53 ideas
| 19917 | Without reason and human help, human life is misery [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: Without mutual help and the cultivation of reason, human beings necessarily live in great misery. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 16.05) | |
| A reaction: A clarion call from a great voice of the Enlightenment. I agree, but in 2017 the rest of western civilization seems to have given up on this ideal. I blame Adorno and Horkheimer. |
| 6472 | Continuity is a sufficient criterion for the identity of a rock, but not for part of a smooth fluid [Russell] |
| Full Idea: Continuity is not a sufficient criterion of material identity; it is sufficient in many cases, such as rocks and tables, where the appearances change slowly, but in others, such as the parts of an approximately homogeneous fluid, it fails us utterly. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §XI) | |
| A reaction: It might be debatable to what extent the 'parts' of a homogeneous fluid have identity. How many 'parts' are there in a glass of water? This seems, now, a problem for internalists; externalists can define the identity by the unseen molecules. |
| 6473 | Physical things are series of appearances whose matter obeys physical laws [Russell] |
| Full Idea: We may lay down the following definition: Physical things are those series of appearances whose matter obeys the laws of physics. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §XI) | |
| A reaction: We will then have to define the laws of physic without making any reference to 'physical things'. There is an obvious suspicion of circularity somewhere here. I find it very odd to define objects just in terms of their appearances. |
| 6465 | We need not deny substance, but there seems no reason to assert it [Russell] |
| Full Idea: It is not necessary to deny a substance or substratum underlying appearances; it is merely expedient (by the application of Occam's Razor) to abstain from asserting this unnecessary entity. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §V) | |
| A reaction: Russell then goes on to struggle heroically in attempts to give accounts of 'matter' and 'objects' entirely in terms of 'sense-data'. If he failed, as many think he did, should we go back to belief in Aristotelian substance? |
| 6471 | The assumption by physicists of permanent substance is not metaphysically legitimate [Russell] |
| Full Idea: The assumption of permanent substance, which technically underlies the procedure of physics, cannot of course be regarded as metaphysically legitimate. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §XI) | |
| A reaction: It is a moot point whether physicists still thought this way after the full arrival of quantum theory in 1926. Russell raises all sorts of nice questions about the relationship between physics and philosophy here. I'm on Russell's side. |
| 6466 | Where possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities [Russell] |
| Full Idea: The supreme maxim in scientific philosophising is this: Wherever possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §VI) | |
| A reaction: This seems to represent Russell's first move (in 1914) into what looks like phenomenalism. One might ask what is the difference between 'logical constructions' and 'inferred entities'. The latter appear to have unity, so I prefer them. |
| 6467 | No sensibile is ever a datum to two people at once [Russell] |
| Full Idea: No sensibile is ever a datum to two people at once. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §VII) | |
| A reaction: So a loud bang has to broken down into an almost infinite number of sound sensibilia - each one presumably the size of the apperture of a small ear. This is beginning to sound a bit silly. |
| 6483 | Russell held that we are aware of states of our own brain [Russell, by Robinson,H] |
| Full Idea: Russell held that we are aware of states of our own brain. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914]) by Howard Robinson - Perception 1.1 | |
| A reaction: I can't say that I had ever intepreted Russell in this way, but it is a wonderfully thought-provoking idea. All the time that I thought I was looking at a table, I was just looking at my own brain, and drawing an unspoken inference that a table caused it. |
| 8244 | Sense-data are qualities devoid of subjectivity, which are the basis of science [Russell, by Deleuze/Guattari] |
| Full Idea: Rather than oppose sensory knowledge and scientific knowledge, we should identify the sensibilia that are peculiar to science. This is what Russell did when he evoked sense-data, qualities devoid of all subjectivity. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914]) by G Deleuze / F Guattari - What is Philosophy? 2.5 | |
| A reaction: An interesting observation. Russell is striking for his lack of interest in theories of arts and ethics, and his whole work focuses on understanding the scientific view. What is involved in sensibilia is a key modern issue (e.g. McDowell). |
| 6462 | Sense-data are not mental, but are part of the subject-matter of physics [Russell] |
| Full Idea: I regard sense-data as not mental, and as being, in fact, part of the actual subject-matter of physics. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §III) | |
| A reaction: Russell had clearly given himself an ontological problem with the introduction of sense-data, and this is his drastic solution. In 1912 his account seems ambiguous between sense-data being mental and being physical. |
| 6463 | Sense-data are objects, and do not contain the subject as part, the way beliefs do [Russell] |
| Full Idea: Logically a sense-datum is an object, a particular of which the subject is aware; it does not contain the subject as a part, as for example beliefs and volitions do. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §IV) | |
| A reaction: This very firmly rejects any notion that a sense-datum is mental. It is a left as a strange sort of object which gets as close as it is possible to get to the 'borders' of the mind, without actually becoming part of it. |
| 6464 | Sense-data are usually objects within the body, but are not part of the subject [Russell] |
| Full Idea: The sense-datum is an external object of which in sensation the subject is aware; it is true that the sense-datum is in many cases in the subject's body, but the subject's body is as distinct from the subject as tables and chairs are. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §IV) | |
| A reaction: This is probably Russell's clearest statement of the nature of sense-data, which are objects within the subjects body, but are not part of the mind. So once again we come up against the question of their ontology. Are they made of neurons? |
| 6459 | We do not know whether sense-data exist as objects when they are not data [Russell] |
| Full Idea: We do not know, except by means of more or less precarious inferences, whether the objects which are at one time sense-data continue to exist at times when they are not data. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §II) | |
| A reaction: Note that he actually refers to sense-data as 'objects'. It shows how thoroughly reified they are in his theory if they have the possibility of independent existence. This invites the question 'what are they made of?' |
| 6460 | 'Sensibilia' are identical to sense-data, without actually being data for any mind [Russell] |
| Full Idea: I shall give the name 'sensibilia' to those objects which have the same metaphysical and physical status as sense-data without necessarily being data to any mind. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §III) | |
| A reaction: This is his response to the problem of whether sense-data can exist independently of experience, which was unclear in 1912. Presumably sensibilia are objects which are possible sources of experience, but that seems to cover most objects. |
| 6461 | Ungiven sense-data can no more exist than unmarried husbands [Russell] |
| Full Idea: We cannot ask, 'Can sense-data exist without being given?' for that is like asking, 'Can husbands exist without being married?' | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §III) | |
| A reaction: This follows hard on Idea 6460, which introduces the idea of 'sensibilia' for things which are like sense-data, but are not 'given'. This is a new distinction in 1914, which he had not made in 1912. |
| 6458 | Individuating sense-data is difficult, because they divide when closely attended to [Russell] |
| Full Idea: There is some difficulty in deciding what is to be considered one sense-datum: often attention causes divisions to appear where, so far as can be discovered, there were no divisions before. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §II) | |
| A reaction: This was, I suspect, why Russell had dropped the idea of sense-data by 1921. He does, however, say that they are the last unit in analysis, rather than being the most basic unit of perception. In other words, they are purely theoretical. |
| 6469 | Sense-data may be subjective, if closing our eyes can change them [Russell] |
| Full Idea: One reason often alleged for the subjectivity of sense-data is that the appearance of a thing itself may change when we find it hard to suppose that the thing itself has changed - as when we shut our eyes, or screw them up to make things look double. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §VIII) | |
| A reaction: Russell firmly denies that they are subjective. These examples are also said to support to proposed existence of sense-data in the first place, since they show the gap between appearance and reality. |
| 19922 | People are only free if they are guided entirely by reason [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: The only genuinely free person is one who lives with his entire mind guided solely by reason. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 16.10) | |
| A reaction: It strikes me as blatantly impossible to be entirely guided by reason. His point is that it is a subservience to reason which is entirely chosen. Why is that different from choosing to be entirely subservient to another person? |
| 19935 | Peoples are created by individuals, not by nature, and only distinguished by language and law [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: Nature certainly does not create peoples, individuals do, and individuals are only separated into nations by differences of language, law and morality. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 17.26) | |
| A reaction: Quite wrong, I think. How did languages evolve if there were not already distinct peoples? Do ants and bees only form into colonies by individual choice? All social contract theories seem to make Spinoza's assumption. |
| 19914 | In nature everything has an absolute right to do anything it is capable of doing [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: Since the universal power of nature is only the power of all individual things together, it follows that each individual thing has the sovereign right to do everything it can do, or the right of each thing extends as far as its determined power extends. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 16.01) | |
| A reaction: A typically ruthless Spinoza idea, very different from the rather ill-founded claims of Locke and Rousseau about the state of nature. |
| 19915 | Natural rights are determined by desire and power, not by reason [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: Each person's natural right is determined not by sound reason but by desire and power. For it is not the case that all men are naturally determined to behave according to the rules and laws of reason | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 16.03) | |
| A reaction: Locke would have been horrified by this. It looks like hopeless unfounded optimism to claim a natural right to anything. Doomed prey can struggle all it likes, but its right to do so seems irrelevant. Yet we see self-evident injustice all the time. |
| 7487 | Society exists to extend human awareness [Spinoza, by Watson] |
| Full Idea: For Spinoza the purpose of society was the extension of human awareness. | |
| From: report of Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670]) by Peter Watson - Ideas Ch.24 | |
| A reaction: I like that. Personally I think human understanding is the best aim our lives can have, but I am inclined to see this in rather individualistic terms (despairing of getting others interested in the project!). |
| 19943 | The state aims to allow personal development, so its main purpose is freedom [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: It is the purpose of the state ...to allow people's minds and bodies to develop in their own way in security and enjoy the free use of reason ...Therefore the true purpose of the state is in fact freedom. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 20.06) | |
| A reaction: The core of Spinoza's political thinking. This strikes me as being as close to communitarianism as to liberalism. |
| 19930 | Sovereignty must include the power to make people submit to it [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: Either there is no sovereignty nor any right over subjects, or else sovereignty must necessarily extend to everything that might be effective in inducing men to submit to it. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 17.02) | |
| A reaction: In the seventeenth century this usually includes the death penalty. Refusal to submit may be fairly passive and harmless, so the issue must concern duties, rather than rights. Taxes, jury duty, calls to arms. |
| 19936 | Kings tend to fight wars for glory, rather than for peace and liberty [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: As soon as the kings took control [of the Hebrews] the reason for going to war was no longer peace and liberty but rather glory, | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 18.05) | |
| A reaction: As Spinoza was writing, Louis XIV had just invaded Holland, solely in quest of military glory. As soon as a leader like Napoleon discovers they are good at war, I assume that the thrill of glory takes over for them too. |
| 19937 | Monarchs are always proud, and can't back down [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: Monarchical minds are always proud, and cannot back down without feelings of humiliation. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 18.05) | |
| A reaction: This would seem to be a problem in all politicians. As I teacher I found that backing down was sometimes quite a smart move, but you can only do it occasionally. |
| 19940 | Deposing a monarch is dangerous, because the people are used to royal authority [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: It is dangerous to depose a monarch, even if it is clear by every criterion that he is a tyrant. A people accustomed to royal authority and held in check only by it, will despise any lesser authority and hold it in contempt. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 18.07) | |
| A reaction: He is obviously thinking of Charles I and Cromwell. I suspect that the respect for Cromwell in the 1650s was only as a great soldier. If the people miss royal authority, the correct response is probably 'get over it!' |
| 19931 | Every state is more frightened of its own citizens than of external enemies [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: People have never succeeded in devising a form of government that was not in greater danger from its own citizens than from foreign foes, and which was not more fearful of the former than of the latter. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 17.04) | |
| A reaction: The sort of lovely clear-headed and accurate observation for which we love Spinoza. Only very powerful despots can afford to ignore the threat from the people. Stalin was paranoid, but eventually murdered almost everyone who seemed a threat. |
| 19920 | Democracy is a legitimate gathering of people who do whatever they can do [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: Democracy is properly defined as a united gathering of people which collectively has the sovereign right to do all that it has the power to do. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 16.08) | |
| A reaction: Representative democracy doesn't fit this definition. What 'unites' the people, and where do they get their sovereign right? If my neighbouring village votes to invade mine, I spurn their pathetic 'sovereign right'. |
| 19933 | If religion is law, then piety is justice, impiety is crime, and non-believers must leave [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: [In the first Hebrew state] religious dogmas were not doctrines but rather laws and decrees, piety being regarded as justice and impiety as crime. Anyone who defected from this religion ceased to be a citizen. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 17.08) | |
| A reaction: Presumably speeding offences count as impiety, and failing to pray is a crime. A critical question will be how far religious doubts must extend before one actually has to leave. Mere doctrinal differences, or full atheism? |
| 19938 | Allowing religious ministers any control of the state is bad for both parties [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: How pernicious it is both for religion and the state to allow ministers of things sacred to acquire the right to make decrees or handle the business of government. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 18.06 (1)) | |
| A reaction: Interesting that he holds it to be bad for the religion as well as the state. In Britain we have bishops in the House of Lords. |
| 19923 | Slavery is not just obedience, but acting only in the interests of the master [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: It is not acting on command in itself that makes someone a slave, but rather the reason for so acting. ...A slave is someone obliged to obey commands from a master which look only to the advantage of the master. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 16.10) | |
| A reaction: So if I forcibly enslaved you, and then only commanded things which were for your own good, that would not be slavery? If the master feeds the slave, is that not part of the slavery? Most jobs might count as slavery by this account? |
| 19939 | Government is oppressive if opinions can be crimes, because people can't give them up [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: Government is bound to become extremely oppressive where dissident opinions which are within the domain of each individual, a right which no one can give up, are treated as a crime. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 18.06 (2)) | |
| A reaction: One might compare illicit desires, such as those of a paedophile, where it is a crime to act on them, but presumably they cannot be given up, so there is no point in legislating against the mere desires. |
| 19944 | Without liberty of thought there is no trust in the state, and corruption follows [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: If liberty of thought is suppressed ...this would undemine the trust which is the first essential of a state; detestable flattery and deceit would flourish, giving rise to intrigues and every sort of honest behaviour. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 20.11) | |
| A reaction: Spinoza specifically defends philosophy, as the epitome of freedom of thought. |
| 19942 | Treason may be committed as much by words as by deeds [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: We cannot altogether deny that treason may be committed as much by words as by deeds. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 20.05) | |
| A reaction: For example, betraying a major state secret. This is an important idea, for anyone who simplistically demands utter freedom of speech. There is also subversive speech, which is very hard to assess. Incitements can be crimes in Britain. |
| 19924 | The freest state is a rational one, where people can submit themselves to reason [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: The freest state is that whose laws are founded on sound reason; for there each man can be free whenever he wishes, that is, he can live under the guidance of reason with his whole mind. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 16.10) | |
| A reaction: I wonder if is not so much that the state is rational as that it is right. Freedom is submission to the truth. Rationality is only good because it arrives at truth. But is there a 'truth' about how a state should be run? Enlightenment optimism. |
| 7827 | Spinoza wanted democracy based on individual rights, and is thus the first modern political philosopher [Stewart,M on Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: Spinoza's advocacy of democracy on the basis of individual rights was extraordinarily bold for its time, and it qualifies him as the first truly modern political philosopher. | |
| From: comment on Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670]) by Matthew Stewart - The Courtier and the Heretic Ch. 6 | |
| A reaction: Sounds right. Hobbes may have been the 'first modern man', but his politics was fairly medieval. John Lilburne and co. may have campaigned for rights and democracy, but they weren't really philosophers. |
| 19926 | The sovereignty has absolute power over citizens [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: No offence can be committed against subjects by sovereigns, since they are of right permitted to do all things., and therefore offences occur only between private persons obliged by law not to harm one another. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 16.14) | |
| A reaction: This slightly alarming remark is the consequence of Spinoza's denial of natural rights. Nowadays we have international law to appeal to. Locke thinks revolution could be justified, but this implies the Spinoza does not? |
| 19918 | Forming a society meant following reason, and giving up dangerous appetites and mutual harm [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: People had to make a firm decision to decide everything by the sole dictates of reason (which no one dares contradict openly). They had to curb their appetites if it would hurt someone else, and not do to others what they did not want done to themselves. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 16.05) | |
| A reaction: The last bit invokes the Golden Rule. Being in society does indeed meaning curbing appetites, such as envy and lust. |
| 19919 | People only give up their rights, and keep promises, if they hope for some greater good [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: No one will give up his right to all things, and absolutely no one will keep his promises, except from fear of a greater ill or hope of a greater good. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 16.06) | |
| A reaction: I think Locke and Rousseau would agree with this. It is hard to imagine doing anything other than in hope of a greater good. But what to do when your hopes are disappointed? |
| 19921 | Once you have given up your rights, there is no going back [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: If people had wanted to keep any right for themselves, they should have made this provision at the same time as they could have safely defended it. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 16.08) | |
| A reaction: Spinoza is wonderful for grasping nettles. The other fans of social contracts seem blithely cheerful about how it is going to work out. But forming a society is like marriage - a risky commitment which could go horribly wrong. |
| 19925 | In democracy we don't abandon our rights, but transfer them to the majority of us [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: In a democracy no one transfers their natural right to another in such a way that they are not thereafter consulted, but rather to the majority of the whole society of which they are part. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 16.11) | |
| A reaction: At this time democracy means Athenian direct democracy. In representative democracy you are only consulted once every few years, and in between the government can ignore the people (as Rousseau pointed out). |
| 19928 | No one, in giving up their power and right, ceases to be a human being [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: No one will ever be able to transfer his power and (consequently) his right to another person in such a way that he ceases to be a human being. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 17.01) | |
| A reaction: Spinoza disdains natural rights, but this is a modest (and pretty uncontroversial) concession. |
| 19929 | Everyone who gives up their rights must fear the recipients of them [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: People have never given up their right and transferred their power to another in such a way that they did not fear the very persons who received their right and power, and put the government at greater risk from its own citizens than from its enemies. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 17.01) | |
| A reaction: I take this idea to be Rousseau's key motivation for the idea of the general will, because you are there supposed to be alienating your natural rights to yourself (sort of). In a democracy you alienate them partly to yourself. |
| 19932 | The early Hebrews, following Moses, gave up their rights to God alone [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: The Hebrews being in this natural state, they resolved, on the advice of Moses in whom they all had the greatest trust, to transfer their right to no mortal man but rather to God alone. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 17.07) | |
| A reaction: [He cites Exodus 24:7] He calls this the first Hebrew state, which seems to have depended heavily on Moses. Priests and prophets become crucial in this situation, and they may be in conflict about God's commands. |
| 19916 | The order of nature does not prohibit anything, and allows whatever appetite produces [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: The order of nature, under which all human beings are born and for the most part live, prohibits nothing but what no one desires or no one can do; it does not prohibit strife or hatred or anger or anything at all that appetite foments. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 16.04) | |
| A reaction: This is as vigorous a rejection of natural law as I have met with. It is hard to see on what grounds anyone could disagree, other than hopeful sentiment. |
| 19927 | State and religious law can clash, so the state must make decisions about religion [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: No one would be obliged by law if he considered it against his faith, and everyone could claim licence to do anything. Since the law of the state would then be wholly violated, it follows that the right of deciding about religion belongs to the sovereign. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 16.21) | |
| A reaction: This is an era when British puritans emigrate to America, because the state is not sufficiently tolerant. The needs of sovereignty and of religion can be very far apart. You can see those with great religious devotion not liking this idea. |
| 13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
| Full Idea: In a single day there lies open to men of learning more than there ever does to the unenlightened in the longest of lifetimes. | |
| From: Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]), quoted by Seneca the Younger - Letters from a Stoic 078 | |
| A reaction: These remarks endorsing the infinite superiority of the educated to the uneducated seem to have been popular in late antiquity. It tends to be the religions which discourage great learning, especially in their emphasis on a single book. |
| 6470 | Matter is the limit of appearances as distance from the object diminishes [Russell] |
| Full Idea: We offer the following tentative definition: The matter of a given thing is the limit of its appearances as their distance from the thing diminishes. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §IX) | |
| A reaction: This strikes me as empiricism gone mad. Russell is famous for being a 'realist', but you would hardly know it at this point. Personally I put emphasis on 'best explanation', which fairly simply delivers most of our commonsense understandings of reality. |
| 6468 | There is 'private space', and there is also the 'space of perspectives' [Russell] |
| Full Idea: In addition to the private spaces, ..there is the 'space of perspectives', since each private world may be regarded as the appearance which the universe presents from a certain point of view. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §VII) | |
| A reaction: This replaces his concept of 'public space', which he introduced in 1912. Russell gradually dropped this, but I like the idea that we somehow directly perceive space in two ways simultaneously (which led him to say that space is six-dimensional). |
| 20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |
| Full Idea: Posidonius defined time thus: it is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed and slowness. | |
| From: report of Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.08.42 | |
| A reaction: Hm. Can we define motion or speed without alluding to time? Looks like we have to define them as a conjoined pair, which means we cannot fully understand either of them. |
| 19934 | Hebrews were very hostile to other states, who had not given up their rights to God [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: Having transferred their right to God, the Hebrews believed their kingdom was the kingdom of God, that they alone were the children of God, and that other nations were enemies of God, whom for that reason they regarded with extreme hostility. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 17.23) | |
| A reaction: [He cites Psalm 139:21-2] So, according to Spinoza, they did not become the chosen people because they thought God had chosen then, but because they were the only state trying to align itself with God. |
| 4300 | The Bible has nothing in common with reasoning and philosophy [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: The Bible leaves reason absolutely free and has nothing in common with philosophy. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670]) | |
| A reaction: Hm. The Bible may not contain reasoning, but it contains the fruits of reasoning, and it is obviously possible for reasoning to contradict its message. |