6 ideas
| 15034 | Are genera and species real or conceptual? bodies or incorporeal? in sensibles or separate from them? [Porphyry] |
| Full Idea: I shall beg off talking of a) whether genera and species are real or situated in bare thoughts alone, b) whether as real they are bodies or incorporeals, and c) whether they are separated or in sensibles and have their reality in connection with them. | |
| From: Porphyry (Isagoge ('Introduction') [c.295], (2)) | |
| A reaction: This passage, picking up on Aristotle, seems to be the original source that grew into the medievel debate about universals. It seems to rather neatly lay out the agenda for the universals debate which is still with us. |
| 8443 | Mereological essentialism says an entity must have exactly those parts [Sosa] |
| Full Idea: Mereological essentialism says that nothing else could have been the unique entity composed of certain parts except the very thing that is composed of those parts. | |
| From: Ernest Sosa (Varieties of Causation [1980], 2) | |
| A reaction: This sounds initially implausible. It means the ship of Theseus ceases to be that ship if you change a single nail of it. Whether we say that seems optional, but if we do, it leads to the collaps of all our normal understanding of identity. |
| 22110 | Demonstration provides depth of understanding and explanation (rather than foundations) [Kretzmann/Stump] |
| Full Idea: According to Aquinas, what demonstration provides is not so much knowledge as conceived by foundationalists as depth of understanding and explanatory insight. | |
| From: Kretzmann/Stump (Aquinas, Thomas [2005]), quoted by Kretzmann/Stump - Aquinas, Thomas 11 | |
| A reaction: It was noticeable that Aristotle didn't make clear what demonstration aims to achieve, and he didn't employ it elsewhere in his writings. We aim for understanding, not for well grounded propositions. Understanding needs implications and mechanisms. |
| 8442 | What law would explain causation in the case of causing a table to come into existence? [Sosa] |
| Full Idea: If I fasten a board onto a tree stump, causing a table to come into existence, ...what law of nature or, even, what quasi-law or law-like principle could possibly play in such a case of generation the role required by nomological accounts? | |
| From: Ernest Sosa (Varieties of Causation [1980], 1) | |
| A reaction: A very nice question. The nomological account is at its strongest when rocks fall off walls or magnets attract, but all sorts of other caused events seem too messy or complex or original to fit the story. |
| 8445 | The necessitated is not always a result or consequence of the necessitator [Sosa] |
| Full Idea: The necessitated is not always a result or consequence of the necessitator. If p-and-q is a fact, then this necessitates that p, but the fact that p need not be a result or consequence of the fact that p-and-q. | |
| From: Ernest Sosa (Varieties of Causation [1980], p.242) | |
| A reaction: This is obviously correct, and needs to be borne in mind when considering necessary causation. It is not enough to produce a piece of logic; something in the link from cause to effect must be demonstrated to be necessary. |
| 8444 | Where is the necessary causation in the three people being tall making everybody tall? [Sosa] |
| Full Idea: It is not clear how to analyse the form of necessary causation found in the only three people in the room being tall causing everybody in the room to be tall. | |
| From: Ernest Sosa (Varieties of Causation [1980], 5) | |
| A reaction: I would want to challenge this as a case of causation. There are no events or processes involved. It seems that a situation described in one way can also be described in another. |