31 ideas
18781 | Inconsistency doesn't prevent us reasoning about some system [Mares] |
Full Idea: We are able to reason about inconsistent beliefs, stories, and theories in useful and important ways | |
From: Edwin D. Mares (Negation [2014], 1) |
16477 | Asserting not-p is saying p is false [Russell] |
Full Idea: When you do what a logician would call 'asserting not-p', you are saying 'p is false'. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth [1940], 5) | |
A reaction: This is presumably classical logic. If we could label p as 'undetermined' (a third truth value), then 'not-p' might equally mean 'undetermined'. |
16484 | There are four experiences that lead us to talk of 'some' things [Russell] |
Full Idea: Propositions about 'some' arise, in practice, in four ways: as generalisations of disjunctions; when an instance suggests compatibility of terms we thought incompatible; as steps to a generalisation; and in cases of imperfect memory. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth [1940], 5) | |
A reaction: Modern logicians seem to have no interest in the question Russell is investigating here, but I love his attempt, however vague the result, to connect logic to real experience and thought. |
18790 | Intuitionism as natural deduction has no rule for negation [Mares] |
Full Idea: In intuitionist logic each connective has one introduction and one elimination rule attached to it, but in the classical system we have to add an extra rule for negation. | |
From: Edwin D. Mares (Negation [2014], 5.5) | |
A reaction: How very intriguing. Mares says there are other ways to achieve classical logic, but they all seem rather cumbersome. |
18789 | Intuitionist logic looks best as natural deduction [Mares] |
Full Idea: Intuitionist logic appears most attractive in the form of a natural deduction system. | |
From: Edwin D. Mares (Negation [2014], 5.5) |
18787 | Three-valued logic is useful for a theory of presupposition [Mares] |
Full Idea: One reason for wanting a three-valued logic is to act as a basis of a theory of presupposition. | |
From: Edwin D. Mares (Negation [2014], 3.1) | |
A reaction: [He cites Strawson 1950] The point is that you can get a result when the presupposition does not apply, as in talk of the 'present King of France'. |
16486 | The physical world doesn't need logic, but the mental world does [Russell] |
Full Idea: The non-mental world can be completely described without the use of any logical word, …but when it comes to the mental world, there are facts which cannot be mentioned without the use of logical words. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth [1940], 5) | |
A reaction: He adds that logical words are not needed for physics, but are needed for psychology. I love Russell's interest in the psychology of logic (in defiance of the anti-psychologism of Frege). See also the ideas of Robert Hanna. |
18793 | Material implication (and classical logic) considers nothing but truth values for implications [Mares] |
Full Idea: The problem with material implication, and classical logic more generally, is that it considers only the truth value of formulas in deciding whether to make an implication stand between them. It ignores everything else. | |
From: Edwin D. Mares (Negation [2014], 7.1) | |
A reaction: The obvious problem case is conditionals, and relevance is an obvious extra principle that comes to mind. |
18784 | In classical logic the connectives can be related elegantly, as in De Morgan's laws [Mares] |
Full Idea: Among the virtues of classical logic is the fact that the connectives are related to one another in elegant ways that often involved negation. For example, De Morgan's Laws, which involve negation, disjunction and conjunction. | |
From: Edwin D. Mares (Negation [2014], 2.2) | |
A reaction: Mares says these enable us to take disjunction or conjunction as primitive, and then define one in terms of the other, using negation as the tool. |
18786 | Excluded middle standardly implies bivalence; attacks use non-contradiction, De M 3, or double negation [Mares] |
Full Idea: On its standard reading, excluded middle tells us that bivalence holds. To reject excluded middle, we must reject either non-contradiction, or ¬(A∧B) ↔ (¬A∨¬B) [De Morgan 3], or the principle of double negation. All have been tried. | |
From: Edwin D. Mares (Negation [2014], 2.2) |
18780 | Standard disjunction and negation force us to accept the principle of bivalence [Mares] |
Full Idea: If we treat disjunction in the standard way and take the negation of a statement A to mean that A is false, accepting excluded middle forces us also to accept the principle of bivalence, which is the dictum that every statement is either true or false. | |
From: Edwin D. Mares (Negation [2014], 1) | |
A reaction: Mates's point is to show that passively taking the normal account of negation for granted has important implications. |
2947 | Questions wouldn't lead anywhere without the law of excluded middle [Russell] |
Full Idea: Without the law of excluded middle, we could not ask the questions that give rise to discoveries. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth [1940], c.p.88) |
18782 | The connectives are studied either through model theory or through proof theory [Mares] |
Full Idea: In studying the logical connectives, philosophers of logic typically adopt the perspective of either model theory (givng truth conditions of various parts of the language), or of proof theory (where use in a proof system gives the connective's meaning). | |
From: Edwin D. Mares (Negation [2014], 1) | |
A reaction: [compressed] The commonest proof theory is natural deduction, giving rules for introduction and elimination. Mates suggests moving between the two views is illuminating. |
16479 | 'Or' expresses hesitation, in a dog at a crossroads, or birds risking grabbing crumbs [Russell] |
Full Idea: Psychologically, 'or' corresponds to a state of hesitation. A dog waits at a fork in the road, to see which way you are going. For crumbs on a windowsill, birds behave in a manner we would express by 'shall I be brave, or go hungry?'. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth [1940], 5) | |
A reaction: I love two facts here - first, that Russell wants to link the connective to the psychology of experience, and second, that a great logician wants to connect his logic to the minds of animals. |
16481 | 'Or' expresses a mental state, not something about the world [Russell] |
Full Idea: When we assert 'p or q' we are in a state which is derivative from two previous states, and we express this state, not something about the world. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth [1940], 5) | |
A reaction: His example: at a junction this road or that road goes to Oxford, but the world only contains the roads, not some state of 'this or that road'. He doesn't deny that in one sense 'p or q' tells you something about the world. |
16487 | Maybe the 'or' used to describe mental states is not the 'or' of logic [Russell] |
Full Idea: It might be contended that, in describing what happens when a man believes 'p or q', the 'or' that we must use is not the same as the 'or' of logic. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth [1940], 5) | |
A reaction: This seems to be the general verdict on Russell's enquiries in this chapter, but I love any attempt, however lacking in rigour etc., to connect formal logic to how we think, and thence to the world. |
16480 | A disjunction expresses indecision [Russell] |
Full Idea: A disjunction is the verbal expression of indecision, or, if a question, of the desire to reach a decision. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth [1940], 5) | |
A reaction: Russell is fishing here for Grice's conversational implicature. If you want to assert a simple proposition, you don't introduce it into an irrelevant disjunction, because that would have a particular expressive purpose. |
16483 | Disjunction may also arise in practice if there is imperfect memory. [Russell] |
Full Idea: Another situation in which a disjunction may arise is practice is imperfect memory. 'Either Brown or Jones told me that'. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth [1940], 5) |
18783 | Many-valued logics lack a natural deduction system [Mares] |
Full Idea: Many-valued logics do not have reasonable natural deduction systems. | |
From: Edwin D. Mares (Negation [2014], 1) |
18792 | Situation semantics for logics: not possible worlds, but information in situations [Mares] |
Full Idea: Situation semantics for logics consider not what is true in worlds, but what information is contained in situations. | |
From: Edwin D. Mares (Negation [2014], 6.2) | |
A reaction: Since many theoretical physicists seem to think that 'information' might be the most basic concept of a natural ontology, this proposal is obviously rather appealing. Barwise and Perry are the authors of the theory. |
18785 | Consistency is semantic, but non-contradiction is syntactic [Mares] |
Full Idea: The difference between the principle of consistency and the principle of non-contradiction is that the former must be stated in a semantic metalanguage, whereas the latter is a thesis of logical systems. | |
From: Edwin D. Mares (Negation [2014], 2.2) |
16475 | A 'heterological' predicate can't be predicated of itself; so is 'heterological' heterological? Yes=no! [Russell] |
Full Idea: A predicate is 'heterological' when it cannot be predicated of itself; thus 'long' is heterological because it is not a long word, but 'short' is homological. So is 'heterological' heterological? Either answer leads to a contradiction. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth [1940], 5) | |
A reaction: [Grelling's Paradox] Yes: 'heterological' is heterological because it isn't heterological; No: it isn't, because it is. Russell says we therefore need a hierarchy of languages (types), and the word 'word' is outside the system. |
18788 | For intuitionists there are not numbers and sets, but processes of counting and collecting [Mares] |
Full Idea: For the intuitionist, talk of mathematical objects is rather misleading. For them, there really isn't anything that we should call the natural numbers, but instead there is counting. What intuitionists study are processes, such as counting and collecting. | |
From: Edwin D. Mares (Negation [2014], 5.1) | |
A reaction: That is the first time I have seen mathematical intuitionism described in a way that made it seem attractive. One might compare it to a metaphysics based on processes. Apparently intuitionists struggle with infinite sets and real numbers. |
16482 | All our knowledge (if verbal) is general, because all sentences contain general words [Russell] |
Full Idea: All our knowledge about the world, in so far as it is expressed in words, is more or less general, because every sentence contains at least one word that is not a proper name, and all such words are general. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth [1940], 5) | |
A reaction: I really like this, especially because it addresses the excessive reliance of some essentialists on sortals, categories and natural kinds, instead of focusing on the actual physical essences of individual objects. |
4758 | Naïve realism leads to physics, but physics then shows that naïve realism is false [Russell] |
Full Idea: Naïve realism leads to physics, and physics, if true, shows that naïve realism is false. Therefore naïve realism, if true, is false, therefore it is false. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth [1940], p.13) | |
A reaction: I'm inclined to agree with this, though once you have gone off and explored representation and sense data you may be driven back to naïve realism again. |
16476 | For simple words, a single experience can show that they are true [Russell] |
Full Idea: So long as a man avoids words which are condensed inductions (such as 'dog'), and confines himself to words that can describe a single experience, it is possible for a single experience to show that his words are true. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth [1940], 5) | |
A reaction: One might question whether a line can be drawn between the inductive and the non-inductive in this way. I'm inclined just to say that the simpler the proposition the less room there is for error in confirming it. |
16485 | Perception can't prove universal generalisations, so abandon them, or abandon empiricism? [Russell] |
Full Idea: Propositions about 'some' may be proved empirically, but propositions about 'all' are difficult to know, and can't be proved unless such propositions are in the premisses. These aren't in perception, so forgo general propositions, or abandon empiricism? | |
From: Bertrand Russell (An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth [1940], 5) | |
A reaction: This is obviously related to the difficulty empiricists have with induction. You could hardly persuade logicians to give up the universal quantifier, because it is needed in mathematics. Do we actually know any universal empirical truths? |
18791 | In 'situation semantics' our main concepts are abstracted from situations [Mares] |
Full Idea: In 'situation semantics' individuals, properties, facts, and events are treated as abstractions from situations. | |
From: Edwin D. Mares (Negation [2014], 6.1) | |
A reaction: [Barwise and Perry 1983 are cited] Since I take the process of abstraction to be basic to thought, I am delighted to learn that someone has developed a formal theory based on it. I am immediately sympathetic to situation semantics. |
16478 | A mother cat is paralysed if equidistant between two needy kittens [Russell] |
Full Idea: I once, to test the story of Buridan's Ass, put a cat exactly half-way between her two kittens, both too young to move: for a time she found the disjunction paralysing. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth [1940], 5) | |
A reaction: Buridan's Ass is said to have starved between two equal piles of hay. Reason can't be the tie-breaker; reason obviously says 'choose one!', but intellectualism demands a reason for the one you choose. |
13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
Full Idea: In a single day there lies open to men of learning more than there ever does to the unenlightened in the longest of lifetimes. | |
From: Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]), quoted by Seneca the Younger - Letters from a Stoic 078 | |
A reaction: These remarks endorsing the infinite superiority of the educated to the uneducated seem to have been popular in late antiquity. It tends to be the religions which discourage great learning, especially in their emphasis on a single book. |
20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |
Full Idea: Posidonius defined time thus: it is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed and slowness. | |
From: report of Posidonius (fragments/reports [c.95 BCE]) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.08.42 | |
A reaction: Hm. Can we define motion or speed without alluding to time? Looks like we have to define them as a conjoined pair, which means we cannot fully understand either of them. |