11 ideas
17266 | Using modal logic, philosophers tried to handle all metaphysics in modal terms [Correia/Schnieder] |
Full Idea: In the heyday of modal logic, philosophers typically tried to account for any metaphysical notions in modal terms. | |
From: Correia,F/Schnieder,B (Grounding: an opinionated introduction [2012], 2.4) | |
A reaction: Lewisian realism about possible worlds actually gets rid of purely 'modal' terms, but I suppose they include possible worlds in their remark. Annoying for modal logicians to be told they had a 'heyday' - a nice example of the rhetoric of philosophy. |
17263 | Why do rationalists accept Sufficient Reason, when it denies the existence of fundamental facts? [Correia/Schnieder] |
Full Idea: What is most puzzling about the rationalist tradition is the steadfast certainty with which the Principle of Sufficient Reason was often accepted, since it in effect denies that there are fundamental facts. | |
From: Correia,F/Schnieder,B (Grounding: an opinionated introduction [2012], 2.2) | |
A reaction: A very simple and interesting observation. The principle implies either a circle of reasons, or an infinite regress of reasons. Nothing can be labelled as 'primitive' or 'foundational' or 'given'. The principle is irrational! |
7557 | To solve Zeno's paradox, reject the axiom that the whole has more terms than the parts [Russell] |
Full Idea: Presumably Zeno appealed to the axiom that the whole has more terms than the parts; so if Achilles were to overtake the tortoise, he would have been in more places than the tortoise, which he can't be; but the conclusion is absurd, so reject the axiom. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Mathematics and the Metaphysicians [1901], p.89) | |
A reaction: The point is that the axiom is normally acceptable (a statue contains more particles than the arm of the statue), but it breaks down when discussing infinity (Idea 7556). Modern theories of infinity are needed to solve Zeno's Paradoxes. |
10059 | In mathematic we are ignorant of both subject-matter and truth [Russell] |
Full Idea: Mathematics may be defined as the subject in which we never know what we are talking about, nor whether what we are saying is true. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Mathematics and the Metaphysicians [1901], p.76) | |
A reaction: A famous remark, though Musgrave is rather disparaging about Russell's underlying reasoning here. |
7556 | A collection is infinite if you can remove some terms without diminishing its number [Russell] |
Full Idea: A collection of terms is infinite if it contains as parts other collections which have as many terms as it has; that is, you can take away some terms of the collection without diminishing its number; there are as many even numbers as numbers all together. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Mathematics and the Metaphysicians [1901], p.86) | |
A reaction: He cites Dedekind and Cantor as source for these ideas. If it won't obey the rule that subtraction makes it smaller, then it clearly isn't a number, and really it should be banned from all mathematics. |
17270 | Is existential dependence by grounding, or do grounding claims arise from existential dependence? [Correia/Schnieder] |
Full Idea: We may take existential dependence to be a relation induced by certain cases of grounding, but one may also think that facts about existential dependence are prior to corresponding ground claims, and in fact ground those claims. | |
From: Correia,F/Schnieder,B (Grounding: an opinionated introduction [2012], 4.3) | |
A reaction: I would vote for grounding, since dependence seems more abstract, and seems to demand explanation, whereas grounding seems more like a feature of reality, and to resist further intrinsic explanation (on the whole). |
17268 | Grounding is metaphysical and explanation epistemic, so keep them apart [Correia/Schnieder] |
Full Idea: To us it seems advisable to separate the objective notion of grounding, which belongs to the field of metaphysics, from the epistemically loaded notion of explanation. | |
From: Correia,F/Schnieder,B (Grounding: an opinionated introduction [2012], 4.2) | |
A reaction: Paul Audi is the defender of the opposite view. I'm with Audi. The 'epistemically loaded' pragmatic aspect is just contextual - that we have different interests in different aspects of the grounding on different occasions. |
17267 | The identity of two facts may depend on how 'fine-grained' we think facts are [Correia/Schnieder] |
Full Idea: There is a disagreement on the issue of factual identity, concerning the 'granularity' of facts, the question of how fine-grained they are. | |
From: Correia,F/Schnieder,B (Grounding: an opinionated introduction [2012], 3.3) | |
A reaction: If they are very fine-grained, then no two descriptions of a supposed fact will capture the same details. If we go broadbrush, facts become fuzzy and less helpful. 'Fact' was never going to be a clear term. |
7554 | Self-evidence is often a mere will-o'-the-wisp [Russell] |
Full Idea: Self-evidence is often a mere will-o'-the-wisp, which is sure to lead us astray if we take it as our guide. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Mathematics and the Metaphysicians [1901], p.78) | |
A reaction: The sort of nice crisp remark you would expect from a good empiricist philosopher. Compare Idea 4948. However Russell qualifies it with the word 'often', and all philosophers eventually realise that you have to start somewhere. |
13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
Full Idea: In a single day there lies open to men of learning more than there ever does to the unenlightened in the longest of lifetimes. | |
From: Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]), quoted by Seneca the Younger - Letters from a Stoic 078 | |
A reaction: These remarks endorsing the infinite superiority of the educated to the uneducated seem to have been popular in late antiquity. It tends to be the religions which discourage great learning, especially in their emphasis on a single book. |
20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |
Full Idea: Posidonius defined time thus: it is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed and slowness. | |
From: report of Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.08.42 | |
A reaction: Hm. Can we define motion or speed without alluding to time? Looks like we have to define them as a conjoined pair, which means we cannot fully understand either of them. |