Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Isagoge ('Introduction')', 'Essay on a Problem in the Doctrine of Chances' and 'Improvement of Understanding'

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4 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition

16541	All the intrinsic properties of a thing should be deducible from its definition [Spinoza]
	Full Idea: The definition of a thing should be such that all the properties of that thing, in so far as it is considered by itself, and not in conjunction with other things, can be deduced from it.
	From: Baruch de Spinoza (Improvement of Understanding [1675], p.35), quoted by E.J. Lowe - What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? 6
	A reaction: This is exactly what Locke requires of a real essence (though he is pessimistic about ever achieving it). Spinoza is talking of an Aristotelian real definition, which may be complex, and not a lexicographer's short verbal explication.

8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals

15034	Are genera and species real or conceptual? bodies or incorporeal? in sensibles or separate from them? [Porphyry]
	Full Idea: I shall beg off talking of a) whether genera and species are real or situated in bare thoughts alone, b) whether as real they are bodies or incorporeals, and c) whether they are separated or in sensibles and have their reality in connection with them.
	From: Porphyry (Isagoge ('Introduction') [c.295], (2))
	A reaction: This passage, picking up on Aristotle, seems to be the original source that grew into the medievel debate about universals. It seems to rather neatly lay out the agenda for the universals debate which is still with us.

14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem

14280	The probability of two events is the first probability times the second probability assuming the first [Bayes]
	Full Idea: The probability that two events will both happen is the probability of the first [multiplied by] the probability of the second on the supposition that the first happens.
	From: Thomas Bayes (Essay on a Problem in the Doctrine of Chances [1763]), quoted by Dorothy Edgington - Conditionals (Stanf) 3.1

14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence

13073	To understand the properties we must know the essence, as with a circle [Spinoza]
	Full Idea: If a circle is defined as a figure in which lines from centre to circumference are equal, such definitions do not explain the essence of a circle, but only a property. The properties of a thing are not understood as long as their essences are not known.
	From: Baruch de Spinoza (Improvement of Understanding [1675], §95), quoted by Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J - Substance and Individuation in Leibniz 1.2.1
	A reaction: This is the traditional Aristotelian view of essence, and the example of a circle is nice, though I am not sure what the essence of a circle might be. Presumably ALL the properties of a circle must flow from it.