Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Isagoge ('Introduction')', 'The Reasons of Love' and 'The Need for Roots'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


38 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
Truth is not a object we love - it is the radiant manifestation of reality [Weil]
     Full Idea: Love of truth is not a correct form of expression. Truth is not an object of love. It is not an object at all. …Truth is the radiant manifestation of reality.
     From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], III 'Growing')
     A reaction: Wow! Love that one!
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
Creation produced a network or web of determinations [Weil]
     Full Idea: What is sovereign in this world is determinateness, limit. Eternal Wisdom imprisons this universe in a network, a web of determinations.
     From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], III 'Growth')
     A reaction: Love this, because I take 'determination' to be the defining relationship in ontology. It covers both physical causation and abstract necessities.
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
Are genera and species real or conceptual? bodies or incorporeal? in sensibles or separate from them? [Porphyry]
     Full Idea: I shall beg off talking of a) whether genera and species are real or situated in bare thoughts alone, b) whether as real they are bodies or incorporeals, and c) whether they are separated or in sensibles and have their reality in connection with them.
     From: Porphyry (Isagoge ('Introduction') [c.295], (2))
     A reaction: This passage, picking up on Aristotle, seems to be the original source that grew into the medievel debate about universals. It seems to rather neatly lay out the agenda for the universals debate which is still with us.
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 9. Normative Necessity
Love creates a necessity concerning what to care about [Frankfurt]
     Full Idea: The necessity with which love binds the will puts an end to indecisiveness concerning what to care about.
     From: Harry G. Frankfurt (The Reasons of Love [2005], 2.13)
     A reaction: I put this here as a reminder that there may be more to necessity than the dry concept of metaphysicians and logicians. 'Why did you rescue that man first?' 'Because I love him'. Kit Fine recognises many sorts of necessity.
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
The aesthete's treatment of beauty as amusement is sacreligious; beauty should nourish [Weil]
     Full Idea: The aesthete's point of view is sacreligious, not only in matters of religion but even in those of art. It consists in amusing oneself with beauty by handling it and looking at it. Beauty is something to be eaten: it is a food.
     From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], II 'Country')
     A reaction: She is endorsing the 'food' view against the 'handling' view. Beauty should nourish, she says.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
Ranking order of desires reveals nothing, because none of them may be considered important [Frankfurt]
     Full Idea: Ranking desires in order of preference is no help, because a person who wants one thing more than another may not regard the former as any more important to him than the latter.
     From: Harry G. Frankfurt (The Reasons of Love [2005], 1.5)
     A reaction: A salutary warning. Someone may pursue something with incredible intensity, but only to stave off a boring and empty existence. The only way I can think of to assess what really matters to people is - to ask them!
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / a. Idealistic ethics
Beauty is the proof of what is good [Weil]
     Full Idea: When the subject in question is the good, beauty is a rigorous and positive proof.
     From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], III 'Growing')
     A reaction: Purest platonism! It is incomprehensible to say 'this thing is evil, but it is beautiful'. But there are plenty of things which strike me as beautiful, without connecting that in any way to moral goodness.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Morality isn't based on reason; moral indignation is quite unlike disapproval of irrationality [Frankfurt]
     Full Idea: The ultimate warrant for moral principles cannot be found in reason. The sort of opprobrium that attaches to moral transgressions is quite unlike the sort of opprobrium that attaches to the requirements of reason.
     From: Harry G. Frankfurt (The Reasons of Love [2005], 2.5 n6)
     A reaction: More like a piece of evidence than a proper argument. We may not feel indignant if someone fails a maths exam, but we might if they mess up the arithmetic of our bank account, even though they meant well.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
If you don't care about at least one thing, you can't find reasons to care about anything [Frankfurt]
     Full Idea: It is not possible for a person who does not already care at least about something to discover reasons for caring about anything.
     From: Harry G. Frankfurt (The Reasons of Love [2005], 1.11)
     A reaction: This is the key idea of this lovely book. Without a glimmer of love somewhere, it is not possible to bootstrap a meaningful life. The glimmer of caring about one thing is transferable. See the Ancient Mariner and the watersnake.
It is by caring about things that we infuse the world with importance [Frankfurt]
     Full Idea: It is by caring about things that we infuse the world with importance.
     From: Harry G. Frankfurt (The Reasons of Love [2005], 1.10)
     A reaction: This book is a lovely attempt at getting to the heart of where values come from. 'Football isn't a matter of life and death; it's more important than that' - Bill Shankly (manager of Liverpool). Frankfurt is right.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
Our criteria for evaluating how to live offer an answer to the problem [Frankfurt]
     Full Idea: Identifying the criteria to be employed in evaluating various ways of living is also tantamount to providing an answer to the question of how to live.
     From: Harry G. Frankfurt (The Reasons of Love [2005], 1.10)
     A reaction: Presumably critical reflection is still possible about those criteria, even though he implies that they just arise out of you (in a rather Nietzschean way). The fear is that critical reflection on basic criteria kills in infant in its cradle.
What is worthwhile for its own sake alone may be worth very little [Frankfurt]
     Full Idea: What is worth having or worth doing for its own sake alone may nonetheless be worth very little.
     From: Harry G. Frankfurt (The Reasons of Love [2005], 1.5)
     A reaction: That is one of my cherished notions sunk without trace! Aristotle's idea that ends are what matter, not means, always struck me as crucial. But Frankfurt is right. Collecting trivia is done for its own sake. Great tasks are performed as a means.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Rather than loving things because we value them, I think we value things because we love them [Frankfurt]
     Full Idea: It is often understood that we begin loving things because we are struck by their value. ..However, what I have in mind is rather that what we love necessarily acquires value for us because we love it.
     From: Harry G. Frankfurt (The Reasons of Love [2005], 2.3)
     A reaction: The uneasy thought here is that this makes value much less rational. If you love because you value, you could probably give reasons for the value. If love comes first it must be instinctive. He says he loved his children before they were born.
The paradigm case of pure love is not romantic, but that between parents and infants [Frankfurt]
     Full Idea: Relationships that are primarily romantic or sexual do not provide very authentic or illuminating paradigms of love. ...The love of parents for their small children comes closest to offering recognizably pure instances of love.
     From: Harry G. Frankfurt (The Reasons of Love [2005], 2.4)
     A reaction: Excellent. Though perhaps a relationships which began romantically might settle into something like the more 'pure' love that he has in mind. Such a relationship must, I trust, be possible between adults.
I value my children for their sake, but I also value my love for them for its own sake [Frankfurt]
     Full Idea: Beside the fact that my children are important to me for their own sakes, there is the additional fact that loving my children is important to me for its own sake.
     From: Harry G. Frankfurt (The Reasons of Love [2005], 2.7)
     A reaction: This is at the heart of Frankfurt's thesis, that love is the bedrock of our values in life, and we therefore all need to love in order to generate any values in our life, quite apart from what our love is directed at. Nice thought.
Love can be cool, and it may not involve liking its object [Frankfurt]
     Full Idea: It is not among the defining features of love that it must be hot rather than cool, ..and nor is it essential that a person like what he loves.
     From: Harry G. Frankfurt (The Reasons of Love [2005], 2.4)
     A reaction: An interesting pair of observations. The greatness of love would probably be measured by length, or by sacrifice. Extreme heat makes us a little suspicious. It would be hard to love something that was actually disliked.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
We might not choose a very moral life, if the character or constitution was deficient [Frankfurt]
     Full Idea: People who are scrupulously moral may nonetheless be destined by deficiencies of character or of constitution to lead lives that no reasonable person would freely choose.
     From: Harry G. Frankfurt (The Reasons of Love [2005], 1.2)
     A reaction: This fairly firmly refutes any Greek dream that all there is to happiness is leading a virtuous life. Frankfurt is with Aristotle more than with the Stoics. It would be tempting to sacrifice virtue to get a sunny character and good health.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure
People want to fulfill their desires, but also for their desires to be sustained [Frankfurt]
     Full Idea: Besides wanting to fulfil his desire, the person who cares about what he desires wants something else as well: he wants the desire to be sustained.
     From: Harry G. Frankfurt (The Reasons of Love [2005], 1.6)
     A reaction: Plato, in 'Gorgias', makes this fact sound like a nightmare, resembling drug addiction, but in Frankfurt's formulation it looks like a good thing. If you want to make your family happy because you love them, you would dread finding your love had died.
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
Loving oneself is not a failing, but is essential to a successful life [Frankfurt]
     Full Idea: Far from demonstrating a flaw in character or being a sign of weakness, coming to love oneself is the deepest and most essential - and by no means the most readily attainable - achievement of a serious and successful life.
     From: Harry G. Frankfurt (The Reasons of Love [2005], 2.14)
     A reaction: Obviously it will be necessary to dilineate the healthy form of self-love, which Frankfurt attempts to do. Ruthless vanity and self-seeking certainly look like the worst possible weaknesses of character. With that proviso, he is right.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / h. Respect
Respect is our only obligation, which can only be expressed through deeds, not words [Weil]
     Full Idea: Humans have only one obligation: respect. The obligation is only performed if the respect is effectively expressed in a real, not a fictitious, way; and this can only be done through the medium of Man's earthly needs.
     From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], I 'Needs')
     A reaction: She says man's 'eternal destiny' imposes this obligation. I read this as saying that you should not imagine that you treat people respectfully if you are merely polite to them. Col. Pickering and Eliza Doolittle! Respect is the supreme virtue.
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
Boredom is serious, not just uncomfortable; it threatens our psychic survival [Frankfurt]
     Full Idea: Boredom is a serious matter. It is not a condition that we seek to avoid just because we do not find it enjoyable. ..It threatens the very continuation of conscious mental life. ..Avoiding bored is a primitive urge for psychic survival.
     From: Harry G. Frankfurt (The Reasons of Love [2005], 2.8)
     A reaction: Presumably nihilism will flood into the emptiness created by boredom. Frankfurt will see it as a lack of love for anything in your life, and hence an absence of value. Frankfurt is very good.
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / b. The natural life
The most important human need is to have multiple roots [Weil]
     Full Idea: To be rooted is perhaps the most important and least recognised need of the human soul. …Every human being needs to have multiple roots.
     From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], II 'Uprootedness')
     A reaction: Agree. I think we are just like trees, in that we need roots to grow well, and plenty of space to fully flourish. Identifying those roots is the main task of parents and teachers.
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
The need for order stands above all others, and is understood via the other needs [Weil]
     Full Idea: Order is the first need of all; it evens stands above all needs properly so-called. To be able to conceive it we must know what the other needs are.
     From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], I 'Order')
     A reaction: This may be music to conservative ears, but you should examine Weil's other ideas to see what she has in mind.
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights
Obligations only bind individuals, not collectives [Weil]
     Full Idea: Obligations are only binding on human beings. There are no obligations for collectivities, as such.
     From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], I 'Needs')
     A reaction: I take it that 'as such' excludes the institutions created by collectivities, such as parliaments and courts. A nomadic tribe seems to have no duties, as a tribe, apart from mutual obligations among its members. Does this excuse crimes by the tribe?
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
A citizen should be able to understand the whole of society [Weil]
     Full Idea: A man needs to be able to encompass in thought the entire range of activity of the social organism to which he belongs.
     From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], I 'Responsibility')
     A reaction: She is urging the active involvement of citizens in decision making - for which they need appropriate knowledge.
Even the poorest should feel collective ownership, and participation in grand display [Weil]
     Full Idea: Participation in collective possessions is important. Where real civic life exists, each feels he has a personal ownership in the public monuments, gardens, ceremonial pomp and circumstances; sumptuousness is thus place within the reach of the poorest.
     From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], I 'Collective')
     A reaction: OK with gardens. Dubious about fobbing the poor off with pomp. Monuments are a modern controversy, when they turn out to commemorate slavery and colonial conquest. I agree with her basic thought.
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 5. Culture
Culture is an instrument for creating an ongoing succession of teachers [Weil]
     Full Idea: Culture - as we know it - is an instrument manipulated by teachers for manufacturing more teachers, who, in their turn, will manufacture still more teachers.
     From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], II 'Towns')
     A reaction: Lot of truth in this. We tend to view our greatest successes in students who become academics and teachers. Culture is very much seen as something which must be 'transmitted' to each new generation.
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / b. Monarchy
A lifelong head of society should only be a symbol, not a ruler [Weil]
     Full Idea: Wherever a man is placed for life at the head of a social organism, he ought to be a symbol and not a ruler, as is the case with the King of England.
     From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], I 'Obedience')
     A reaction: Nice to hear a radical French thinker endorsing an ancient British tradition! She may not be endorsing a lifelong head of state. Lifelong rulers are the main agents of totalitarianism.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / f. Against democracy
Party politics in a democracy can't avoid an anti-democratic party [Weil]
     Full Idea: A democracy where public life is made up of strife between political parties is incapable of preventing the formation of a party whose avowed aim is the overthrow of that democracy.
     From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], I 'Opinion')
     A reaction: We have seen this around 2020 in the USA and the UK. Freedom is compulsory? Weil hates political parties (as did Rousseau).
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 8. Socialism
Socialism tends to make a proletariat of the whole population [Weil]
     Full Idea: What is called Socialism tends to force everybody without distinction into the proletarian condition.
     From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], II 'Towns')
     A reaction: For example, Weil favours maximising private house ownership, rather than communally owned housing. She is describing wholesale nationalisation. I would incline towards nationalisation only of all basic central services.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 11. Capitalism
The capitalists neglect the people and the nation, and even their own interests [Weil]
     Full Idea: The capitalists have betrayed their calling by criminally neglecting not only the interests of the people, not only those of the nation, but even their own.
     From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], II 'Towns')
     A reaction: It is certainly true that the dedicated capitalist has little loyalty either to the people or to the nation. She doesn't spell out their failure of self-interest. I guess it produces a way of life they don't really want, deep down.
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
Freedom needs autonomy (rather than causal independence) - embracing our own desires and choices [Frankfurt]
     Full Idea: What counts as far as freedom goes is not causal independence, but autonomy. It is a matter of whether we are active rather than passive in our motives and choices, whether those are what we really want, and not alien to us.
     From: Harry G. Frankfurt (The Reasons of Love [2005], 1.8)
     A reaction: This is why setting your own targets is excellent, but having targets set for you by authorities is pernicious. These kind of principles need to be clear before any plausible theory of liberalism can be developed.
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
By making money the sole human measure, inequality has become universal [Weil]
     Full Idea: By making money the sole, or almost the sole, motive of all actions, the sole, or almost the sole, measure of all things, the poison of inequality has been introduced everywhere.
     From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], I 'Equality')
     A reaction: Presumably this dates right back to the invention of money, and then increases with the endless rise of capitalism.
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
People have duties, and only have rights because of the obligations of others to them [Weil]
     Full Idea: A right is effectual only in relation to its corresponding obligation, springing not from the individual who possesses it, but from others who consider themselves under an obligation to him. In isolation a man only has duties, and only others have rights.
     From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], I 'Needs')
     A reaction: This seems correct, and obviously refutes the idea that people have intrinsic natural rights. However, it may be our sense of what nature requires which gives rise to the obligations we feel towards others.
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / a. Right to punish
To punish people we must ourselves be innocent - but that undermines the desire to punish [Weil]
     Full Idea: In order to have the right to punish the guilty, we ought first of all to purify ourselves of their crimes. …But once this is accomplished we shall no longer feel the least desire to punish, or as little as possible and with extreme sorrow.
     From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], III 'Growing')
     A reaction: Elsewhere she endorses punishment, as a social necessity, and a redemption for the wicked. This idea looks like a bit of a change of heart. She may be thinking of Jesus on the mote in someone's eye.
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / d. Non-combatants
The soldier-civilian distinction should be abolished; every citizen is committed to a war [Weil]
     Full Idea: The distinction between soldiers and civilians, which the pressure of circumstances has already almost obliterated, should be entirely abolished. Every individual in the population owes his country the whole of his strength, resources and life itself.
     From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], II 'Nation')
     A reaction: Written in London in 1943. The year carpet bombing seriously escalated. The facts of warfare can change the ethics.
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / a. Aims of education
Education is essentially motivation [Weil]
     Full Idea: Education - whether its object be children or adults, individuals or an entire people, or even oneself - consists in creating motives.
     From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], III 'Growing')
     A reaction: I can't disagree. Intellectual motivation is simply what we find interesting, and there is no formula for that. A teacher can teach a good session, and only 5% of the pupils find it interesting. A bad session could be life-changing for one student.
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
Religion should quietly suffuse all human life with its light [Weil]
     Full Idea: The proper function of religion is to suffuse with its light all secular life, public or private, without in any way dominating it.
     From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], II 'Nation')
     A reaction: Even for the non-religious there is something attractive about some view of the world which 'suffuses our lives with light'. It probably describes medieval Christendom, but that contained an awful lot of darkness.