13 ideas
| 21054 | Reason enables the unbounded extension of our rules and intentions [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Reason, in a creature, is a faculty which enables that creature to extend far beyond the limits of natural instinct the rules and intentions it follows in using its various powers, and the range of its project is unbounded. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Idea for a Universal History [1784], 2nd) | |
| A reaction: I'm inclined to identify the mind's creation of universals as the source of this power, rather than reason. Generalisations are infinitely extensible. Cantor's infinities are a nice example. Can't ideas be extended irrationally? |
| 20475 | Maybe modal sentences cannot be true or false [Casullo] |
| Full Idea: Some people claim that modal sentences do not express truths or falsehoods. | |
| From: Albert Casullo (A Priori Knowledge [2002], 3.2) | |
| A reaction: I can only imagine this coming from a narrow hardline empiricist. It seems to me obvious that we make true or false statements about what is possible or impossible. |
| 20476 | If the necessary is a priori, so is the contingent, because the same evidence is involved [Casullo] |
| Full Idea: If one can only know a priori that a proposition is necessary, then one can know only a priori that a proposition is contingent. The evidence relevant to determining the latter is the same as that relevant to determining the former. | |
| From: Albert Casullo (A Priori Knowledge [2002], 3.2) | |
| A reaction: This seems a telling point, but I suppose it is obvious. If you see that the cat is on the mat, nothing in the situation tells you whether this is contingent or necessary. We assume it is contingent, but that may be an a priori assumption. |
| 20471 | Epistemic a priori conditions concern either the source, defeasibility or strength [Casullo] |
| Full Idea: There are three suggested epistemic conditions on a priori knowledge: the first regards the source of justification, the second regards the defeasibility of justification, and the third appeals to the strength of justification. | |
| From: Albert Casullo (A Priori Knowledge [2002], 2) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] He says these are all inspired by Kant. The non-epistemic suggested condition involve necessity or analyticity. The source would have to be entirely mental; the defeasibly could not be experiential; the strength would be certainty. |
| 20477 | The main claim of defenders of the a priori is that some justifications are non-experiential [Casullo] |
| Full Idea: The leading claim of proponents of the a priori is that sources of justification are of two significantly different types: experiential and nonexperiential. Initially this difference is marked at the phenomenological level. | |
| From: Albert Casullo (A Priori Knowledge [2002], 5) | |
| A reaction: He cites Plantinga and Bealer for the phenomenological starting point (that some knowledge just seems rationally obvious, certain, and perhaps necessary). |
| 20472 | Analysis of the a priori by necessity or analyticity addresses the proposition, not the justification [Casullo] |
| Full Idea: There is reason to view non-epistemic analyses of a priori knowledge (in terms of necessity or analyticity) with suspicion. The a priori concerns justification. Analysis by necessity or analyticity concerns the proposition rather than the justification. | |
| From: Albert Casullo (A Priori Knowledge [2002], 2.1) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] The fact that the a priori is entirely a mode of justification, rather than a type of truth, is the modern view, influenced by Kripke. Given that assumption, this is a good objection. |
| 20474 | 'Overriding' defeaters rule it out, and 'undermining' defeaters weaken in [Casullo] |
| Full Idea: A justified belief that a proposition is not true is an 'overriding' defeater, ...and the belief that a justification is inadequate or defective is an 'undermining' defeater. | |
| From: Albert Casullo (A Priori Knowledge [2002], n 40) | |
| A reaction: Sounds more like a sliding scale than a binary option. Quite useful, though. |
| 21053 | The manifest will in the world of phenomena has to conform to the laws of nature [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Whatever conception of the freedom of the will one may form in terms of metaphysics, the will's manifestations in the world of phenomena, i.e. human actions, are determined in accordance with natural laws, as is every other natural event. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Idea for a Universal History [1784], Intro) | |
| A reaction: So free will either requires total substance dualism, or it is best described as transcendental fictionalism. This seems to imply the Leibnizian idea that metaphysics contains facts which having nothing to do with the physical world. |
| 21055 | Our aim is a constitution which combines maximum freedom with strong restraint [Kant] |
| Full Idea: The highest task which nature has set mankind is to establish a society in which freedom under external laws would be combined to the greatest possible extent with irresistible force, in other words of establishing a perfectly just constitution. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Idea for a Universal History [1784], 5th) | |
| A reaction: The 'force' is to restrict the harms that may result from individual freedom. This seems to equate justice with liberal freedom. Force can prevent direct harm to others, but what to do about indirect harm? Many lack freedom, but whose fault is it? |
| 21056 | The vitality of business needs maximum freedom (while avoiding harm to others) [Kant] |
| Full Idea: If the citizen is deterred from seeking his personal welfare in any way he chooses which is consistent with the freedom of others, the vitality of business in general and hence also the strength of the whole are held in check. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Idea for a Universal History [1784], 8th) | |
| A reaction: This is a rather American view of liberalism. Kant has been praising the virtues of aggressive competition. |
| 21057 | The highest ideal of social progress is a universal cosmopolitan existence [Kant] |
| Full Idea: There is hope that the highest purpose of nature, a universal cosmopolitan existence, will at last be realised as the matrix within which all the original capacities of the human race may develop. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Idea for a Universal History [1784], 8th) | |
| A reaction: Apart from Diogenes of Sinope, Kant seems to have been the first great champion of the cosmopolitan ideal. As I write (2018) the western world is putting up growing barriers against immigrants. I think my response may be to adopt Kantian cosmopolitanism. |
| 13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
| Full Idea: In a single day there lies open to men of learning more than there ever does to the unenlightened in the longest of lifetimes. | |
| From: Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]), quoted by Seneca the Younger - Letters from a Stoic 078 | |
| A reaction: These remarks endorsing the infinite superiority of the educated to the uneducated seem to have been popular in late antiquity. It tends to be the religions which discourage great learning, especially in their emphasis on a single book. |
| 20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |
| Full Idea: Posidonius defined time thus: it is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed and slowness. | |
| From: report of Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.08.42 | |
| A reaction: Hm. Can we define motion or speed without alluding to time? Looks like we have to define them as a conjoined pair, which means we cannot fully understand either of them. |