Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Isagoge ('Introduction')', 'Letter to Bramhall' and 'Confessio naturae contra atheistas'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

---

4 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals

15034	Are genera and species real or conceptual? bodies or incorporeal? in sensibles or separate from them? [Porphyry]
	Full Idea: I shall beg off talking of a) whether genera and species are real or situated in bare thoughts alone, b) whether as real they are bodies or incorporeals, and c) whether they are separated or in sensibles and have their reality in connection with them.
	From: Porphyry (Isagoge ('Introduction') [c.295], (2))
	A reaction: This passage, picking up on Aristotle, seems to be the original source that grew into the medievel debate about universals. It seems to rather neatly lay out the agenda for the universals debate which is still with us.

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / c. Individuation by location

12693	A body is that which exists in space [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: A body is defined as that which exists in space.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Confessio naturae contra atheistas [1669], A6.1.490), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 1
	A reaction: A very early view. Leibniz notes that this tells you nothing about shape and motion.

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism

16620	A chair is wood, and its shape is the form; it isn't 'compounded' of the matter and form [Hobbes]
	Full Idea: Nothing can be compounded of matter and form. The matter of a chair is wood; the form is the figure it has, apt for the intended use. Does his Lordship think the chair compounded of the wood and the figure?
	From: Thomas Hobbes (Letter to Bramhall [1650], 4:302), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 07.1
	A reaction: Aristotle does use the word 'shape' [morphe] when he is discussing hylomorphism, and the statue example seems to support it, but elsewhere the form is a much deeper principle of individuation.

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism

16622	Essence is just an artificial word from logic, giving a way of thinking about substances [Hobbes]
	Full Idea: Essence and all other abstract names are words artificial belonging to the art of logic, and signify only the manner how we consider the substance itself.
	From: Thomas Hobbes (Letter to Bramhall [1650], 4:308), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671
	A reaction: I sympathise quite a lot with this view, but not with its dismissive tone. The key question I take to be: if you reject essences entirely (having read too much physics), how are we going to think about entities in the world in future?