12 ideas
| 9329 | Justification is coherence with a background system; if irrefutable, it is knowledge [Lehrer] |
| Full Idea: Justification is coherence with a background system which, when irrefutable, converts to knowledge. | |
| From: Keith Lehrer (Consciousness,Represn, and Knowledge [2006]) | |
| A reaction: A problem (as the theory stands here) would be whether you have to be aware that the coherence is irrefutable, which would seem to require a pretty powerful intellect. If one needn't be aware of the irrefutability, how does it help my justification? |
| 9330 | Generalization seems to be more fundamental to minds than spotting similarities [Lehrer] |
| Full Idea: There is a level of generalization we share with other animals in the responses to objects that suggest that generalization is a more fundamental operation of the mind than the observation of similarities. | |
| From: Keith Lehrer (Consciousness,Represn, and Knowledge [2006]) | |
| A reaction: He derives this from Reid (1785) - Lehrer's hero - who argued against Hume that we couldn't spot similarities if we hadn't already generalized to produce the 'respect' of the similarity. Interesting. I think Reid must be right. |
| 9328 | All conscious states can be immediately known when attention is directed to them [Lehrer] |
| Full Idea: I am inclined to think that all conscious states can be immediately known when attention is directed to them. | |
| From: Keith Lehrer (Consciousness,Represn, and Knowledge [2006]) | |
| A reaction: This strikes me as a very helpful suggestion, for eliminating lots of problem cases for introspective knowledge which have been triumphally paraded in recent times. It might, though, be tautological, if it is actually a definition of 'conscious states'. |
| 6237 | Fear of God is not conscience, which is a natural feeling of offence at bad behaviour [Shaftesbury] |
| Full Idea: Conscience is to find horribly offensive the reflection of any unjust action or behaviour; to have awe and terror of the Deity, does not, of itself, imply conscience; …thus religious conscience supposes moral or natural conscience. | |
| From: 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury (Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit [1699], II.II.I) | |
| A reaction: The reply from religion would be that the Deity has implanted natural conscience in each creature, though this seems to deny our freedom of moral judgment. Personally I am inclined to think that values are just observations of the world - such as health. |
| 6234 | If an irrational creature with kind feelings was suddenly given reason, its reason would approve of kind feelings [Shaftesbury] |
| Full Idea: If a creature wanting reason has many good qualities and affections, it is certain that if you give this creature a reflecting faculty, it will at the same instant approve of gratitude, kindness and pity. | |
| From: 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury (Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit [1699], I.III.III) | |
| A reaction: A wonderful denunciation of the authority of reason, which must have influenced David Hume. I think, though, that the inverse of this case must be considered (if suddenly given feelings, they would fall in line with reasoning). We reason about feelings. |
| 6233 | A person isn't good if only tying their hands prevents their mischief, so the affections decide a person's morality [Shaftesbury] |
| Full Idea: We do not say that he is a good man when, having his hands tied up, he is hindered from doing the mischief he designs; …hence it is by affection merely that a creature is esteemed good or ill, natural or unnatural. | |
| From: 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury (Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit [1699], I.II.I) | |
| A reaction: Note that he more or less equates being morally 'ill' with being 'unnatural'. We tend to reserve 'unnatural' for extreme or perverse crimes. Personally I would place more emphasis on evil judgements, and less on evil feelings. |
| 6236 | People more obviously enjoy social pleasures than they do eating and drinking [Shaftesbury] |
| Full Idea: How much the social pleasures are superior to any other may be known by visible tokens and effects; the marks and signs which attend this sort of joy are more intense and clear than those which attend the satisfaction of thirst and hunger. | |
| From: 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury (Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit [1699], II.II.I) | |
| A reaction: He presumably refers to smiles and laughter, but they could be misleading as they are partly a means of social communication. You should ask people whether they would prefer a nice conversation or a good pork chop. Nice point, though. |
| 6235 | Self-interest is not intrinsically good, but its absence is evil, as public good needs it [Shaftesbury] |
| Full Idea: Though no creature can be called good merely for possessing the self-preserving affections, it is impossible that public good can be preserved without them; so that a creature wanting in them is wanting in natural rectitude, and may be esteemed vicious. | |
| From: 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury (Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit [1699], II.I.III) | |
| A reaction: Aristotle held a similar view (Idea 92). I think maybe Shaftesbury was the last call of the Aristotelians, before being engulfed by utilitarians and Kantians. This idea is at the core of capitalism. |
| 6232 | Every creature has a right and a wrong state which guide its actions, so there must be a natural end [Shaftesbury] |
| Full Idea: We know there is a right and a wrong state of every creature; and that his right one is by nature forwarded, and by himself affectionately sought. There being therefore in every creature a certain interest or good; there must also be a natural end. | |
| From: 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury (Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit [1699], I.II.I) | |
| A reaction: This is an early modern statement of Aristotelian teleology, just at the point where it was falling out of fashion. The underlying concept is that of right function. I agree with Shaftesbury, but you can't stop someone damaging their health. |
| 13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
| Full Idea: In a single day there lies open to men of learning more than there ever does to the unenlightened in the longest of lifetimes. | |
| From: Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]), quoted by Seneca the Younger - Letters from a Stoic 078 | |
| A reaction: These remarks endorsing the infinite superiority of the educated to the uneducated seem to have been popular in late antiquity. It tends to be the religions which discourage great learning, especially in their emphasis on a single book. |
| 20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |
| Full Idea: Posidonius defined time thus: it is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed and slowness. | |
| From: report of Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.08.42 | |
| A reaction: Hm. Can we define motion or speed without alluding to time? Looks like we have to define them as a conjoined pair, which means we cannot fully understand either of them. |
| 5642 | For Shaftesbury, we must already have a conscience to be motivated to religious obedience [Shaftesbury, by Scruton] |
| Full Idea: Shaftesbury argued that no morality could be founded in religious obedience, or piety. On the contrary, a man is motivated to such obedience only because conscience tells him that the divine being is worthy of it. | |
| From: report of 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury (Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit [1699]) by Roger Scruton - Short History of Modern Philosophy Ch.8 | |
| A reaction: This seems to me a good argument. The only alternative is that we are brought to God by a conscience which was planted in us by God, but then how would you know you were being obedient to the right hypnotist? |