Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Isagoge ('Introduction')', 'fragments/reports' and 'Of Organum or Ars Magna of Thinking'

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5 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis
An idea is analysed perfectly when it is shown a priori that it is possible [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Every idea is analysed perfectly only when it is demonstrated a priori that it is possible.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Of Organum or Ars Magna of Thinking [1679], p.3)
     A reaction: I take it he means metaphysical possibility, rather than natural, or we can't think about pigs flying. He probably has maths in mind. Seeing the possibility of something may well amount to understanding its truth conditions.
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
Are genera and species real or conceptual? bodies or incorporeal? in sensibles or separate from them? [Porphyry]
     Full Idea: I shall beg off talking of a) whether genera and species are real or situated in bare thoughts alone, b) whether as real they are bodies or incorporeals, and c) whether they are separated or in sensibles and have their reality in connection with them.
     From: Porphyry (Isagoge ('Introduction') [c.295], (2))
     A reaction: This passage, picking up on Aristotle, seems to be the original source that grew into the medievel debate about universals. It seems to rather neatly lay out the agenda for the universals debate which is still with us.
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / d. Rational foundations
Our thoughts are either dependent, or self-evident. All thoughts seem to end in the self-evident [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Whatever is thought by us is either conceived through itself, or involves the concept of another. …Thus one must proceed to infinity, or all thoughts are resolved into those which are conceived through themselves.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Of Organum or Ars Magna of Thinking [1679], p.1)
     A reaction: This seems to embody the rationalist attitude to foundations. I am sympathetic. Experiences just come to us as basic, but they don't qualify as 'thoughts', let alone knowledge. Experiences are more 'given' than 'conceptual'.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
Critolaus redefined Aristotle's moral aim as fulfilment instead of happiness [Critolaus, by White,SA]
     Full Idea: Critolaus reformulated Aristotelian theory by defining happiness as a 'fulfilment' (sumplêrôma) of psychic, physical, and external goods, where virtue vastly outweighs the rest.
     From: report of Critolaus (fragments/reports [c.170 BCE]) by Stephen A. White - Critolaus
     A reaction: The sounds more like an attempt at clarification than a real change of Peripatetic doctrine. Occasionally 'fulfilment' is offered as a translation for eudaimonia. Maybe we should just take up Critolaus' suggestion when we are discussing Aristotle.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
Supreme human happiness is the greatest possible increase of his perfection [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: The supreme happiness of man consists in the greatest possible increase of his perfection.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Of Organum or Ars Magna of Thinking [1679], p.1)
     A reaction: I fear that (being a great intellectual) he had a rather intellectual interpretation of 'perfection'. This is in danger of being a tautology, but if the proposal is given an Aritotelian slant I am sympathetic.