Combining Texts

All the ideas for '67: Platonic Questions', 'thirty titles (lost)' and 'Mathematical Truth'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


6 ideas

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
Mathematical truth is always compromising between ordinary language and sensible epistemology [Benacerraf]
     Full Idea: Most accounts of the concept of mathematical truth can be identified with serving one or another of either semantic theory (matching it to ordinary language), or with epistemology (meshing with a reasonable view) - always at the expense of the other.
     From: Paul Benacerraf (Mathematical Truth [1973], Intro)
     A reaction: The gist is that language pulls you towards platonism, and epistemology pulls you towards empiricism. He argues that the semantics must give ground. He's right.
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
Realists have semantics without epistemology, anti-realists epistemology but bad semantics [Benacerraf, by Colyvan]
     Full Idea: Benacerraf argues that realists about mathematical objects have a nice normal semantic but no epistemology, and anti-realists have a good epistemology but an unorthodox semantics.
     From: report of Paul Benacerraf (Mathematical Truth [1973]) by Mark Colyvan - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mathematics 1.2
The platonist view of mathematics doesn't fit our epistemology very well [Benacerraf]
     Full Idea: The principle defect of the standard (platonist) account of mathematical truth is that it appears to violate the requirement that our account be susceptible to integration into our over-all account of knowledge.
     From: Paul Benacerraf (Mathematical Truth [1973], III)
     A reaction: Unfortunately he goes on to defend a causal theory of justification (fashionable at that time, but implausible now). Nevertheless, his general point is well made. Your theory of what mathematics is had better make it knowable.
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
Speusippus suggested underlying principles for every substance, and ended with a huge list [Speussipus, by Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Speusippus suggested principles for each substance, including principles for numbers, magnitude and the soul. He thus arrived at no mean list of substances.
     From: report of Speussipus (thirty titles (lost) [c.367 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 1028b
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 2. Psuche
When the soul is intelligent and harmonious, it is part of god and derives from god [Plutarch]
     Full Idea: The soul, when it has partaken of intelligence and reason and concord, is not merely a work but also a part of god and has come to be not by his agency but both from him as source and out of his substance.
     From: Plutarch (67: Platonic Questions [c.85], II.1001)
     A reaction: A most intriguing shift of view from earlier concepts of the psuché. How did this come about? This man is a pagan. The history is in the evolution of Platonism. See 'The Middle Platonists' by John Dillon. Davidson is also very impressed by reason.
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
Speusippus said things were governed by some animal force rather than the gods [Speussipus, by Cicero]
     Full Idea: Speusippus, following his uncle Plato, held that all things were governed by some kind of animal force, and tried to eradicate from our minds any notion of the gods.
     From: report of Speussipus (thirty titles (lost) [c.367 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') I.33