reaction: This would clearly be an inconsistency for some opponents of abortion who allow rape as an exception.
It can't be murder for a mother to perform an abortion on herself to save her own life [Thomson]
     Full Idea: It cannot seriously be thought to be murder if a mother performs an abortion on herself to save her own life (if, say, she had a serious heart condition).
     From: Judith (Jarvis) Thomson (A Defense of Abortion [1971], p.127)
     A reaction: An extreme view might condemn such an action, but it can hardly be based on the 'sanctity of life'.
The right to life is not a right not to be killed, but not to be killed unjustly [Thomson]
     Full Idea: Maybe the right to life consists not in the right not to be killed, but in the right not to be killed unjustly.
     From: Judith (Jarvis) Thomson (A Defense of Abortion [1971], p.131)
     A reaction: Sounds tautological. There is no right to life, then, but just the requirement that people behave justly?
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
Nature is devoid of thought [Descartes, by Meillassoux]
     Full Idea: It is Descartes who ratifies the idea that nature is devoid of thought.
     From: report of René Descartes (works [1643]) by Quentin Meillassoux - After Finitude; the necessity of contingency 5
     A reaction: His dualism is crucial, along with his ontological argument, because they make all mentality supernatural. Remember, for Descartes animals are mindless machines.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / c. Matter as extension
Matter can't just be Descartes's geometry, because a filler of the spaces is needed [Robinson,H on Descartes]
     Full Idea: Notoriously, the Cartesian idea that matter is purely geometrical will not do, for it leaves no distinction between matter and empty volumes: a filler for these volumes is required.
     From: comment on René Descartes (works [1643]) by Howard Robinson - Perception IX.3
     A reaction: Descartes thinks of matter as 'extension'. Descartes's error seems so obvious that it is a puzzle why he made it. He may have confused epistemology and ontology - all we can know of matter is its extension in space.