Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'The Wealth of Nations' and 'Armstrong on combinatorial possibility'

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9 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis
Armstrong's analysis seeks truthmakers rather than definitions [Lewis]
     Full Idea: I suggest that Armstrong has an unfamiliar notion of analysis, as not primarily a quest for definitions, but as a quest for truth-makers.
     From: David Lewis (Armstrong on combinatorial possibility [1992], 'The demand')
     A reaction: This is not a dichotomy, I think, but a shift of emphasis. A definition will probably refer to truthmakers; a decent account of truthmakers would approximate a definition.
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
Predications aren't true because of what exists, but of how it exists [Lewis]
     Full Idea: Predications seem, for the most part, to be true not because of whether things are, but because of how things are.
     From: David Lewis (Armstrong on combinatorial possibility [1992], 'The demand')
     A reaction: This simple point shows that you get into a tangle if you insist that truthmakers just consist of what exists. Lewis says Armstrong offers states of affairs as truthmakers for predications.
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / d. Being makes truths
Say 'truth is supervenient on being', but construe 'being' broadly [Lewis]
     Full Idea: I want to say that 'truth is supervenient on being', but as an Ostrich about universals I want to construe 'being' broadly.
     From: David Lewis (Armstrong on combinatorial possibility [1992], 'Truth')
     A reaction: [His slogan is borrowed from Bigelow 1988:132-,158-9] This seems much more promising that the more precise and restricted notion of truthmakers, as resting on the existence of particular things. Presentism is the big test case.
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 9. Making Past Truths
Presentism says only the present exists, so there is nothing for tensed truths to supervene on [Lewis]
     Full Idea: Presentism says that although there is nothing outside the present, yet there are past-tensed and future-tensed truths that do not supervene on the present, and hence do not supervene on being.
     From: David Lewis (Armstrong on combinatorial possibility [1992], p.207)
     A reaction: Since I rather like both presentism and truth supervening on being, this observation comes as rather a devastating blow. I thought philosophy would be quite easy, but it's turning out to be rather tricky. Could tensed truths supervene on the present?
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 9. States of Affairs
How do things combine to make states of affairs? Constituents can repeat, and fail to combine [Lewis]
     Full Idea: To me it is mysterious how a state of affairs is made out of its particular and universal constituents. Different states of affairs may have the very same constituents, and the existence of constituents by no means entails the existence of the states.
     From: David Lewis (Armstrong on combinatorial possibility [1992], 'What is there')
     A reaction: He is rejecting the structure of states of affairs as wholes made of parts. But then mereology was never going to explain the structure of the world.
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 1. Contractarianism
People prepare our dinner from their own self-interest, not from humanity [Smith,A]
     Full Idea: It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love.
     From: Adam Smith (The Wealth of Nations [1776], p.26-7), quoted by Amartya Sen - The Idea of Justice 08 'Narrowing'
     A reaction: Sen passionately pleads that this not be taken out of context. It is about the motivation for the relationship of exchange, and not about morality in general, which also includes trust etc. The subsequent lines in Smith show this.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 11. Capitalism
Selfish profit-seeking increases collective wealth, so greed is good, and egoism is altruism [Smith,A, by Harari]
     Full Idea: Smith's claim that the selfish human urge to increase private profits is the basis for collective wealth is one of the most revolutionary ideas in human history. …Greed is good …and egoism is altruism.
     From: report of Adam Smith (The Wealth of Nations [1776]) by Yuval Noah Harari - Sapiens: brief history of humankind 16 'Growing'
     A reaction: The central confrontation of political philosophy still seems to be Adam Smith v Karl Marx. Why can't there be altruistic non-greedy profit-seeking? Not 'I want profits' but 'we want profits'. Altruistic capitalists aim to create jobs.
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius]
     Full Idea: In a single day there lies open to men of learning more than there ever does to the unenlightened in the longest of lifetimes.
     From: Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]), quoted by Seneca the Younger - Letters from a Stoic 078
     A reaction: These remarks endorsing the infinite superiority of the educated to the uneducated seem to have been popular in late antiquity. It tends to be the religions which discourage great learning, especially in their emphasis on a single book.
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / d. Time as measure
Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus]
     Full Idea: Posidonius defined time thus: it is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed and slowness.
     From: report of Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.08.42
     A reaction: Hm. Can we define motion or speed without alluding to time? Looks like we have to define them as a conjoined pair, which means we cannot fully understand either of them.