17263
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Why do rationalists accept Sufficient Reason, when it denies the existence of fundamental facts? [Correia/Schnieder]
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Full Idea:
What is most puzzling about the rationalist tradition is the steadfast certainty with which the Principle of Sufficient Reason was often accepted, since it in effect denies that there are fundamental facts.
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From:
Correia,F/Schnieder,B (Grounding: an opinionated introduction [2012], 2.2)
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A reaction:
A very simple and interesting observation. The principle implies either a circle of reasons, or an infinite regress of reasons. Nothing can be labelled as 'primitive' or 'foundational' or 'given'. The principle is irrational!
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18244
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I say the irrational is not the cut itself, but a new creation which corresponds to the cut [Dedekind]
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Full Idea:
Of my theory of irrationals you say that the irrational number is nothing else than the cut itself, whereas I prefer to create something new (different from the cut), which corresponds to the cut. We have the right to claim such a creative power.
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From:
Richard Dedekind (Letter to Weber [1888], 1888 Jan), quoted by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics 5.4
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A reaction:
Clearly a cut will not locate a unique irrational number, so something more needs to be done. Shapiro remarks here that for Dedekind numbers are objects.
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17270
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Is existential dependence by grounding, or do grounding claims arise from existential dependence? [Correia/Schnieder]
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Full Idea:
We may take existential dependence to be a relation induced by certain cases of grounding, but one may also think that facts about existential dependence are prior to corresponding ground claims, and in fact ground those claims.
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From:
Correia,F/Schnieder,B (Grounding: an opinionated introduction [2012], 4.3)
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A reaction:
I would vote for grounding, since dependence seems more abstract, and seems to demand explanation, whereas grounding seems more like a feature of reality, and to resist further intrinsic explanation (on the whole).
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17267
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The identity of two facts may depend on how 'fine-grained' we think facts are [Correia/Schnieder]
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Full Idea:
There is a disagreement on the issue of factual identity, concerning the 'granularity' of facts, the question of how fine-grained they are.
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From:
Correia,F/Schnieder,B (Grounding: an opinionated introduction [2012], 3.3)
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A reaction:
If they are very fine-grained, then no two descriptions of a supposed fact will capture the same details. If we go broadbrush, facts become fuzzy and less helpful. 'Fact' was never going to be a clear term.
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