Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Categories' and 'The Koran'

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66 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 2. Invocation to Philosophy
Without extensive examination firm statements are hard, but studying the difficulties is profitable [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: It is hard to make firm statements on these questions without having examined them many times, but to have gone through the various difficulties is not unprofitable.
     From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 08b23)
     A reaction: Suggesting that philosophy is more like drawing the map than completing the journey.
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Instead of prayer and charity, sinners pursue vain disputes and want their own personal scripture [Mohammed]
     Full Idea: The sinners will say 'we never prayed or fed the hungry. We engaged in vain disputes and denied the Day of Reckoning'. Indeed, each one of them demands a scripture of his own to be unrolled before him.
     From: Mohammed (The Koran [c.622], Ch.74)
     A reaction: The implication seems to be that most disputes are 'vain'. The charge that everyone wants a 'scripture of his own' is a nice challenge to the world of liberal education, where we are all enjoined to pursue our personalised routes to our own truth.
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 4. Contraries
The contrary of good is bad, but the contrary of bad is either good or another evil [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: What is contrary to a good thing is necessarily bad, as we see with health and sickness. But the contrary of bad is sometimes good, sometimes not, as we see with excess, opposed by both deficiency and moderation.
     From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 13b36)
Both sides of contraries need not exist (as health without sickness, white without black) [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: With contraries it is not necessary if one exists for the other to exist too, for if everyone were well health would exist but not sickness, and if everything were white whiteness would exist but not black.
     From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 14a06)
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 8. Category Mistake / a. Category mistakes
The differentiae of genera which are different are themselves different in kind [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: The differentiae of genera which are different and not subordinate one to the other are themselves different in kind.
     From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 01b16)
     A reaction: This seems to be indicating a category mistake, as he warns us not to attribute the wrong kind of differentiae to something we are picking out.
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / b. Objects make truths
A true existence statement has its truth caused by the existence of the thing [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Whereas the true statement [that there is a man] is in no way the cause of the actual thing's existence, the actual thing does seem in some way the cause of the statement's being true.
     From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 14b18)
     A reaction: Armstrong offers this as the earliest statement of the truthmaker principle. Notice the cautious qualification 'seem in some way'. The truthmaker dependence seems even clearer in falsemaking, where the death of the man falsifies the statement.
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
Predications of predicates are predications of their subjects [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Whenever one thing is predicated of another as of a subject, all things said of what is predicated will be said of the subject also.
     From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 01b10)
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / c. Priority of numbers
One is prior to two, because its existence is implied by two [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: One is prior to two because if there are two it follows at once that there is one, whereas if there is one there is not necessarily two.
     From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 14a29)
     A reaction: The axiomatic introduction of a 'successor' to a number does not seem to introduce this notion of priority, based on inclusiveness. Introducing order by '>' also does not seem to indicate any logical priority.
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
Parts of a line join at a point, so it is continuous [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: A line is a continuous quantity. For it is possible to find a common boundary at which its parts join together, a point.
     From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 04b33)
     A reaction: This appears to be the essential concept of a Dedekind cut. It seems to be an open question whether a cut defines a unique number, but a boundary seems to be intrinsically unique. Aristotle wins again.
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / b. Greek arithmetic
Some quantities are discrete, like number, and others continuous, like lines, time and space [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Of quantities, some are discrete, others continuous. ...Discrete are number and language; continuous are lines, surfaces, bodies, and also, besides these, time and place.
     From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 04b20)
     A reaction: This distinction seems to me to be extremely illuminating, when comparing natural numbers with real numbers, and it is the foundation of the Greek view of mathematics.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / f. Primary being
Primary being must be more than mere indeterminate ultimate subject of predication [Politis on Aristotle]
     Full Idea: He criticises his 'Categories' view, because if primary being is simply the ultimate subject of predication the primary being is, in virtue of itself, something indeterminate; it would be a necessary but not a sufficient condition for primary being.
     From: comment on Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 7.5
     A reaction: Thus, Politis argues, primary being is essence in the later work. The words 'substance' and 'ousia' cause confusion here, and must be watched closely. Wedin argues that Aristotle merely develops his 'Categories' view, but most disagree.
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
There are six kinds of change: generation, destruction, increase, diminution, alteration, change of place [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: There are six kinds of change: generation, destruction, increase, diminution, alteration, change of place. A change in our affections would be an example of alteration.
     From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 15a13)
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
A thing is prior to another if it implies its existence [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: That from which the implication of existence does not hold reciprocally is thought to be prior.
     From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 14a32)
     A reaction: shadows and objects
Of interdependent things, the prior one causes the other's existence [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: For of things which reciprocate as to implication of existence, that which is in some way the cause of the other's existence might reasonably by called prior by nature.
     From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 14b12)
     A reaction: Not so clear when you seek examples. The bus is prior to its redness, but you can't have a colourless bus, so being coloured is prior to being a bus. Aristotle's example is a man being prior to the truths about him.
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
The categories (substance, quality, quantity, relation, action, passion, place, time) peter out inconsequentially [Benardete,JA on Aristotle]
     Full Idea: The Aristotelian schedule of categories - substance, quality, quantity, relation, action, passion, place, time, and so forth - appears to peter out inconsequentially.
     From: comment on Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.7
     A reaction: Compare Idea 5544 for Kant's attempt to classify categories. Personally I like the way Aristotle's 'peter out'. That seems to me a more plausible character for good metaphysics.
There are ten basic categories for thinking about things [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Of things said without any combination, each signifies either substance or quantity or qualification or a relative or where or when or being-in-a-position or having or doing or being-affected.
     From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 01b25)
     A reaction: This sums up the earlier of Aristotle's two metaphysical view, and each of this categories is discussed in the present text.
Substance,Quantity,Quality,Relation,Place,Time,Being-in-a-position,Having,Doing,Being affected [Aristotle, by Westerhoff]
     Full Idea: Aristotle's list of ten categories proved to be the most influential scheme found in his works: Substance, Quantity, Quality, Relation, Place, Time, Being-in-a-position, Having, Doing, Being affected.
     From: report of Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE]) by Jan Westerhoff - Ontological Categories §01
7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
Aristotle derived categories as answers to basic questions about nature, size, quality, location etc. [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
     Full Idea: Aristotle seems to have worked out his list of categories by considering various questions that one might ask about a particular object, such as What is it? How big is it? How is it qualified? And Where is it?
     From: report of Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE]) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance
     A reaction: Of course, to think of his questions, Aristotle already had categories in his mind. How would he approach a proposal to recategorise reality more efficiently?
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
Aristotle said relations are not substances, so (if they exist) they must be accidents [Aristotle, by Heil]
     Full Idea: Aristotle categorised relations as accidents - Socrates's whiteness, the sphericity of this ball - entities dependent on substances. Relations are not substances, so they must be, if anything at all, accidents.
     From: report of Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], §7) by John Heil - Relations 'Historical'
     A reaction: Heil says this thought encouraged anti-realist views of relations, which became the norm until Russell.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 2. Need for Properties
Aristotle promoted the importance of properties and objects (rather than general and particular) [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
     Full Idea: In 'Categories' Aristotle is taking a first step in making the distinction between objects and properties central to ontology. This plays virtually no role in Plato, and was overshadowed by the distinction between general and particular.
     From: report of Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE]) by Michael Frede - Individuals in Aristotle I
     A reaction: Frede says he gets in a tangle because he mixes the earlier and the new views. Because we are nowadays in a total muddle about properties, I'm thinking we should go back to the earlier view! Modern commentators make him a trope theorist.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
Some things said 'of' a subject are not 'in' the subject [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Of things there are, some are said of a subject, but are not in any subject. For example, man is said of a subject, the individual man, but is not in any subject.
     From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 01a20)
     A reaction: See? 'Being a man' is not a property of a man! Only the properties which are 'in' the man are properties of the man. The rest are things which are said 'of' men, usually as classifications. A classification is not a property.
We call them secondary 'substances' because they reveal the primary substances [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: It is reasonable that, after the primary substances, their species and genera should be the only other things called (secondary) substances. For only they, of things predicated, reveal the primary substance.
     From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 02b29)
     A reaction: This is the key passage in all of Aristotle for sortal essentialists like Wiggins, especially the word 'only'. I take it that this observation is superseded by the Metaphysics. Definition is the route to substance (which involves general terms).
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 9. Qualities
Four species of quality: states, capacities, affects, and forms [Aristotle, by Pasnau]
     Full Idea: In Categories 8 there are four species of qualities: States and conditions, Natural capacities and incapacities, Affective qualities or affections, and Shape and external form.
     From: report of Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], Ch.8) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 23.5
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 3. Instantiated Universals
Colour must be in an individual body, or it is not embodied [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Colour is in body and therefore also in an individual body; for were it not in some individual body it would not be in body at all.
     From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 02b02)
     A reaction: This may be just a truism, or it may be the Aristotelian commitment to universals only existing if they are instantiated.
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Aristotle gave up his earlier notion of individuals, because it relied on universals [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
     Full Idea: In 'Metaphysics' Aristotle abandons the notion of an individual which he had relied on in the 'Categories', since it presupposes that there are general things, that there are universals.
     From: report of Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE]) by Michael Frede - Individuals in Aristotle Intro
     A reaction: Ah, very illuminating. So all the way through we have a concept of individuals, first relying on universals, and then relying on hylomorphism? I suppose a bundle theory of individuals would need universals.
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
Genus and species are substances, because only they reveal the primary substance [Aristotle, by Wedin]
     Full Idea: The reason Aristotle gives for calling species and genera substances is that of what is predicated only they reveal what the primary substance is.
     From: report of Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 02b29-37) by Michael V. Wedin - Aristotle's Theory of Substance III.6
     A reaction: Thus we should not be misled into thinking that the genus and species ARE the essence. We edge our way towards the essence of an individual by subdividing its categories.
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
Substances have no opposites, and don't come in degrees (including if the substance is a man) [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: There is nothing contrary to substances,…. and a substance does not admit of a more and a less. If this substance is a man, it will not be more a man or less a man either than itself or than another man.
     From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 03b33)
Is primary substance just an ultimate subject, or some aspect of a complex body? [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
     Full Idea: 'Categories' treats something's being an ultimate subject as a test for being a primary substance, but it does not treat its primary objects as complex bodies consisting of matter and form. In that case, is the composite or a feature the ultimate subject?
     From: report of Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE]) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance Ch.1
     A reaction: Gill is trying to throw light on the difference between 'Categories' and 'Metaphysics'. Once you have hylomorphism (form-plus-matter) you have a new difficulty in explaining unity. The answer is revealed once we understand 'form'.
Primary being is 'that which lies under', or 'particular substance' [Aristotle, by Politis]
     Full Idea: In 'Categories' Aristotle argues the primary being (proté ousia) is the ultimate subject of predication (to hupokeimenon, meaning 'that which lies under'), nowadays referred to as the 'particular substance' view.
     From: report of Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 4.4
     A reaction: Politis says that Aristotle shifts to the quite different view in 'Metaphysics', that primary being is essence, rather than mere subject of predication.
A single substance can receive contrary properties [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: It seems distinctive of substance that what is numerically one and the same is able to receive contraries. ...For example, an individual man - one and the same - becomes pale at one time and dark at another.
     From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 04a10/20)
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
Secondary substances do have subjects, so they are not ultimate in the ontology [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
     Full Idea: The concept of substance applies to secondary substances only with some deletions; ..it is not true that they have no subjects, and hence they are not ultimate subjects for all other elements of the ontology.
     From: report of Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE]) by Michael Frede - Title, Unity, Authenticity of the 'Categories' V
     A reaction: It increasingly strikes that to treat secondary substance (roughly, species) as essence is a shocking misreading of Aristotle. Frede says they are substances, because they do indeed 'underlie'.
In earlier Aristotle the substances were particulars, not kinds [Aristotle, by Lawson-Tancred]
     Full Idea: In 'Metaphysics' Aristotle changed his view, as in 'Categories' the substances, the basic realities, were particular items, notably individual men, horses, cabbages etc.
     From: report of Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE]) by Hugh Lawson-Tancred - Introductions to 'Metaphysics' p.178
     A reaction: The charge is that having successfully rebelled against Plato, Aristotle gradually succumbed to his teacher's influence, and ended up with a more platonist view. For anti-platonists like myself, the 'Categories' seems to be the key text.
A 'primary' substance is in each subject, with species or genera as 'secondary' substances [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: A substance, in its most primary sense, is that which is neither said of a subject nor in a subject, e.g. the individual man or horse. The species in which things primarily called substances are, are called secondary substances, as are the genera.
     From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 02a11)
     A reaction: This distinction between 'primary' and 'secondary' substances is characteristic of Aristotle's earlier metaphysical view, with the later view (more unified and Platonic) in the 'Metaphysics'.
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
Earlier Aristotle had objects as primary substances, but later he switched to substantial form [Aristotle, by Lowe]
     Full Idea: In 'Categories' primary substances are individual concrete objects, such as a particular horse, whereas in 'Metaphysics' such things are combinations of matter and substantial form, with the latter being the primary substances.
     From: report of Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE]) by E.J. Lowe - The Possibility of Metaphysics 9.1
     A reaction: Lowe claims there is no real difference. Aristotle came to think that matter was not part of primary substance, so the shift seems to be that substance was concrete, but then he decided it was abstract. Physicists will prefer 'Metaphysics'.
Things are called 'substances' because they are subjects for everything else [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: It is because the primary substances are subjects for everything else that they are called substances [ousiai] most strictly.
     From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 03a04)
     A reaction: This points to a rather minimal account of substance, as possibly the 'bare particular' which has no other role than to have properties. This expands in 'Metaphysics' to be matter which has form, making properties possible.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
A primary substance reveals a 'this', which is an individual unit [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Every substance seems to signify a certain 'this'. As regards the primary substances, it is indisputably true that each of them signifies a certain 'this'; for the thing revealed is individual and numerically one.
     From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 03b10)
     A reaction: The notion of 'primary' substance is confined to this earlier metaphysics of Aristotle.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
Primary substances are ontological in 'Categories', and explanatory in 'Metaphysics' [Aristotle, by Wedin]
     Full Idea: The primacy of 'Categories' primary substances is a kind of ontological primacy, whereas the primacy of form is a kind of structural or explanatory primacy.
     From: report of Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE]) by Michael V. Wedin - Aristotle's Theory of Substance X.9
     A reaction: 'Structural' and 'explanatory' sound very different, since the former sounds ontological and the latter epistemological (and more subjective).
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
Aristotle denigrates the category of relation, but for modern absolutists self-relation is basic [Benardete,JA on Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Aristotle denigrates the whole category of relations, but modern logical absolutists single out self-relation (in the mode of identity) as metaphysically privileged.
     From: comment on Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.8
     A reaction: I think this refers to Plantinga and Merrihew Adams, who make identity-with-itself the basic component of individual existences.
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
Only what can be said of many things is a predicable [Aristotle, by Wedin]
     Full Idea: Aristotle reminds us that nothing is to count as predicable that cannot be said-of many things.
     From: report of Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE]) by Michael V. Wedin - Aristotle's Theory of Substance III.1
     A reaction: Thus there wouldn't be any predicates if there were not universals. Could we have proper names for individual qualities (tropes), in the way that we have them for individual objects?
Some predicates signify qualification of a substance, others the substance itself [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: 'White' signifies nothing but a qualification, whereas the species ('man') and the genus ('animal') mark off the qualification of substance - they signify substance of a certain qualification.
     From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 03b18)
     A reaction: This is making a fundamental distinction between two different types of predication. I would describe them as one attributing a real property, and the other attributing a category (as a result of the properties). I don't think 'substance' helps here.
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 1. Contractarianism
Repay evil with good and your enemies will become friends (though this is hard) [Mohammed]
     Full Idea: Requite evil with good, and he who is your enemy will become your dearest friend; but none will attain this save those who endure with fortitude and are greatly favoured by Allah.
     From: Mohammed (The Koran [c.622], Ch.41)
     A reaction: This seems opposed to some of the more vengeful remarks in the Koran. It strikes me as good common sense, since vengeance only seems to breed counter-vengeance. It doesn't carry the full altruistic commitment, though, of unrewarded love.
You may break off a treaty if you fear treachery from your ally [Mohammed]
     Full Idea: If you fear treachery from any of your allies, you may retaliate by breaking off your treaty with them; Allah does not love the treacherous.
     From: Mohammed (The Koran [c.622], Ch.8)
     A reaction: I do not think this is good advice. Everybody fears treachery, but if we all acted on that fear human relationships and society would immediately collapse. If anyone thought this was good advice, I would not want to make a treaty with them.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
Allah rewards those who are devout, sincere, patient, humble, charitable, chaste, and who fast [Mohammed]
     Full Idea: Allah will bestow forgiveness and a rich reward on those, both men and women, who are devout, sincere, patient, humble, charitable and chaste; who fast and are ever mindful of Allah.
     From: Mohammed (The Koran [c.622], Ch.33)
     A reaction: Most people would still agree that all of these are virtues, though other lists will show interesting virtues that are not mentioned here, and many on this list seem overrated in the modern pantheon of virtues.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
Those who avenge themselves when wronged incur no guilt [Mohammed]
     Full Idea: Those who avenge themselves when wronged incur no guilt.
     From: Mohammed (The Koran [c.622], Ch.42)
     A reaction: Compare Ideas 1659 (Protagoras), 346 (Socrates), 6288 (Jesus), and 4286 (Scruton!). In the light of those ideas, this comment in the Koran strikes me as coming from an older and less civilized world.
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / c. Deterrence of crime
Punish theft in men or women by cutting off their hands [Mohammed]
     Full Idea: As for the man or woman who is guilty of theft, cut off their hands to punish them for their crimes.
     From: Mohammed (The Koran [c.622], Ch.5)
     A reaction: I find this shocking because it is irrevocable and offers no hope of redemption. It is particularly shocking that the text does not enjoin any caution about inflicting the punishment on the young, most of whom reform from thieving in later life.
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius]
     Full Idea: In a single day there lies open to men of learning more than there ever does to the unenlightened in the longest of lifetimes.
     From: Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]), quoted by Seneca the Younger - Letters from a Stoic 078
     A reaction: These remarks endorsing the infinite superiority of the educated to the uneducated seem to have been popular in late antiquity. It tends to be the religions which discourage great learning, especially in their emphasis on a single book.
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 1. Causing Death
Do not kill except for a just cause [Mohammed]
     Full Idea: Do not kill except for a just cause.
     From: Mohammed (The Koran [c.622], Ch.25)
     A reaction: Slippery slope! I can see that pleasure would not be a just cause, and ensuring the entry of all humanity to paradise might be one, but I find the area in between a little unclear. The Koran seems to allow you to decide for yourself.
Killing a human, except as just punishment, is like killing all mankind [Mohammed]
     Full Idea: We laid it down for the Israelites that whoever killed a human being, except as a punishment for murder or other wicked crimes, should be looked upon as though he had killed all mankind.
     From: Mohammed (The Koran [c.622], Ch.5)
     A reaction: It seems inconceivable that the Koran could be used to justify indiscriminate terrorism, in the light of remarks such as this.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
It is not possible for fire to be cold or snow black [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: It is not possible for fire to be cold or snow black.
     From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 12b01)
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 2. Thermodynamics / d. Entropy
Change goes from possession to loss (as in baldness), but not the other way round [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Change occurs from possession to privation, but from privation to possession is impossible; one who has gone blind does not recover sight nor does a bald man regain his hair nor does a toothless man grow new ones.
     From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 13a35)
     A reaction: Although this seems like an insight into entropy, it isn't an accurate observation, since trees lose their leaves, and then regain them in spring. Maybe somewhere men regrow their hair each spring.
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / d. Time as measure
Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus]
     Full Idea: Posidonius defined time thus: it is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed and slowness.
     From: report of Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.08.42
     A reaction: Hm. Can we define motion or speed without alluding to time? Looks like we have to define them as a conjoined pair, which means we cannot fully understand either of them.
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
Allah is lord of creation, compassionate, merciful, king of judgement-day [Mohammed]
     Full Idea: Praise be to Allah, Lord of Creation, The Compassionate, the Merciful, King of Judgement-day!
     From: Mohammed (The Koran [c.622], Exord)
     A reaction: The Muslim concept of God confronts directly a clear theological difficulty, a difficulty faced by any judge: the conflict between mercy and justice. Christianity seems to emphasise mercy, and Islam emphasises justice.
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
True believers see that Allah made the night for rest and the day to give light [Mohammed]
     Full Idea: Do they not see how We have made the night for them to rest in and the day to give them light? Surely there are signs in this for true believers.
     From: Mohammed (The Koran [c.622], Ch.27)
     A reaction: The main traditional argument for God implied in the Koran is the design argument. It is clear from this that Islam will not be comfortable with Darwinian evolution, which implies we are 'designed' for the Earth, not the Earth for us.
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
Allah cannot have begotten a son, as He is self-sufficient [Mohammed]
     Full Idea: They say: 'Allah has begotten a son.' Allah forbid! Self-sufficient is He.
     From: Mohammed (The Koran [c.622], Ch.10)
     A reaction: This is quite persuasive, except that the point of Jesus is that he suffers a cruel death, and we are required to identify with God's parental feelings here, His involvement, which would not occur with the death of one of His prophets.
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 6. Islam
Make war on the unbelievers until Allah's religion reigns supreme [Mohammed]
     Full Idea: Make war on the unbelievers until idolatry is no more and Allah's religion reigns supreme.
     From: Mohammed (The Koran [c.622], Ch.8)
     A reaction: This should presumably be seen in context, as a war speech written during a conflict, like Churchill 'fighting them on the beaches', which does not apply to modern German tourists. However, one worries about how fundamentalists might read it.
There shall be no compulsion in religion [Mohammed]
     Full Idea: There shall be no compulsion in religion.
     From: Mohammed (The Koran [c.622], Ch.2)
     A reaction: This seems to contradict some of the more aggressive remarks in the Koran, such as Idea 6827. As I read it, the three non-compelling ideas that lead to true religion in the Koran are desire for paradise, fear of punishment, and worship of divine design.
Unbelievers try to interpret the ambiguous parts of the Koran, simply to create dissension [Mohammed]
     Full Idea: Some of the verses of the Koran are precise in meaning - they are the foundations of the Book - and others are ambiguous. Disbelievers follow the ambiguous part, to create dissension by seeking to explain it. No one knows its meaning except Allah.
     From: Mohammed (The Koran [c.622], Ch.3)
     A reaction: It is tempting to ask why some of the verses are ambiguous. The implication here is that they are a deliberate test for believers, like the apple in the garden of Eden.
The Koran is certainly composed by Allah; no one could compose a chapter like it [Mohammed]
     Full Idea: This Koran could not have been composed by any but Allah. It is beyond doubt from the Lord of the Creation. If they say: 'It is your own invention', say: 'Compose one chapter like it. Call on your false gods to help you!'
     From: Mohammed (The Koran [c.622], Ch.10)
     A reaction: I find this unpersuasive, firstly because I couldn't imitate the sonnets of Shakespeare either, and secondly because the authority of a text must be asserted outside the text, not within it. Scribble "this is a ten pound note" on a scrap of paper.
Do not split into sects, exulting in separate beliefs [Mohammed]
     Full Idea: Do not split up your religion into sects, each exulting in its own beliefs.
     From: Mohammed (The Koran [c.622], Ch.30)
     A reaction: This seems like good advice to a religion, but it is very difficult to retrace steps and reunite once it has happened. Which sect should make the greatest concessions? Must they both admit to being somewhat wrong?
I created mankind that it might worship Me [Mohammed]
     Full Idea: I created mankind and the jinn in order that they might worship Me.
     From: Mohammed (The Koran [c.622], Ch.51)
     A reaction: This seems to be a view common to all the monotheistic religions, with monasticism as its clearest (and most logical) outcome. Nietzsche is the most obvious opponent of this idea that the abasement of mankind is its highest ideal.
Be patient with unbelievers, and leave them to the judgement of Allah [Mohammed]
     Full Idea: Bear patiently with what the unbelievers say, and leave their company without recrimination; leave to Me those that deny the truth.
     From: Mohammed (The Koran [c.622], Ch.73)
     A reaction: This explicitly says Muslims should not attack infidels simply for their unbelief in Allah.
He that kills a believer by design shall burn in Hell for ever [Mohammed]
     Full Idea: He that kills a believer by design shall burn in Hell for ever.
     From: Mohammed (The Koran [c.622], Ch.4)
     A reaction: This would appear to make modern indiscriminate urban terrorism a damning sin for a Muslim.
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / d. Heaven
The righteous shall dwell on couches in gardens, wedded to dark-eyed houris [Mohammed]
     Full Idea: In fair gardens the righteous shall dwell in bliss, rejoicing in what their Lord will give them. They shall recline on couches ranged in rows. To dark-eyed houris We shall wed them.
     From: Mohammed (The Koran [c.622], Ch.52)
     A reaction: What I find distressing about this is that we have gradually worked out how young men can recline on couches in gardens with dark-eyed houris before death, and the Koran seems to depict it as the highest form of living.
Heaven will be reclining on couches, eating fruit, attended by virgins [Mohammed]
     Full Idea: All who dwell in heaven shall recline on couches lined with thick brocade, and within their reach will hang the fruits of gardens; they shall dwell with bashful virgins whom neither men nor jinnee will have touched before.
     From: Mohammed (The Koran [c.622], Ch.55)
     A reaction: In the seventh century this was more impressive than it seems now. I still find it sad (though understandable) that paradise must always be depicted in terms of physical pleasure. Aristotle wouldn't have yearned for such an immortality.
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / e. Hell
Unbelievers will have their skin repeatedly burned off in hell [Mohammed]
     Full Idea: Those that deny Our revelations We will burn in Hell-fire. No sooner will their skins be consumed that We shall give them other skins, so that they may truly taste Our scourge. Allah is mighty and wise.
     From: Mohammed (The Koran [c.622], Ch.4)
     A reaction: Of all the accounts of hell in the Koran, this strikes me as the most alarming. I cannot think of a worse infliction, because here every nerve which can experience pain will suffer it (though the drinking of boiling water, Idea 6816, will make it worse).
The unbelievers shall drink boiling water [Mohammed]
     Full Idea: As for the unbelievers, they shall drink boiling water.
     From: Mohammed (The Koran [c.622], Ch.10)
     A reaction: This seems to be presented not only as a threat to unbelievers, but also as a satisfaction to believers.