Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Isagoge ('Introduction')', 'Frege's Distinction of Sense and Reference' and 'Quine on Quantifying In'

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5 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form

12220	Is it the sentence-token or the sentence-type that has a logical form? [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: Do we attribute a logical form to a sentence token because it is a token of a type with that form, or do we attribute a logical form to a sentence type because it is a type of a token with that form?
	From: Kit Fine (Quine on Quantifying In [1990], p.110)
	A reaction: Since I believe in propositions (as the unambiguous thought that lies behind a sentence), I take it that logical form concerns propositions, though strict logicians don't like this, for fear that logic spills into psychology.

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive

9182	Ancient names like 'Obadiah' depend on tradition, not on where the name originated [Dummett]
	Full Idea: In the case of 'Obadiah', associated only with one act of writing a prophecy, ..it is the tradition which connects our use of the name with the man; where the actual name itself first came from has little to do with it.
	From: Michael Dummett (Frege's Distinction of Sense and Reference [1975], p.256)
	A reaction: Excellent. This seems to me a much more accurate account of reference than the notion of a baptism. In the case of 'Homer', whether someone was ever baptised thus is of no importance to us. The tradition is everything. Also Shakespeare.

5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification

12222	Substitutional quantification is referential quantification over expressions [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: Substitutional quantification may be regarded as referential quantification over expressions.
	From: Kit Fine (Quine on Quantifying In [1990], p.124)
	A reaction: This is an illuminating gloss. Does such quantification involve some ontological commitment to expressions? I feel an infinite regress looming.

8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals

15034	Are genera and species real or conceptual? bodies or incorporeal? in sensibles or separate from them? [Porphyry]
	Full Idea: I shall beg off talking of a) whether genera and species are real or situated in bare thoughts alone, b) whether as real they are bodies or incorporeals, and c) whether they are separated or in sensibles and have their reality in connection with them.
	From: Porphyry (Isagoge ('Introduction') [c.295], (2))
	A reaction: This passage, picking up on Aristotle, seems to be the original source that grew into the medievel debate about universals. It seems to rather neatly lay out the agenda for the universals debate which is still with us.

19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference

9181	The causal theory of reference can't distinguish just hearing a name from knowing its use [Dummett]
	Full Idea: The causal theory of reference, in a full-blown form, makes it impossible to distinguish between knowing the use of a proper name and simply having heard the name and recognising it as a name.
	From: Michael Dummett (Frege's Distinction of Sense and Reference [1975], p.254)
	A reaction: None of these things are all-or-nothing. I have an inkling of how to use it once I realise it is a name. Of course you could be causally connected to a name and not even realise that it was a name, so something more is needed.