Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'On the Heavens' and 'Virtue Epistemology'

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17 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
A very hungry man cannot choose between equidistant piles of food [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: The man who, though exceedingly hungry and thirsty, and both equally, yet being equidistant from food and drink, is therefore bound to stay where he is.
     From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 296b33)
     A reaction: This is, of course, Buridan's famous Ass, but this quotation has the advantage of precedence, and also of being expressed in an original quotation (which does not exist for Buridan).
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 1. Epistemic virtues
Epistemic virtues: love of knowledge, courage, caution, autonomy, practical wisdom... [Kvanvig]
     Full Idea: Virtue theorists may focus on the particular habits or virtues of successful cognizers, such as love of knowledge, firmness, courage and caution, humility, autonomy, generosity, and practical wisdom.
     From: Jonathan Kvanvig (Virtue Epistemology [2011], III)
     A reaction: [He cites Roberts and Wood 2007] It is interesting that most of these virtues do not merely concern cognition. How about diligence, self-criticism, flexibility...?
If epistemic virtues are faculties or powers, that doesn't explain propositional knowledge [Kvanvig]
     Full Idea: Conceiving of the virtues in terms of faculties or powers doesn't help at all with the problem of accounting for propositional knowledge.
     From: Jonathan Kvanvig (Virtue Epistemology [2011], IV B)
     A reaction: It always looks as if epistemic virtues are a little peripheral to the main business of knowledge, which is getting beliefs to be correct and well-founded. Given that epistemic saints make occasional mistakes, talk of virtues can't be enough.
The value of good means of attaining truth are swamped by the value of the truth itself [Kvanvig]
     Full Idea: The Swamping Problem is that the value of truth swamps the value of additional features of true beliefs which are only instrumentally related to them. True belief is no more valuable if one adds a feature valuable for getting one to the truth.
     From: Jonathan Kvanvig (Virtue Epistemology [2011], IV B)
     A reaction: His targets here are reliabilism and epistemic virtues. Kvanvig's implication is that the key to understanding the nature of knowledge is to pinpoint why we value it so much.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / b. Successful function
Each thing that has a function is for the sake of that function [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Each thing that has a function is for the sake of that function.
     From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 286a08)
     A reaction: This is the central idea of Aristotle's Ethics. Did it originate with Plato, or Socrates, the young pupil Aristotle? I suspect the strong influence of Aristotle on later Plato. A major idea. Functions link the facts to life.
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius]
     Full Idea: In a single day there lies open to men of learning more than there ever does to the unenlightened in the longest of lifetimes.
     From: Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]), quoted by Seneca the Younger - Letters from a Stoic 078
     A reaction: These remarks endorsing the infinite superiority of the educated to the uneducated seem to have been popular in late antiquity. It tends to be the religions which discourage great learning, especially in their emphasis on a single book.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / a. Final purpose
An unworn sandal is in vain, but nothing in nature is in vain [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: We say of a sandal which is not worn that it is in vain; God and nature, however, do nothing in vain.
     From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 271a33)
There has to be some goal, and not just movement to infinity [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: There has to be some goal, and not just movement to infinity.
     From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 277a26)
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements
Aether moves in circles and is imperishable; the four elements perish, and move in straight lines [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
     Full Idea: For Aristotle, aether and the four sublunary elements obey different physical laws. Aether moves naturally in a circle and, unlike its lower counterparts, is not a source of perishability. The four sublunary elements move naturally in straight lines.
     From: report of Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE]) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance Ch.2
     A reaction: I think it is anachronistic for Gill to talk of 'obeying' and 'laws'. She should have said that they have different 'natures'. We can be amused by Greek errors, until we stare hard at the problems they were trying to solve.
An element is what bodies are analysed into, and won't itself divide into something else [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: An element is a body into which other bodies may be analyzed, present in them potentially or in actuality (which of these is still disputable), and not itself divisible into bodies different in form. That is what all men mean by element.
     From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 302a05), quoted by Weisberg/Needham/Hendry - Philosophy of Chemistry 1.1
     A reaction: This is the classic definition of an element, which endured for a long time, and has been replaced by an 'actual components' view. Obviously analysis nowadays goes well beyond the atoms.
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
If the more you raise some earth the faster it moves, why does the whole earth not move? [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: If you raise some earth and release it, it moves and won't stay put, and the more you raise it the faster it moves, so why does the whole earth not move?
     From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 294a12)
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 1. Void
Void is a kind of place, so it can't explain place [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: It is absurd to explain place by the void, as though this latter were not itself some kind of place.
     From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 309b24)
     A reaction: Presumably this is aimed at Democritus.
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / d. Time as measure
Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus]
     Full Idea: Posidonius defined time thus: it is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed and slowness.
     From: report of Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.08.42
     A reaction: Hm. Can we define motion or speed without alluding to time? Looks like we have to define them as a conjoined pair, which means we cannot fully understand either of them.
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 1. Cosmology
The Earth must be spherical, because it casts a convex shadow on the moon [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: A lunar eclipse always has a convex dividing line, so, if it is eclipsed by the interposition of the earth, the circumference of the earth, being spherical, is responsible for the shape.
     From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 297b29)
The earth must be round and of limited size, because moving north or south makes different stars visible [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Clearly the earth is round and not of great size, because when we move north or south we find that very different stars are visible.
     From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 297b30)
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 3. The Beginning
Everyone agrees that the world had a beginning, but thinkers disagree over whether it will end [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: All thinkers agree that the world had a beginning, but some claim that, having come into existence, it is everlasting.
     From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 279b12)
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 10. Multiverse
It seems possible that there exists a limited number of other worlds apart from this one [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: One might indeed be puzzled whether, just as the world about us exists, nothing prevents there being others as well, certainly more than one, though not an unlimited number
     From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 274a26)