Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Isagoge ('Introduction')', 'Principles of Theoretical Logic' and 'Does Consciousness Exist?'

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4 ideas

4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 1. Predicate Calculus PC
17750 The first clear proof of the consistency of the first order predicate logic was in 1928 [Hilbert/Ackermann, by Walicki]
     Full Idea: The first clear proof of the consistency of the first order predicate logic is found in the 1928 book of Hilbert and Ackermann.
     From: report of Hilbert,D/Ackermann,W (Principles of Theoretical Logic [1928]) by Michal Walicki - Introduction to Mathematical Logic History E.2.1
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
15034 Are genera and species real or conceptual? bodies or incorporeal? in sensibles or separate from them? [Porphyry]
     Full Idea: I shall beg off talking of a) whether genera and species are real or situated in bare thoughts alone, b) whether as real they are bodies or incorporeals, and c) whether they are separated or in sensibles and have their reality in connection with them.
     From: Porphyry (Isagoge ('Introduction') [c.295], (2))
     A reaction: This passage, picking up on Aristotle, seems to be the original source that grew into the medievel debate about universals. It seems to rather neatly lay out the agenda for the universals debate which is still with us.
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
9286 Consciousness is not a stuff, but is explained by the relations between experiences [James]
     Full Idea: Consciousness connotes a kind of external relation, and not a special stuff or way of being. The peculiarity of our experiences, that they not only are, but are known, is best explained by their relations to one another, the relations being experiences.
     From: William James (Does Consciousness Exist? [1904], §3)
     A reaction: This view has suddenly caught people's interest. It might be better than the higher/lower relationship, which seems to leave the basic problem untouched. Does a whole network of relations between experiences gradually 'add up' to consciousness?
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
9285 'Consciousness' is a nonentity, a mere echo of the disappearing 'soul' [James]
     Full Idea: 'Consciousness' is the name of a nonentity. ..Those who cling to it are clinging to a mere echo, the faint rumour left behind by the disappearing 'soul' upon the air of philosophy. ..I deny that it stands for an entity, but it does stand for a function.
     From: William James (Does Consciousness Exist? [1904], Intro)
     A reaction: This kind of view is often treated as being preposterous, but I think it is correct. No one is denying the phenomenology, but it is the ontology which is at stake. Either you are a substance dualist, or mind must be eliminated as an 'entity'.