5 ideas
9935 | Mathematical truth is always compromising between ordinary language and sensible epistemology [Benacerraf] |
Full Idea: Most accounts of the concept of mathematical truth can be identified with serving one or another of either semantic theory (matching it to ordinary language), or with epistemology (meshing with a reasonable view) - always at the expense of the other. | |
From: Paul Benacerraf (Mathematical Truth [1973], Intro) | |
A reaction: The gist is that language pulls you towards platonism, and epistemology pulls you towards empiricism. He argues that the semantics must give ground. He's right. |
17927 | Realists have semantics without epistemology, anti-realists epistemology but bad semantics [Benacerraf, by Colyvan] |
Full Idea: Benacerraf argues that realists about mathematical objects have a nice normal semantic but no epistemology, and anti-realists have a good epistemology but an unorthodox semantics. | |
From: report of Paul Benacerraf (Mathematical Truth [1973]) by Mark Colyvan - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mathematics 1.2 |
9936 | The platonist view of mathematics doesn't fit our epistemology very well [Benacerraf] |
Full Idea: The principle defect of the standard (platonist) account of mathematical truth is that it appears to violate the requirement that our account be susceptible to integration into our over-all account of knowledge. | |
From: Paul Benacerraf (Mathematical Truth [1973], III) | |
A reaction: Unfortunately he goes on to defend a causal theory of justification (fashionable at that time, but implausible now). Nevertheless, his general point is well made. Your theory of what mathematics is had better make it knowable. |
15034 | Are genera and species real or conceptual? bodies or incorporeal? in sensibles or separate from them? [Porphyry] |
Full Idea: I shall beg off talking of a) whether genera and species are real or situated in bare thoughts alone, b) whether as real they are bodies or incorporeals, and c) whether they are separated or in sensibles and have their reality in connection with them. | |
From: Porphyry (Isagoge ('Introduction') [c.295], (2)) | |
A reaction: This passage, picking up on Aristotle, seems to be the original source that grew into the medievel debate about universals. It seems to rather neatly lay out the agenda for the universals debate which is still with us. |
7517 | I could take a healthy infant and train it up to be any type of specialist I choose [Watson,JB] |
Full Idea: Give me a dozen healthy infants, and my own specified world to bring them up in, and I'll guarantee to take any one at random and train him to become any type of specialist I might select - doctor, artist, beggar, thief - regardless of his ancestry. | |
From: J.B. Watson (Behaviorism [1924], Ch.2), quoted by Steven Pinker - The Blank Slate | |
A reaction: This was a famous pronouncement rejecting the concept of human nature as in any way fixed - a total assertion of nurture over nature. Modern research seems to be suggesting that Watson is (alas?) wrong. |