Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Isagoge ('Introduction')', 'Causality: Reductionism versus Realism' and 'An Axiomatization of Set Theory'

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5 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / f. Limitation of Size
Limitation of Size is not self-evident, and seems too strong [Lavine on Neumann]
     Full Idea: Von Neumann's Limitation of Size axiom is not self-evident, and he himself admitted that it seemed too strong.
     From: comment on John von Neumann (An Axiomatization of Set Theory [1925]) by Shaughan Lavine - Understanding the Infinite VII.1
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
All the axioms for mathematics presuppose set theory [Neumann]
     Full Idea: There is no axiom system for mathematics, geometry, and so forth that does not presuppose set theory.
     From: John von Neumann (An Axiomatization of Set Theory [1925]), quoted by Stewart Shapiro - Foundations without Foundationalism 8.2
     A reaction: Von Neumann was doubting whether set theory could have axioms, and hence the whole project is doomed, and we face relativism about such things. His ally was Skolem in this.
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
Are genera and species real or conceptual? bodies or incorporeal? in sensibles or separate from them? [Porphyry]
     Full Idea: I shall beg off talking of a) whether genera and species are real or situated in bare thoughts alone, b) whether as real they are bodies or incorporeals, and c) whether they are separated or in sensibles and have their reality in connection with them.
     From: Porphyry (Isagoge ('Introduction') [c.295], (2))
     A reaction: This passage, picking up on Aristotle, seems to be the original source that grew into the medievel debate about universals. It seems to rather neatly lay out the agenda for the universals debate which is still with us.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
Reductionists can't explain accidents, uninstantiated laws, probabilities, or the existence of any laws [Tooley]
     Full Idea: Reductionist accounts of causation cannot distinguish laws from accidental uniformities, cannot allow for basic uninstantiated laws, can't explain probabilistic laws, and cannot even demonstrate the existence of laws.
     From: Michael Tooley (Causality: Reductionism versus Realism [1990], 2)
     A reaction: I am tempted to say that this is so much the worse for the idea of laws. Extensive regularities only occur for a reason. Probabilities aren't laws. Hypothetical facts will cover uninstantiated laws. Laws are just patterns.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / e. Probabilistic causation
Quantum physics suggests that the basic laws of nature are probabilistic [Tooley]
     Full Idea: Quantum physics seems to lend strong support to the idea that the basic laws of nature may well be probabilistic.
     From: Michael Tooley (Causality: Reductionism versus Realism [1990], 3.2.1)
     A reaction: Groan. Quantum physics should be outlawed from all philosophical discussions. The scientists don't understand it themselves. I'm certainly not going to build my worldview on it. I don't accept that these probabilities could count as 'laws'.