10 ideas
| 20100 | Classical liberalism seeks freedom of opinion, of private life, of expression, and of property [Micklethwait/Wooldridge] |
| Full Idea: The classical liberals agreed on a basic list of freedoms: of opinion (including religion), of private life, of expression, and of property | |
| From: Micklethwait,J/Wooldridge,A (The Fourth Revolution [2014], 9) | |
| A reaction: Mill is main articulator of this. Modern neo-liberals focus on economic freedom. Neither of them seem to make freedom of opportunity central, though I suspect our modern Liberal Party would. |
| 18617 | Substances, unlike aggregates, can survive a change of parts [Mumford] |
| Full Idea: Substances can survive a change in their parts in a way that a mere aggregate of parts. | |
| From: Stephen Mumford (Metaphysics: a very short introduction [2012], 3) | |
| A reaction: A simple but very important idea. If we then distinguish between 'substances' and 'aggregates' we get a much clearer grip on things. Is the Ship of Theseus a substance or an aggregate? There is no factual answer to that. What do you want to explain? |
| 18618 | Maybe possibilities are recombinations of the existing elements of reality [Mumford] |
| Full Idea: It has been suggested that we could think of possibilities as recombinations of all the existing elements of reality. | |
| From: Stephen Mumford (Metaphysics: a very short introduction [2012], 8) | |
| A reaction: [Armstrong 1989 is the source] The obvious problem would be that the existence of an entirely different reality would be impossible, if this was all possibility could be. It seems to cramp the style of the possible too much. Are properties elements? |
| 18619 | Combinatorial possibility has to allow all elements to be combinable, which seems unlikely [Mumford] |
| Full Idea: The combinatorial account only works if you allow that the elements are recombinable. ...But could Lincoln really have been green? It seems possible that you could jump to the moon, unless we impose some restrictions. | |
| From: Stephen Mumford (Metaphysics: a very short introduction [2012], 8) | |
| A reaction: Mumford suggests different combination rules for logical and natural possibility. The general objection is that combinatorial possibility is too permissive - which it clearly is. |
| 18620 | Combinatorial possibility relies on what actually exists (even over time), but there could be more [Mumford] |
| Full Idea: Can combinatorial possibility deliver enough possibilities? It uses the existing elements, but there might have been one more particular or one more property. Even extended over time, the elements seem finite, yet there could have been more. | |
| From: Stephen Mumford (Metaphysics: a very short introduction [2012], 8) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] One objection is that the theory allows too much, and now the objection is that it allows too little. Both objections are correct, so that's the end of that. But I admire the attempt to base modality on actuality. |
| 5960 | When the soul is intelligent and harmonious, it is part of god and derives from god [Plutarch] |
| Full Idea: The soul, when it has partaken of intelligence and reason and concord, is not merely a work but also a part of god and has come to be not by his agency but both from him as source and out of his substance. | |
| From: Plutarch (67: Platonic Questions [c.85], II.1001) | |
| A reaction: A most intriguing shift of view from earlier concepts of the psuché. How did this come about? This man is a pagan. The history is in the evolution of Platonism. See 'The Middle Platonists' by John Dillon. Davidson is also very impressed by reason. |
| 20097 | The welfare state aims at freedom from want, and equality of opportunity [Micklethwait/Wooldridge] |
| Full Idea: In the classical liberal tradition freedom meant freedom from external control, and equality meant equality before the law. In the welfare state (of Beatrice Webb) freedom was reinterpreted as freedom from want, and equality as equality of opportunity. | |
| From: Micklethwait,J/Wooldridge,A (The Fourth Revolution [2014], 3) | |
| A reaction: The authors call this the 'third revolution' in government, after 17th century centralisation and early 19th century accountability. Tawney 1931 is the key text. |
| 20099 | For communists history is driven by the proletariat [Micklethwait/Wooldridge] |
| Full Idea: For the communists the proletariat rather than the state was the locomotive of history. | |
| From: Micklethwait,J/Wooldridge,A (The Fourth Revolution [2014], 3) | |
| A reaction: I feel increasingly reluctant to support any party which appears to mainly represent the interests of a single social class, no matter how large that class may be. An attraction of liberalism is that it makes no reference to class. |
| 20098 | Fans of economic freedom claim that capitalism is self-correcting [Micklethwait/Wooldridge] |
| Full Idea: The central laissez-faire conceit is that capitalism is a self-correcting mechanism. | |
| From: Micklethwait,J/Wooldridge,A (The Fourth Revolution [2014], 3) | |
| A reaction: This was Keynes's rather left-wing criticism of standard capitalist views. These resurfaced in the 1980s with mantras about the virtues of 'market forces'. |
| 20096 | Roman law entrenched property rights [Micklethwait/Wooldridge] |
| Full Idea: Roman law entrenched property rights. | |
| From: Micklethwait,J/Wooldridge,A (The Fourth Revolution [2014], 1 Intro) | |
| A reaction: Normally attributed to Locke, so this is a good corrective. Was the principle gradually forgotten before Locke? |