6 ideas
16974 | The nature of each logical concept is given by a collection of inference rules [Correia] |
Full Idea: The view presented here presupposes that each logical concept is associated with some fixed and well defined collection of rules of inference which characterize its basic logical nature. | |
From: Fabrice Correia (On the Reduction of Necessity to Essence [2012], 4) | |
A reaction: [He gives Fine's 'Senses of Essences' 57-8 as a source] He seems to have in mind natural deduction, where the rules are for the introduction and elimination of the concepts. |
15034 | Are genera and species real or conceptual? bodies or incorporeal? in sensibles or separate from them? [Porphyry] |
Full Idea: I shall beg off talking of a) whether genera and species are real or situated in bare thoughts alone, b) whether as real they are bodies or incorporeals, and c) whether they are separated or in sensibles and have their reality in connection with them. | |
From: Porphyry (Isagoge ('Introduction') [c.295], (2)) | |
A reaction: This passage, picking up on Aristotle, seems to be the original source that grew into the medievel debate about universals. It seems to rather neatly lay out the agenda for the universals debate which is still with us. |
16973 | Explain logical necessity by logical consequence, or the other way around? [Correia] |
Full Idea: One view is that logical consequence is to be understood in terms of logical necessity (some proposition holds necessarily, if some group of other propositions holds). Alternatively, logical necessity is a logical consequence of the empty set. | |
From: Fabrice Correia (On the Reduction of Necessity to Essence [2012], 3) | |
A reaction: I think my Finean preference is for all necessities to have a 'necessitator', so logical necessity results from logic in some way, perhaps from logical consequence, or from the essences of the connectives and operators. |
7444 | Type-type psychophysical identity is combined with a functional characterisation of pain [Lewis] |
Full Idea: The materialist theory Armstrong and I proposed joins claims of type-type psychophysical identity with a behaviourist or functionalist way of characterising mental states such as pain. | |
From: David Lewis (Mad Pain and Martian Pain [1980], §III) | |
A reaction: Armstrong has backed off from 'type-type' identity, because the realisations of a given mental state might be too diverse to be considered of the same type. Putnam's machine functionalism allows the possibility of dualism. |
7445 | The application of 'pain' to physical states is non-rigid and contingent [Lewis] |
Full Idea: The word 'pain' is a non-rigid designator; it is a contingent matter what state the concept and the word apply to. (Note: so the sort of theory Kripke argues against is not what we propose). | |
From: David Lewis (Mad Pain and Martian Pain [1980], §III) | |
A reaction: I like the view that a given quale is necessarily identical to a given mental state, but that many mental states might occupy a given behavioural role. The smell of roses might occupy the behavioural role of pain. Frog pain isn't quite like ours. |
7443 | A theory must be mixed, to cover qualia without behaviour, and behaviour without qualia [Lewis, by PG] |
Full Idea: To pass our test it seems that our theory will have to be a 'mixed' theory, to account for the Madman (whose pain has odd causes, and odd effects) and also for the Martian (who has normal causes and effects, but an odd physical state). | |
From: report of David Lewis (Mad Pain and Martian Pain [1980], §II) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
A reaction: A statement that 'pain' is ambiguous (qualia/causal role) would help a lot here. Martians have the causal role but no qualia, and the madman has the qualia but lacks the causal role. I say lots of different qualia might have the same causal role. |