7 ideas
8833 | Why should we prefer coherent beliefs? [Klein,P] |
Full Idea: A key question for a coherentist is, why should he or she adopt a coherent set of beliefs rather than an incoherent set? | |
From: Peter Klein (Infinitism solution to regress problem [2005], 'Step 1') | |
A reaction: The point of the question is that the coherentist may have to revert to other criteria in answering it. One could equally ask, why should I believe in tables just because I vividly experience them? Or, why believe 2+2=4, just because it is obvious? |
8834 | Infinitism avoids a regress, circularity or arbitrariness, by saying warrant just increases [Klein,P] |
Full Idea: Infinitism can solve the regress problem, because it endorses a warrant-emergent form of reasoning in which warrant increases as the series of reasons lengthens. The theory can avoid both circularity and arbitrariness. | |
From: Peter Klein (Infinitism solution to regress problem [2005], 'Step 2') | |
A reaction: It nicely avoids arbitrariness by offering a reason for absolutely every belief. I think the way to go may to combine individual Infinitism with a social account of where to set the bar of acceptable justification. |
8838 | If justification is endless, no link in the chain is ultimately justified [Ginet on Klein,P] |
Full Idea: An endless chain of inferential justifications can never ultimately explain why any link in the chain is justified. | |
From: comment on Peter Klein (Infinitism solution to regress problem [2005]) by Carl Ginet - Infinitism not solution to regress problem p.148 | |
A reaction: This strikes me as a mere yearning for foundations. I don't see sense-experience or the natural light of human reason (or the word of God, for that matter) as in any way 'ultimate'. It's all evidence to be evaluated. |
8839 | Reasons acquire warrant through being part of a lengthening series [Klein,P] |
Full Idea: The infinitist holds that finding a reason, and then another reason for that reason, places it at the beginning of a series where each gains warrant as part of the series. ..Rational credibility increases as the series lengthens. | |
From: Peter Klein (Infinitism solution to regress problem [2005], p.137) | |
A reaction: A striking problem here for Klein is the status of the first reason, prior to it being supported by a series. Surprisingly, it seems that it would not yet be a justification. Coherence accounts have the same problem, if coherence is the only criterion. |
5960 | When the soul is intelligent and harmonious, it is part of god and derives from god [Plutarch] |
Full Idea: The soul, when it has partaken of intelligence and reason and concord, is not merely a work but also a part of god and has come to be not by his agency but both from him as source and out of his substance. | |
From: Plutarch (67: Platonic Questions [c.85], II.1001) | |
A reaction: A most intriguing shift of view from earlier concepts of the psuché. How did this come about? This man is a pagan. The history is in the evolution of Platonism. See 'The Middle Platonists' by John Dillon. Davidson is also very impressed by reason. |
4051 | People will volunteer for euthanasia because they think other people want them dead [Kamisar] |
Full Idea: In the process of voluntary euthanasia we will sweep up some who are not really tired of life, but think others are tired of them. | |
From: Yale Kamisar (Against Euthanasia [1958], p.78) | |
A reaction: We could permit such choices. Or set up systems to eliminate such cases. |
4050 | We only allow voluntary euthanasia to someone who is both sane and crazed by pain [Kamisar] |
Full Idea: It seems that voluntary euthanasia can only be carried out by someone who is both sane, and crazed by pain. | |
From: Yale Kamisar (Against Euthanasia [1958], p.77) | |
A reaction: A fair point, despite its obvious exaggeration. How much pain must someone experience before we permit them to choose euthanasia? |