21546
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We can't sharply distinguish variables, domains and values, if symbols frighten us [Russell]
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Full Idea:
Whoever is afraid of symbols can hardly hope to acquire exact ideas where it is necessary to distinguish 1) the variable in itself as opposed to its value, 2) any value of the variable, 3) all values, 4) some value.
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From:
Bertrand Russell (Review: Meinong 'Untersuchungen zur..' [1905], p.84)
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A reaction:
Not the best example, perhaps, of the need for precision, but a nice illustration of the new attitude Russell brought into philosophy.
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21545
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I prefer to deny round squares, and deal with the difficulties by the theory of denoting [Russell]
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Full Idea:
I should prefer to say that there is no such object as 'the round square'. The difficulties of excluding such objects can, I think, be avoided by the theory of denoting.
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From:
Bertrand Russell (Review: Meinong 'Untersuchungen zur..' [1905], p.81)
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A reaction:
The 'theory of denoting' is his brand new theory of definite descriptions, which makes implicit claims of existence explicit, so that they can be judged. Why can't we just say that a round square can be an intentional object, but not a real object?
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21547
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On Meinong's principles 'the existent round square' has to exist [Russell]
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Full Idea:
To my contention that, on his principles, 'the existent round square' exists, Meinong replies that it is existent but does not exist. I must confess that I see no difference between existing and being existent, and I have no more to say on this head.
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From:
Bertrand Russell (Review: Meinong 'Uber die Stellung...' [1907], p.93)
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A reaction:
Russell is obviously invoking the famously dubious ontological argument for God's existence. Normally impossible objects are rejected because of contradictions, but there might also be category mistakes. 'The slow square'.
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