37 ideas
| 23728 | Analysis aims to express the full set of platitudes surrounding a given concept [Smith,M] |
| Full Idea: The aim of analysis is to give us knowledge of all and only the platitudes surrounding our use of the concept that is up for analysis. | |
| From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 1.10) | |
| A reaction: His earlier specimen concept is 'redness'. For other concepts there might be considerable disagreement about which propositions are or are not the relevant platitudes. Smith emphasises that analysis need not be reductive. |
| 23744 | Defining a set of things by paradigms doesn't pin them down enough [Smith,M] |
| Full Idea: The discussion of colour concepts shows that permutation problems arise when a set of concepts, acquired inter alia via the presentation of paradigms, is largely interdefined. | |
| From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 5.9) | |
| A reaction: Smith says that our normative moral concepts are largely interdefined in this way. The 'permutation' problem is that they can change places in the definition set, and so their intrinsic individual character is not pinned down. Sounds right. |
| 15034 | Are genera and species real or conceptual? bodies or incorporeal? in sensibles or separate from them? [Porphyry] |
| Full Idea: I shall beg off talking of a) whether genera and species are real or situated in bare thoughts alone, b) whether as real they are bodies or incorporeals, and c) whether they are separated or in sensibles and have their reality in connection with them. | |
| From: Porphyry (Isagoge ('Introduction') [c.295], (2)) | |
| A reaction: This passage, picking up on Aristotle, seems to be the original source that grew into the medievel debate about universals. It seems to rather neatly lay out the agenda for the universals debate which is still with us. |
| 9240 | Love creates a necessity concerning what to care about [Frankfurt] |
| Full Idea: The necessity with which love binds the will puts an end to indecisiveness concerning what to care about. | |
| From: Harry G. Frankfurt (The Reasons of Love [2005], 2.13) | |
| A reaction: I put this here as a reminder that there may be more to necessity than the dry concept of metaphysicians and logicians. 'Why did you rescue that man first?' 'Because I love him'. Kit Fine recognises many sorts of necessity. |
| 23743 | Capturing all the common sense facts about rationality is almost impossible [Smith,M] |
| Full Idea: It would be a superhuman task just to write down an explicit, non-summary style, statement of the platitudes that capture our idea of what it is to be fully rational. | |
| From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 5.9) | |
| A reaction: Well said. Philosophers are inclined to make simplistic binary judgements about whether persons or animals are rational. A visit to YouTube will show fish acting extremely rationally. |
| 23739 | Goals need desires, and so only desires can motivate us [Smith,M] |
| Full Idea: Only an agent's desires may constitute her having certain goals, and it follows from this that only her desires may constitute her motivating reasons. | |
| From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 4.8) | |
| A reaction: We might distinguish between reasons which direct us towards certain ends, and reasons which motivate us to pursue those ends. Most mornings I have a reason to get out of bed, which precedes my motivation to actually do it. |
| 23724 | A pure desire could be criticised if it were based on a false belief [Smith,M] |
| Full Idea: There is a minor proviso to Hume's view, which is that desires are subject to rational criticism, but only insofar as they are based on beliefs that are subject to rational criticism. | |
| From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 1.3) | |
| A reaction: He says this is not a refutation of the basic Humean claim. He has in mind a desire such as to consume cyanide because you believe it will be good for you. |
| 23736 | A person can have a desire without feeling it [Smith,M] |
| Full Idea: We should concede that a desire may be had in the absence of its being felt. | |
| From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 4.5) | |
| A reaction: A nice observation. An example he gives is a father's desire that his child does well. Smith is discussing Hume's account of motivation in terms of desires and beliefs. |
| 23723 | In the Humean account, desires are not true/false, or subject to any rational criticism [Smith,M] |
| Full Idea: According to the standard picture of human psychology that we get from Hume, not only are desires not assessable in terms of truth and falsehood, they are not subject to any sort of rational criticism at all. | |
| From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 1.3) | |
| A reaction: This is where action theory meets metaethics. The separation of facts from values underlies this, because a desire is a fact, but the wickedness of a desire is not. Surely a desire could be a failure of practical reason? |
| 23735 | Subjects may be fallible about the desires which explain their actions [Smith,M] |
| Full Idea: It is an adequacy constraint on any conception of desire that the epistemology of desire it recommends allows that subjects may be fallible about the desires they have. | |
| From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 4.5) | |
| A reaction: [I do wish authors would write my short versions instead of their rambling sentences!] Even after the event we may be unsure why we did something. If someone observes self-interest when I thought my action was altruistic, I don't know how to respond. |
| 23738 | Humeans (unlike their opponents) say that desires and judgements can separate [Smith,M] |
| Full Idea: Humeans claim that agents who believe they should act may nevertheless lack the desire to do so, where anti-Humeans must say the two go together, and someone with the belief thereby has the desire. | |
| From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 4.7) | |
| A reaction: [very compressed] A very helpful distinction about the classic debates over the motivations of action. Smith defends the Humean view, and makes it very plausible. No mere sense of rightness or duty can compel us to act. |
| 23742 | If first- and second-order desires conflict, harmony does not require the second-order to win [Smith,M] |
| Full Idea: Even if we assume that reason prefers harmony between first- and second-order desires, there is no reason to assume that reason is on the side of achieving that harmony by changing first-order desires to suit second-order, rather than vice versa. | |
| From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 5.7) | |
| A reaction: [Smith is discussing David Lewis 1989 on second-order desires] Smith says that on the Humean view the rational winner should simply be the stronger of the two. Since this sounds like an endorsement for weakness of will, Smith relies on beliefs. |
| 23746 | Objective reasons to act might be the systematic desires of a fully rational person [Smith,M] |
| Full Idea: One way to decide what we have normative reasons to do …is by trying to find a set of desires that is systematically justifiable, which is our best assessment of the desires we would have under conditions of full rationality. | |
| From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 5.9) | |
| A reaction: This is Smith accepting the Humean view that desires are essential for motivation, but trying to find a marriage of desires with reason to produce the more objective aspects of morality. An interesting aspiration… |
| 23733 | Motivating reasons are psychological, while normative reasons are external [Smith,M] |
| Full Idea: There are motivating reasons for action, which are psychological states, and normative reasons, which are propositions of the general form 'a person's doing this is desirable or required'. | |
| From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 4.2) | |
| A reaction: Motivating reasons are locatable entities in minds, whereas normative reasons are either abstract, or perhaps motivating reasons expressed by other people. Smith says the two types are unconnected. |
| 23740 | Humeans take maximising desire satisfaction as the normative reasons for actions [Smith,M] |
| Full Idea: The distinctive Humean view of normative reasons for action is that the rational thing for an agent to do is simply to act so as to maximally satisfy her desires, whatever the content of those desires. | |
| From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 5.1) | |
| A reaction: Smith disagrees with this view (though he agrees with Hume about motivating reasons). An obvious problem for the Humean view would be a strong desire to do something excessively dangerous. |
| 23745 | We cannot expect even fully rational people to converge on having the same desires for action [Smith,M] |
| Full Idea: We cannot expect that, even under conditions of full rationality, agents would all converge on the same desires about what is to be done in the various circumstances they might face. | |
| From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 5.9) | |
| A reaction: A very good argument in favour of the Humean view that desires are an essential part of moral motivation. Possible convergence of view is a standard hallmark of communal rationality. |
| 9228 | Ranking order of desires reveals nothing, because none of them may be considered important [Frankfurt] |
| Full Idea: Ranking desires in order of preference is no help, because a person who wants one thing more than another may not regard the former as any more important to him than the latter. | |
| From: Harry G. Frankfurt (The Reasons of Love [2005], 1.5) | |
| A reaction: A salutary warning. Someone may pursue something with incredible intensity, but only to stave off a boring and empty existence. The only way I can think of to assess what really matters to people is - to ask them! |
| 23731 | 'Externalists' say moral judgements are not reasons, and maybe not even motives [Smith,M] |
| Full Idea: The 'externalist' view of morality says either that judgements of rightness are motives but not reasons, or (more strongly) that they are neither, meaning that moral judgements do not have practical implications. | |
| From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 3.1) | |
| A reaction: [Philippa Foot's untypical 1972 article is cited for the strong view. Hare and Blackburn are typical of the first view]. I would say that such judgements are both reasons and motives - but not necessarily for me! 'Someone should do something about this!'. |
| 23732 | A person could make a moral judgement without being in any way motivated by it [Smith,M] |
| Full Idea: Amoralists make moral judgements without being motivated accordingly, and without suffering any sort of practical irrationality either; the practicality requirement of moral judgement is thus false. | |
| From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 3.3) | |
| A reaction: It is hard to imagine an immoralist with this nihilistic attitude bothering to make any moral judgements at all. Why would someone indifferent to art make aesthetic judgements? What could a 'judgement of rightness' mean to an amoralist? |
| 9238 | Morality isn't based on reason; moral indignation is quite unlike disapproval of irrationality [Frankfurt] |
| Full Idea: The ultimate warrant for moral principles cannot be found in reason. The sort of opprobrium that attaches to moral transgressions is quite unlike the sort of opprobrium that attaches to the requirements of reason. | |
| From: Harry G. Frankfurt (The Reasons of Love [2005], 2.5 n6) | |
| A reaction: More like a piece of evidence than a proper argument. We may not feel indignant if someone fails a maths exam, but we might if they mess up the arithmetic of our bank account, even though they meant well. |
| 23729 | Moral internalism says a judgement of rightness is thereby motivating [Smith,M] |
| Full Idea: Moral 'internalism' says if an agent judges an action as right in some circumstance, then they are either thereby motivated to do it, or they are irrational (e.g. their will is weak). | |
| From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 3.1) | |
| A reaction: [Somewhat reworded] So the motivation comes from an internal judgement, not from external factors. Is it not tautological that 'this is the right thing to do' means it should be done (ceteris paribus)? |
| 23730 | 'Rationalism' says the rightness of an action is a reason to perform it [Smith,M] |
| Full Idea: Moral 'rationalism' says if an action is right for agents in some circumstances, then there is a reason for the agents to do it. | |
| From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 3.1) | |
| A reaction: That is, there is not merely a motivation to act (the 'internalist' view), but there is a reason to act. Smith calls both views the 'practicality requirement' of normal moral judgements. Smith defends the rationalist view. |
| 23727 | Expressivists count attitudes as 'moral' if they concern features of things, rather than their mere existence [Smith,M] |
| Full Idea: The pro- and con- attitudes of the expressivists count as 'moral' only if they are had towards particular people, actions or states of affairs in virtue of their natural features, ….rather than in virtue of being the particulars that they are. | |
| From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 2.4) | |
| A reaction: So whereas emotivists don't have to have any reasons for their moral feelings, other expressivists seem to require reasons (i.e. indicating features of things) to endorse their attitudes. What of reasonless emotionless attitudes? |
| 23741 | Is valuing something a matter of believing or a matter of desiring? [Smith,M] |
| Full Idea: What is it to value something? That is, equivalently, what is it to accept that we have a normative reason to do something? In Hume's terms, is it a matter of believing? Or is it a matter of desiring? We seem to face a dilemma. | |
| From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 5.4) | |
| A reaction: Smith is discussing moral motivation, and there is obviously more to valuing something than acting on it. Nice question, though. Personally I value St Paul's Cathedral, but I don't desire it. I value heart surgeons, but don't want to emulate them. |
| 9232 | It is by caring about things that we infuse the world with importance [Frankfurt] |
| Full Idea: It is by caring about things that we infuse the world with importance. | |
| From: Harry G. Frankfurt (The Reasons of Love [2005], 1.10) | |
| A reaction: This book is a lovely attempt at getting to the heart of where values come from. 'Football isn't a matter of life and death; it's more important than that' - Bill Shankly (manager of Liverpool). Frankfurt is right. |
| 9234 | If you don't care about at least one thing, you can't find reasons to care about anything [Frankfurt] |
| Full Idea: It is not possible for a person who does not already care at least about something to discover reasons for caring about anything. | |
| From: Harry G. Frankfurt (The Reasons of Love [2005], 1.11) | |
| A reaction: This is the key idea of this lovely book. Without a glimmer of love somewhere, it is not possible to bootstrap a meaningful life. The glimmer of caring about one thing is transferable. See the Ancient Mariner and the watersnake. |
| 9229 | What is worthwhile for its own sake alone may be worth very little [Frankfurt] |
| Full Idea: What is worth having or worth doing for its own sake alone may nonetheless be worth very little. | |
| From: Harry G. Frankfurt (The Reasons of Love [2005], 1.5) | |
| A reaction: That is one of my cherished notions sunk without trace! Aristotle's idea that ends are what matter, not means, always struck me as crucial. But Frankfurt is right. Collecting trivia is done for its own sake. Great tasks are performed as a means. |
| 9233 | Our criteria for evaluating how to live offer an answer to the problem [Frankfurt] |
| Full Idea: Identifying the criteria to be employed in evaluating various ways of living is also tantamount to providing an answer to the question of how to live. | |
| From: Harry G. Frankfurt (The Reasons of Love [2005], 1.10) | |
| A reaction: Presumably critical reflection is still possible about those criteria, even though he implies that they just arise out of you (in a rather Nietzschean way). The fear is that critical reflection on basic criteria kills in infant in its cradle. |
| 9235 | Rather than loving things because we value them, I think we value things because we love them [Frankfurt] |
| Full Idea: It is often understood that we begin loving things because we are struck by their value. ..However, what I have in mind is rather that what we love necessarily acquires value for us because we love it. | |
| From: Harry G. Frankfurt (The Reasons of Love [2005], 2.3) | |
| A reaction: The uneasy thought here is that this makes value much less rational. If you love because you value, you could probably give reasons for the value. If love comes first it must be instinctive. He says he loved his children before they were born. |
| 9236 | Love can be cool, and it may not involve liking its object [Frankfurt] |
| Full Idea: It is not among the defining features of love that it must be hot rather than cool, ..and nor is it essential that a person like what he loves. | |
| From: Harry G. Frankfurt (The Reasons of Love [2005], 2.4) | |
| A reaction: An interesting pair of observations. The greatness of love would probably be measured by length, or by sacrifice. Extreme heat makes us a little suspicious. It would be hard to love something that was actually disliked. |
| 9237 | The paradigm case of pure love is not romantic, but that between parents and infants [Frankfurt] |
| Full Idea: Relationships that are primarily romantic or sexual do not provide very authentic or illuminating paradigms of love. ...The love of parents for their small children comes closest to offering recognizably pure instances of love. | |
| From: Harry G. Frankfurt (The Reasons of Love [2005], 2.4) | |
| A reaction: Excellent. Though perhaps a relationships which began romantically might settle into something like the more 'pure' love that he has in mind. Such a relationship must, I trust, be possible between adults. |
| 9239 | I value my children for their sake, but I also value my love for them for its own sake [Frankfurt] |
| Full Idea: Beside the fact that my children are important to me for their own sakes, there is the additional fact that loving my children is important to me for its own sake. | |
| From: Harry G. Frankfurt (The Reasons of Love [2005], 2.7) | |
| A reaction: This is at the heart of Frankfurt's thesis, that love is the bedrock of our values in life, and we therefore all need to love in order to generate any values in our life, quite apart from what our love is directed at. Nice thought. |
| 9227 | We might not choose a very moral life, if the character or constitution was deficient [Frankfurt] |
| Full Idea: People who are scrupulously moral may nonetheless be destined by deficiencies of character or of constitution to lead lives that no reasonable person would freely choose. | |
| From: Harry G. Frankfurt (The Reasons of Love [2005], 1.2) | |
| A reaction: This fairly firmly refutes any Greek dream that all there is to happiness is leading a virtuous life. Frankfurt is with Aristotle more than with the Stoics. It would be tempting to sacrifice virtue to get a sunny character and good health. |
| 9230 | People want to fulfill their desires, but also for their desires to be sustained [Frankfurt] |
| Full Idea: Besides wanting to fulfil his desire, the person who cares about what he desires wants something else as well: he wants the desire to be sustained. | |
| From: Harry G. Frankfurt (The Reasons of Love [2005], 1.6) | |
| A reaction: Plato, in 'Gorgias', makes this fact sound like a nightmare, resembling drug addiction, but in Frankfurt's formulation it looks like a good thing. If you want to make your family happy because you love them, you would dread finding your love had died. |
| 9241 | Loving oneself is not a failing, but is essential to a successful life [Frankfurt] |
| Full Idea: Far from demonstrating a flaw in character or being a sign of weakness, coming to love oneself is the deepest and most essential - and by no means the most readily attainable - achievement of a serious and successful life. | |
| From: Harry G. Frankfurt (The Reasons of Love [2005], 2.14) | |
| A reaction: Obviously it will be necessary to dilineate the healthy form of self-love, which Frankfurt attempts to do. Ruthless vanity and self-seeking certainly look like the worst possible weaknesses of character. With that proviso, he is right. |
| 9300 | Boredom is serious, not just uncomfortable; it threatens our psychic survival [Frankfurt] |
| Full Idea: Boredom is a serious matter. It is not a condition that we seek to avoid just because we do not find it enjoyable. ..It threatens the very continuation of conscious mental life. ..Avoiding bored is a primitive urge for psychic survival. | |
| From: Harry G. Frankfurt (The Reasons of Love [2005], 2.8) | |
| A reaction: Presumably nihilism will flood into the emptiness created by boredom. Frankfurt will see it as a lack of love for anything in your life, and hence an absence of value. Frankfurt is very good. |
| 9231 | Freedom needs autonomy (rather than causal independence) - embracing our own desires and choices [Frankfurt] |
| Full Idea: What counts as far as freedom goes is not causal independence, but autonomy. It is a matter of whether we are active rather than passive in our motives and choices, whether those are what we really want, and not alien to us. | |
| From: Harry G. Frankfurt (The Reasons of Love [2005], 1.8) | |
| A reaction: This is why setting your own targets is excellent, but having targets set for you by authorities is pernicious. These kind of principles need to be clear before any plausible theory of liberalism can be developed. |