Combining Texts

All the ideas for '67: Platonic Questions', 'Structure and Nature' and 'Grounding: an opinionated introduction'

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8 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics

17266	Using modal logic, philosophers tried to handle all metaphysics in modal terms [Correia/Schnieder]
	Full Idea: In the heyday of modal logic, philosophers typically tried to account for any metaphysical notions in modal terms.
	From: Correia,F/Schnieder,B (Grounding: an opinionated introduction [2012], 2.4)
	A reaction: Lewisian realism about possible worlds actually gets rid of purely 'modal' terms, but I suppose they include possible worlds in their remark. Annoying for modal logicians to be told they had a 'heyday' - a nice example of the rhetoric of philosophy.

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason

17263	Why do rationalists accept Sufficient Reason, when it denies the existence of fundamental facts? [Correia/Schnieder]
	Full Idea: What is most puzzling about the rationalist tradition is the steadfast certainty with which the Principle of Sufficient Reason was often accepted, since it in effect denies that there are fundamental facts.
	From: Correia,F/Schnieder,B (Grounding: an opinionated introduction [2012], 2.2)
	A reaction: A very simple and interesting observation. The principle implies either a circle of reasons, or an infinite regress of reasons. Nothing can be labelled as 'primitive' or 'foundational' or 'given'. The principle is irrational!

6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism

10242	I apply structuralism to concrete and abstract objects indiscriminately [Quine]
	Full Idea: My own line is a yet more sweeping structuralism (than David Lewis's account of classes), applying to concrete and abstract objects indiscriminately.
	From: Willard Quine (Structure and Nature [1992], p.6), quoted by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics 4.9
	A reaction: Shapiro calls this 'breathtaking', and retreats from it, but it is something like my own view, starting from Mill's pebbles and working up.

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding

17270	Is existential dependence by grounding, or do grounding claims arise from existential dependence? [Correia/Schnieder]
	Full Idea: We may take existential dependence to be a relation induced by certain cases of grounding, but one may also think that facts about existential dependence are prior to corresponding ground claims, and in fact ground those claims.
	From: Correia,F/Schnieder,B (Grounding: an opinionated introduction [2012], 4.3)
	A reaction: I would vote for grounding, since dependence seems more abstract, and seems to demand explanation, whereas grounding seems more like a feature of reality, and to resist further intrinsic explanation (on the whole).

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / c. Grounding and explanation

17268	Grounding is metaphysical and explanation epistemic, so keep them apart [Correia/Schnieder]
	Full Idea: To us it seems advisable to separate the objective notion of grounding, which belongs to the field of metaphysics, from the epistemically loaded notion of explanation.
	From: Correia,F/Schnieder,B (Grounding: an opinionated introduction [2012], 4.2)
	A reaction: Paul Audi is the defender of the opposite view. I'm with Audi. The 'epistemically loaded' pragmatic aspect is just contextual - that we have different interests in different aspects of the grounding on different occasions.

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism

10243	My ontology is quarks etc., classes of such things, classes of such classes etc. [Quine]
	Full Idea: My tentative ontology continues to consist of quarks and their compounds, also classes of such things, classes of such classes, and so on.
	From: Willard Quine (Structure and Nature [1992], p.9), quoted by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics 4.9
	A reaction: I would call this the Hierarchy of Abstraction (just coined it - what do you think?). Unlike Quine, I don't see why its ontology should include things called 'sets' in addition to the things that make them up.

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts

17267	The identity of two facts may depend on how 'fine-grained' we think facts are [Correia/Schnieder]
	Full Idea: There is a disagreement on the issue of factual identity, concerning the 'granularity' of facts, the question of how fine-grained they are.
	From: Correia,F/Schnieder,B (Grounding: an opinionated introduction [2012], 3.3)
	A reaction: If they are very fine-grained, then no two descriptions of a supposed fact will capture the same details. If we go broadbrush, facts become fuzzy and less helpful. 'Fact' was never going to be a clear term.

15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 2. Psuche

5960	When the soul is intelligent and harmonious, it is part of god and derives from god [Plutarch]
	Full Idea: The soul, when it has partaken of intelligence and reason and concord, is not merely a work but also a part of god and has come to be not by his agency but both from him as source and out of his substance.
	From: Plutarch (67: Platonic Questions [c.85], II.1001)
	A reaction: A most intriguing shift of view from earlier concepts of the psuché. How did this come about? This man is a pagan. The history is in the evolution of Platonism. See 'The Middle Platonists' by John Dillon. Davidson is also very impressed by reason.