Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Isagoge ('Introduction')', 'On Aristotle's 'Metaphysics'' and 'Causation in a Physical World'

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6 ideas

7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism

16655	Different genera are delimited by modes of predication, which rest on modes of being [Aquinas]
	Full Idea: Being is delimited into different genera in accord with different modes of predicating, which depend on different modes of being.
	From: Thomas Aquinas (On Aristotle's 'Metaphysics' [1266], V.9.890), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 12.3
	A reaction: I like this. When people say that predication is the way we divide things up, and go all linguistic-relativist about things, they forget how closely language not only describes reality, but arises out of, or is even caused by, reality. 'Grue' is silly.

8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals

15034	Are genera and species real or conceptual? bodies or incorporeal? in sensibles or separate from them? [Porphyry]
	Full Idea: I shall beg off talking of a) whether genera and species are real or situated in bare thoughts alone, b) whether as real they are bodies or incorporeals, and c) whether they are separated or in sensibles and have their reality in connection with them.
	From: Porphyry (Isagoge ('Introduction') [c.295], (2))
	A reaction: This passage, picking up on Aristotle, seems to be the original source that grew into the medievel debate about universals. It seems to rather neatly lay out the agenda for the universals debate which is still with us.

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation

8404	Explain single events by general rules, or vice versa, or probability explains both, or they are unconnected [Field,H]
	Full Idea: Some think singular causal claims should be explained in terms of general causal claims; some think the order should be reversed; some think a third thing (e.g. objective probability) will explain both; and some think they are only loosely connected.
	From: Hartry Field (Causation in a Physical World [2003], 2)
	A reaction: I think Ducasse gives the best account, which is the second option, of giving singular causal claims priority. Probability (Mellor) strikes me as a non-starter, and the idea that they are fairly independent seems rather implausible.

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation

8401	Physical laws are largely time-symmetric, so they make a poor basis for directional causation [Field,H]
	Full Idea: It is sometimes pointed out that (perhaps with a few minor exceptions) the fundamental physical laws are completely time-symmetric. If so, then if one is inclined to found causation on fundamental physical law, it isn't evident how directionality gets in.
	From: Hartry Field (Causation in a Physical World [2003], 1)
	A reaction: All my instincts tell me that causation is more fundamental than laws, and that directionality is there at the start. That, though, raises the nice question of how, if causation explains laws, the direction eventually gets left OUT!

8400	Identifying cause and effect is not just conventional; we explain later events by earlier ones [Field,H]
	Full Idea: It is not just that the earlier member of a cause-effect pair is conventionally called the cause; it is also connected with other temporal asymmetries that play an important role in our practices. We tend to explain later events in terms of earlier ones.
	From: Hartry Field (Causation in a Physical World [2003], 1)
	A reaction: We also interfere with the earlier one to affect the later one, and not vice versa (Idea 8363). I am inclined to think that attempting to explain the direction of causation is either pointless or hopeless.

8402	The only reason for adding the notion of 'cause' to fundamental physics is directionality [Field,H]
	Full Idea: Although it is true that the notion of 'cause' is not needed in fundamental physics, even statistical physics, still directionality considerations don't preclude this notion from being consistently added to fundamental physics.
	From: Hartry Field (Causation in a Physical World [2003], 1)
	A reaction: This only makes sense if the notion of cause already has directionality built into it, which I think is correct. The physicist might reply that they don't care about directionality, but the whole idea of an experiment seems to depend on it (Idea 8363).