3 ideas
| 10594 | Henkin semantics is more plausible for plural logic than for second-order logic [Maddy] |
| Full Idea: Henkin-style semantics seem to me more plausible for plural logic than for second-order logic. | |
| From: Penelope Maddy (Second Philosophy [2007], III.8 n1) | |
| A reaction: Henkin-style semantics are presented by Shapiro as the standard semantics for second-order logic. |
| 15034 | Are genera and species real or conceptual? bodies or incorporeal? in sensibles or separate from them? [Porphyry] |
| Full Idea: I shall beg off talking of a) whether genera and species are real or situated in bare thoughts alone, b) whether as real they are bodies or incorporeals, and c) whether they are separated or in sensibles and have their reality in connection with them. | |
| From: Porphyry (Isagoge ('Introduction') [c.295], (2)) | |
| A reaction: This passage, picking up on Aristotle, seems to be the original source that grew into the medievel debate about universals. It seems to rather neatly lay out the agenda for the universals debate which is still with us. |
| 16766 | One thing needs a single thing to unite it; if there were two forms, something must unite them [Aquinas] |
| Full Idea: One thing simpliciter is produced out of many actually existing things only if there is something uniting and tying them to each other. If Socrates were animal and rational by different forms, then to be united they would need something to make them one. | |
| From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones de anima [1269], 11c), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 25.2 | |
| A reaction: This is the reply to the idea that a single thing is just an interesting of many sortal essences. It presumes, of course, that a thing like a horse has something called 'unity'. |