11 ideas
9358 | There are several logics, none of which will ever derive falsehoods from truth [Lewis,CI] |
Full Idea: The fact is that there are several logics, markedly different, each self-consistent in its own terms and such that whoever, using it, avoids false premises, will never reach a false conclusion. | |
From: C.I. Lewis (A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori [1923], p.366) | |
A reaction: As the man who invented modal logic in five different versions, he speaks with some authority. Logicians now debate which version is the best, so how could that be decided? You could avoid false conclusions by never reasoning at all. |
9357 | Excluded middle is just our preference for a simplified dichotomy in experience [Lewis,CI] |
Full Idea: The law of excluded middle formulates our decision that whatever is not designated by a certain term shall be designated by its negative. It declares our purpose to make a complete dichotomy of experience, ..which is only our penchant for simplicity. | |
From: C.I. Lewis (A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori [1923], p.365) | |
A reaction: I find this view quite appealing. 'Look, it's either F or it isn't!' is a dogmatic attitude which irritates a lot of people, and appears to be dispensible. Intuitionists in mathematics dispense with the principle, and vagueness threatens it. |
9364 | Names represent a uniformity in experience, or they name nothing [Lewis,CI] |
Full Idea: A name must represent some uniformity in experience or it names nothing. | |
From: C.I. Lewis (A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori [1923], p.368) | |
A reaction: I like this because, in the quintessentially linguistic debate about the exact logical role of names, it reminds us that names arise because of the way reality is; they are not sui generis private games for logicians. |
21559 | We need rules for deciding which norms are predicative (unless none of them are) [Russell] |
Full Idea: We need rules for deciding what norms are predicative and what are not, unless we adopt the view (which has much to recommend it) that no norms are predicative. ...[146] A predative propositional function is one which determines a class. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Difficulties of Transfinite Numbers and Types [1905], p.141) | |
A reaction: He is referring to his 'no class' theory, which he favoured at that time. |
21558 | 'Predicative' norms are those which define a class [Russell] |
Full Idea: Norms (containing one variable) which do not define classes I propose to call 'non-predicative'; those which do define classes I shall call 'predicative'. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Difficulties of Transfinite Numbers and Types [1905], p.141) |
9362 | Necessary truths are those we will maintain no matter what [Lewis,CI] |
Full Idea: Those laws and those laws only have necessary truth which we are prepared to maintain, no matter what. | |
From: C.I. Lewis (A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori [1923], p.367) | |
A reaction: This bold and simple claim has famously been torpedoed by a well-known counterexample - that virtually every human being will cling on to the proposition "dogs have at some time existed" no matter what, but it clearly isn't a necessary truth. |
9365 | We can maintain a priori principles come what may, but we can also change them [Lewis,CI] |
Full Idea: The a priori contains principles which can be maintained in the face of all experience, representing the initiative of the mind. But they are subject to alteration on pragmatic grounds, if expanding experience shows their intellectual infelicity. | |
From: C.I. Lewis (A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori [1923], p.373) | |
A reaction: [compressed] This simply IS Quine's famous 'web of belief' picture, showing how firmly Quine is in the pragmatist tradition. Lewis treats a priori principles as a pragmatic toolkit, which can be refined to be more effective. Not implausible... |
9361 | We have to separate the mathematical from physical phenomena by abstraction [Lewis,CI] |
Full Idea: Physical processes present us with phenomena in which the purely mathematical has to be separated out by abstraction. | |
From: C.I. Lewis (A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori [1923], p.367) | |
A reaction: This is the father of modal logic endorsing traditional abstractionism, it seems. He is also, though, endorsing the view that a priori knowledge is created by us, with pragmatic ends in view. |
13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
Full Idea: In a single day there lies open to men of learning more than there ever does to the unenlightened in the longest of lifetimes. | |
From: Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]), quoted by Seneca the Younger - Letters from a Stoic 078 | |
A reaction: These remarks endorsing the infinite superiority of the educated to the uneducated seem to have been popular in late antiquity. It tends to be the religions which discourage great learning, especially in their emphasis on a single book. |
9363 | Science seeks classification which will discover laws, essences, and predictions [Lewis,CI] |
Full Idea: The scientific search is for such classification as will make it possible to correlate appearance and behaviour, to discover law, to penetrate to the "essential nature" of things in order that behaviour may become predictable. | |
From: C.I. Lewis (A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori [1923], p.368) | |
A reaction: Modern scientific essentialists no longer invoke scare quotes, and I think we should talk of the search for the 'mechanisms' which explain behaviour, but Lewis seems to have been sixty years ahead of his time. |
20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |
Full Idea: Posidonius defined time thus: it is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed and slowness. | |
From: report of Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.08.42 | |
A reaction: Hm. Can we define motion or speed without alluding to time? Looks like we have to define them as a conjoined pair, which means we cannot fully understand either of them. |